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Welcome to the fourth issue of Conversations, which explores Cavell’s philosophic 
interest in literature, an oft-repeated and rehashed thematic prism  and vantage point 
from which to address Cavell’s work. However, it  is our feeling that,  at times anyhow, 
Cavell’s interest in Wittgenstein and film dwarfs slightly  his literary  interests. We are 
constantly  reminded, of course,  of Cavell’s last line in The Claim of Reason, expres-
sed as “can philosophy  become literature and still know itself?”  This issue seeks to 
reverse the gradient of thinking somewhat  to ask something like: “Can literature be-
come philosophy, or philosophical, and still know itself?”  Whatever pressure philo-
sophy  faces to respect, say, formal parameters of argumentation, does anyone yet 
conceive of literature facing similar professional pressure from the opposite directi-
on? What sort of formal parameters ought literary  study  to respect, if any? Is this a 
plea for philosophy? Does Cavell count here? 
We open with Bernhard Stricker, who, briefly  discussing Proust’s In Search of 
Lost Time, asks if the flood of memories released by  the protagonist’s famous eating 
of the tea-laden madeleine is indicative of experience missed or experience lost.  If 
missed, it  was certainly  missed in the moment. But if subject to recall, say, through 
literature,  or literary  rendering,  when did the narrator  of Proust’s novel ever have his 
experience? Is such experience always-already lost? 
Whether or how we can ever claim  something not quite lost, but,  perhaps, not 
quite intended, is addressed by  Eric Lindstrom. Focussing on Cavell’s treatment of 
J.L. Austin’s “perlocutionary” utterances (rebranded by  Cavell as “passionate” ones), 
the literary  ante is specifically  raised by  looking at moments of intentions “unreal-
ized”  so to speak in the works of that  other famous Austen, including Emma. Linds-
trom, himself a  Jane Austen scholar, has us ponder just what Austen intended in arti-
culating her  protagonist’s convalescence. Is there a redeeming quality  to Austen’s 
ironical portrayal of human pettiness, or  is it much more a  vicious attack on the sta-
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tus quo—as vicious, say,  as any  Nietzschean Romantic grandstanding, however mu-
ted? 
Perlocution is further explored by  David Kaufmann, though he makes it a 
point to conflate the illocutionary  (conventional) operation of utterances with their 
perlocutionary  force. Rather  than looking at them as separate speech acts, Kaufmann 
reminds us that Austin’s ultimate agenda was to describe the ultimate speech act, 
however much we may  benefit, in the early  going, from  separating illocutionary  con-
ditions from  perlocutionary  effects. Austin may  not have explored perlocutionary  ut-
terances as much  as “literary” people may  have liked; Kaufmann, however, “aims to 
[drag] the literary  back to pragmatics, aesthetics and everyday  ethics”  via a discussion 
of perlocutions.
But the elephant  in the room  may  be whether or  not one can theorize a com-
plete speech  act,  with  full illocutionary  and perlocutionary  affect  brought to bear. In-
deed, the quest for  such totalizing knowledge (the “pure” statement”), the desire to 
comment on language from a position of everywhere and nowhere,  raises the issue of 
whether  or not philosophy’s claim  on literature is monstrous.  Can pragmatic and 
aesthetic concerns be explored simultaneously,  or, in line with some critical “uncer-
tainty”  principle,  does our ability  to comment on one necessarily  negate the other? Is 
the drive to establish pragmatics and aesthetics in its totality  a hubristic enterprise? 
This is a way,  perhaps, of characterizing the desire to want to unify  Anglo-analytical 
and Continental dispositions of professional philosophy. 
Allying himself resolutely  with the Anglo-analytical tradition,  Bruce Krajewski 
notes more than a hint of elitism  in Cavell’s writing—the “esoteric”  and oftentimes 
impenetrable characteristics of which  are borrowed from  other notable esotericists: 
Heidegger  and Nietzsche. Some obviously  balk at  Cavell’s attempt to bring such  noto-
rious Continental influences into the mainstream of American philosophical currents. 
But Cavell has been largely  unsuccessful in  this regard. Krajewski’s essay  reminds us 
perhaps why Cavell remains “strange”  to the institutionalized American philo-
sophy—not, that is, because he is unknowingly  overlooked, but rather, knowingly re-
pressed, say, for philosophy’s own good.
After much  heady  philosophical consideration of language and its sequent 
affects comes a warm  and charming anecdote of “educational”  intimacy, as Darko 
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Štrajn lets his mind wander to formulate a proper acknowledgment and appreciation 
of a fortuitous run-in with Stanley Cavell. 
Lastly, Sam Cardoen formulates a Cavellian acknowledgement and response of 
his own, this time to Cavell’s essay, “Knowing and Acknowledging” and his reading of 
Endgame.  Cardoen cleverly  notes that Hamm’s negation of his own existence is a si-
multaneous expression of solidarity  with all those now deceased—hence life negating 
and life affirming (solidarity) at the same time. This takes us back, perhaps,  to the 
responsibility  of all those who, upon uttering language, are faced with  life or death. It 
remains up to all of us to choose life. Human desires may  be abstruse, but we cannot 
renege on intelligibility, which means that  literature and philosophy, aesthetics and 
pragmatics, must not lose sight of each other.
With all best wishes,
SÉRGIO AND AMIR
CONVERSATIONS                                                                                                                                                                          4 3
Experience Missed or Lost?: Cavell’s Concept 
of the Ordinary and Walter Benjamin on the 
“Loss of Aura”
BERNHARD STRICKER
I sometimes speak of […] discovering the extraordinary in what 
we call  ordinary and discovering  the ordinary  in what we call  ex-
traordinary; sometimes as detecting significance in the insignifi-
cant, sometimes as detecting insignificance in the significant.
CAVELL, “Companionable Thinking”
[…] we penetrate the mystery only to the degree that  we recog-
nize it in  the everyday world, by virtue of a dialectical  optic that 
perceives the everyday  as impenetrable, the impenetrable as 
everyday.
WALTER BENJAMIN, “Surrealism”
The notion of the ordinary  or everyday  is of seminal importance in Cavell’s readings 
of literature.1 The transcendental and anthropological dimensions of skepticism  and 
the ordinary, however, may  sometimes appear to be treated by  him in an essentially 
ahistorical manner.  But the discovery  of the ordinary, which is always a re-discovery, 
can also be shown to be deeply  embedded in  Cavell’s treatment of modernism  in  the 
arts. The present essay  therefore proposes that we can deepen our  understanding of 
the ordinary  by  relating it to Walter  Benjamin’s ideas about the “loss of aura,” which 
he develops with  regard to Baudelaire, Proust  and film, most famously  in his essays 
CONVERSATIONS 4
1. The notion  of the ordinary is particularly  important in Cavell, In Quest of the Ordinary. 
Lines  of Skepticism and Romanticism (Chicago and London: University  of Chicago Press, 1988); see 
also Cavell, “Ending the Waiting  Game: A Reading of  Beckett’s Endgame,”  in  Stanley Cavell, Must We 
Mean What We  Say? A Book of Essays, updated edn. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 
115-162.
about “The Artwork in the Age of Its Mechanical Reproducibility”  and on “Some Mo-
tifs in Baudelaire.”  Cavell’s and Benjamin’s common aesthetic interests can of course 
be regarded as the expression of very  different concerns: Whereas Cavell is then con-
sidered to be primarily  interested in epistemological issues, Benjamin will be seen as 
defending, sometimes radically, a  historical-materialist view  of art. In spite of these 
differences in outlook, however, Cavell and Benjamin attempt to address a  very  simi-
lar question,  namely  how  to conceive of significance as neither having its source in 
transcendence nor  as being reducible to a mere given in the positivistic sense. In this 
sense, both the notion of the ordinary  and the concept of the “loss of aura”  are re-
sponsive to the particular historical conditions of modernity.
There is an ambiguity  in the notion of “aura”  that aligns it with and simultane-
ously  distinguishes it from the ordinary: The interplay  of closeness and distance in 
Benjamin’s definition  of “aura” as “the unique appearance of a distance, however 
near it may  be” 2 approximates Wittgenstein’s characterization of the ordinary  in the 
following terms: “The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden be-
cause of their  simplicity  and familiarity.  (One is unable to notice something—because 
it’s always before one’s eyes.)”3 That a  dialectic of nearness and distance is at work 
not  only  in each  of these two concepts taken by  themselves but also in the relation-
ship between Benjamin and Wittgenstein more generally  is what Cavell draws atten-
tion to when he says: “[…] Benjamin’s anti- or counterphilosophy  may  be seen spe-
cifically  as immeasurably  distant from and close to Wittgenstein’s anti- or  counter-
philosophy  in Philosophical Investigations […].” 4 In “The Artwork in the Age of Its 
Mechanical Reproducibility,”  however, Benjamin  seems to conceive of auratic experi-
ence as definitively  a thing of the past, which is not the case for  the ordinary  in Witt-
genstein’s and Cavell’s sense. Still, it  is a  significant aspect of the ordinary  that  it is 
never  simply  present as such,  but is constantly  missed. It  is precisely  its unobtrusive-
ness, its elusive character  that  constitutes the ordinary  as a place where we have al-
ways already  been without having yet or  ever really  arrived there.5 Thus, a  notion of 
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2. Walter Benjamin, “Little History of Photography,” in Selected Writings, vol. 2, 518.
3. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 43e, § 129.
4. Cavell, “Benjamin and Wittgenstein: Signals and Affinities,” in  Critical Inquiry 25.2 (Winter 
1999), 236.
5. Cavell  calls the ordinary  “a  place we have never been”; Cavell, “Something Out of the Ordi-
nary,”  in Philosophy the  Day after Tomorrow  (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 2005), 9-10.
experience as something that is either  essentially  bound to be missed or  is not possi-
ble at  all any  more in the modern age unites Cavell’s and Benjamin’s accounts of the 
nature and importance of art. The comparison between their attitudes toward the 
status of experience is therefore an approach to the concept of the ordinary  that 
shows it to be crucial to an understanding of the relation between art and the modern 
world.
Cavell’s Transcendental Criticism and the Idea of the Ordinary
The notion  of the “ordinary” as included in the term “ordinary  language philosophy” 
was originally  used to contrast with concepts such as “logic,” “philosophy”  or  “meta-
physics.” Repeatedly, Cavell quotes and comments on Wittgenstein’s description of 
his philosophical procedures in the Philosophical Investigations  that  says: “What we 
do is to bring words back from their  metaphysical to their everyday  use.” 6 Cavell thus 
remained faithful not only  to the tradition of ordinary  language philosophy, but to the 
term  as well, giving the idea of the “ordinary”  or  the “everyday” more weight than 
Austin or even Wittgenstein did. His discovery  of what he calls the “underwriting of 
ordinary  language philosophy” by  the American transcendentalists,7 especially  Emer-
son’s emphasis on “the common, […] the familiar, the low,” 8 was certainly  of great 
importance in this respect. In consequence, further aspects of the idea of the ordinary 
become increasingly  more significant. One of these aspects is its inconspicuousness, 
the unobtrusive closeness that Wittgenstein highlights in saying: “The aspects of 
things that  are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity  and 
familiarity.” 9 In various ways, the things that  easily  go unnoticed for  being so close 
have played an important  role in Cavell’s thought from the beginning. Consider, for 
example,  the idea that the data which  provide the foundation of his interpretation of 
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6. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, 3rd edn. 
(Malden: Blackwell, 2001), 41e, § 116.
7. Cavell, “The Politics of  Interpretation. (Politics  as opposed to what?),” in  Themes  out of 
School. Effects and Causes (San Francisco: North Point Press, 1984), 51.
8. “I ask not for the great, the remote, the romantic; what is doing in  Italy  or Arabia; what is 
Greek art, or Provençal  minstrelsy; I embrace the common, I explore and sit at  the feet of the familiar, 
the low”; Ralph  Waldo Emerson, “The American  Scholar,” in Nature  and Selected Essays, ed. Larzer 
Ziff (London: Penguin, 2003), 102.
9. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 43e, § 129.
King Lear are all obvious, and his attempt to account for the fact that these aspects of 
the play  could have been missed by  all readers but himself.10 Or think of the issue of 
“presentness” that comes up both  in the Lear essay  and in The World Viewed. 11 In 
these passages,  it  sometimes seems as though we let ourselves continuously  be dis-
tracted. Yet, in  other moments,  this condition appears less as a self-inflicted state 
than as an aspect  of the ordinary  itself in  its elusiveness. This ambiguity  is obvious in 
the first  pages of Cavell’s autobiography, Little did I  know, in a  short  passage in 
which he draws, in a rather offhand way, a picture of the human condition: 
[…] whatever happens – whatever is eventful enough for  speech – is from the 
beginning accidental, as if human life is inherently interrupted,  things chroni-
cally  occurring at unripe times, in the wrong tempo, comically  or poignantly. 
[…] What that now means to me is that we chronically interrupt ourselves – 
say, we fail to give the right quality  or  quantity  of time to our  thoughts or 
deeds,  say, let them climax. […] But chronic interruption means the perpetual 
incompleteness of human expression […].12
In these sentences,  human existence appears as a  life-form  that is not naturally  syn-
chronized with its experience. We can understand Cavell’s autobiography, of course, 
as an attempt to give voice to a part  of his own life that has remained expressionless 
in  this way. In “Something out of the Ordinary,”  Cavell makes explicit that an essen-
tial constituent of the ordinary  is that it  always slips out of our  grasp: “the ordinary  as 
what is missable.”13  Shortly  after, Cavell establishes a  connection between what he 
calls the “fact or fantasy of an experience missed” and the concept of criticism:
I have rather assumed, more or  less without  argument […], that Kant’s loca-
tion of the aesthetic judgment, as claiming to record the presence of pleasure 
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10. Cavell, “The Avoidance of Love. A  Reading of King Lear,”  in  Must We Mean What We 
Say?, 272; cf. ibid., 310: “It is the difficulty of seeing the obvious, something  which for some reason is 
always underestimated.”
11. Ibid., 322; Cavell, The  World Viewed. Reflections on the  Ontology of Film, enlarged edn. 
(Cambridg.e, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 108-126.
12. Cavell, Little  Did I Know: Excerpts  from Memory (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2010), 30; emphasis added.
13. Cavell, “Something out of the Ordinary,” 11.
without a  concept,  makes room for  a particular form of criticism, one capable 
of supplying the concepts which, after the fact of pleasure, articulate the 
grounds of this experience in particular objects. The work of such  criticism is 
to reveal its object as having yet to achieve its due effect.  Something there,  de-
spite being fully opened to the senses, has been missed.14
In “Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy,” Cavell has already  drawn on 
Kant’s Critique of Judgment in his attempt to characterize the ambiguous nature 
of the ordinary  language philosopher’s claim  to determine “what we should say 
when,” which  is neither a  merely  empirical nor a purely  transcendental 
judgment.15 Now, while referring to his earlier essay, Cavell tries to articulate the 
presuppositions of his practice of literary  criticism  (and art criticism in general) 
by  transforming and enlarging once more Kant’s understanding of aesthetic 
judgment. Kant does not attribute any  conceptual content to the aesthetic judg-
ment but  distinguishes clearly  between the aesthetic and the cognitive mode of 
judgment.16 In contrast to that, Cavell thinks that criticism  is able to provide the 
concepts for an understanding of an aesthetic experience retrospectively. Conse-
quently,  the task of the critic is not to subsume an object under certain  concepts, 
but to explain how and why  at the time of the experience we lacked the necessary 
conceptual outfit  to fully  grasp what we perceived, i.e., why  we had to miss some-
thing that was still somehow  there. Works of art  allow us to have this experience 
of an experience missed in  an exemplary  way. That an experience can be revealed 
in this belated fashion—in an essentially retrospective way—as richer  than we 
were able to realize while it  was present,  shows us that  there is an  aesthetic sur-
plus in our  experience,  which makes our experiences in hindsight more compre-
hensive than our possibilities of simultaneous perception. This excess of meaning 
can eventually  guarantee the existence of something independent from my  con-
sciousness and my  conceptual patterns of recognition. Thus, aesthetic experience 
paradoxically  becomes a touchstone of the real,  or of the existence of the world. 
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14. Cavell, “Something out of the Ordinary,” 11.
15. Cavell, “Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy,”  in Must We  Mean What We  Say?, 
86-96.
16. Immanuel  Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. J.H. Bernard (New York: Hafner Press, 
1951), 45-46 (§ 6).
Criticism, then,  determines the features of its objects not by  recognition,  but  by 
letting  the object in  question itself teach us the mode of its experience. Cavell 
stresses this responsiveness to the artwork’s own modeling of its conditions of re-
ception as a decisive aspect  of his approach to literature.17 In its responsiveness to 
the work of art, criticism  turns into a criticism  of the object and our experience of 
the object at the same time. Thus, it allows us to leave behind our “constructions” 
or  “schematizations”  of experience, whether of the empiricist (“All experience is 
based on sense data”) or  of the rationalistic type (“All experience is based on a 
priori forms of knowledge”).  In  doing so, art  teaches us about what Cavell,  in a 
paradoxical twist  of Kantian terms, calls “the autonomy  of the object.”18 In attrib-
uting “self-government” to reason alone,  Kant rendered it almost impossible to 
think of ourselves as truly  receptive to something outside of ourselves. The ensu-
ing post-Kantian skepticism  is perceived as a problem  and reacted against in  the 
texts of Wordsworth, Coleridge and the transcendentalists that Cavell dedicates 
himself to in In Quest of the Ordinary. 19 A criticism that tries to show in each case 
that its object does not presuppose the conditions of its being experienced but 
creates  them, deserves to be called “transcendental criticism.”  What is at stake in 
this kind of criticism is made explicit by Cavell when he speaks of the
[…] connection between the arrogation of the right to speak for  others about the 
language we share and about works of art we cannot bear not to share. […] It  is 
a condition of,  or  threat to, that relation to things called aesthetic, that some-
thing I know and cannot make intelligible stands to be lost to me.20
When I am not able to share the experience of an  artwork, I eventually  cannot  even 
be sure of what I experienced myself and I am therefore liable to have to give up on 
what I took to be a significant part of reality. That our experience of art is threatened 
if we are unable to share it with someone may  at first glance seem to invite the com-
parison with the skeptic’s picture of privacy  as an essential incapacity  to communi-
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17. David Rudrum, Stanley Cavell and the Claim of Literature  (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2013), 7.
18. Cavell, “Ending the Waiting Game,” 116.
19. Cavell, “Emerson, Coleridge, Kant. (Terms as Conditions),” in In Quest of the Ordinary, 29ff.
20. Cavell, “Something Out of the Ordinary,” 9.
cate or share our experience. But  the experience of art,  far  from being necessarily  pri-
vate, rather calls for the creation of a community  in which the experience could be 
shared and it must be understood as itself an attempt at extending the boundaries of 
our common, shared world.
From Involuntary Memory to the Loss of Aura
The theme of a missed experience and its recovery  is probably  nowhere more promi-
nent than in Proust’s novel In Search of Lost Time that Cavell repeatedly  refers to in 
his autobiography.21  In the novel’s most  famous passage the protagonist  tastes a 
madeleine, a small cake dipped in lime blossom  tea, that suddenly  makes him  re-
experience parts of his childhood that had formerly  been out  of reach of his conscious 
memory.22 In early  childhood, as he now remembers, he used to eat such  a  piece of 
cake when he went to visit his aunt Leonie. After  the first forty  pages of the novel that 
contain the narrator’s dim  conscious childhood memories, the aesthetic experience of 
the cake opens up a completely  new  dimension of memory  and triggers a rush of 
childhood images that  fills the bulk of the novel’s first volume. It  is important to no-
tice that this special dimension of memory, called involuntary  memory, does not re-
vive experiences the way  we consciously  lived through them in the past, it rather 
opens up a completely  new dimension of our experience that we missed at the time 
when the events remembered originally  took place. Walter Benjamin emphasizes this 
aspect of involuntary memory in saying: 
[…] only  what has not been experienced explicitly  and consciously, what  has 
not  happened to the subject as an isolated experience [Erlebnis], can become a 
component of mémoire involontaire.23
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21. Cavell, Little Did I  Know, 28, 31, 386, 533. For a  more elaborate account of  the connection 
between Proust and Cavell see Bernhard Stricker, “‘L’intérêt de la lecture’—lesen und gelesen werden. 
(Proust, Thoreau, de Man, Cavell),”  in Proust-Lektüren, ed. Peter Brandes (Hamburg: Dr. Kovač, 
2014), 17-66.
22. Marcel  Proust, À la recherche  du temps perdu, 4 vols., ed. Jean-Yves Tadié et al. (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1987-1989), vol. 1, 43-47.
23. Benjamin, “On  Some Motifs in  Baudelaire,” in  Selected Writings, 4 vols. (Cambridge, MA: 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1996-2003), vol. 4, 1938-1940, trans. Edmund Jeph-
cott and Others, ed. Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings, 317.
We can regard In Search of Lost Time as a study  of the ordinary: The narrator  un-
folds before us in minute detail the train of everyday  events and their recurrences 
over the span of nearly  a lifetime. One of the novel’s first  reviewers complained about 
the discrepancy  between the trivial nature of the recorded action and the amount of 
time spent in telling it.24 But the importance of the ordinary  is also registered in  the 
novel’s abundant use of what  Gérard Genette has called the “iterative mode” of story-
telling,  i.e., the mode that is used to narrate events that occur  repeatedly  or  on a regu-
lar basis,  in sentences such as “Every  sunday, we went to church.” 25 For Walter  Ben-
jamin, the self-estrangement that lies at the foundation of our involuntary  memory  is 
due to the de-subjectifying aspects of modern everyday  life. As a result, it is a ques-
tion of chance whether  we will be able to take possession of our experience and 
achieve self-knowledge: 
According to Proust, it is a matter of chance whether an individual forms an 
image of himself,  whether  he can take hold of his experience. But there is 
nothing inevitable about the dependence on chance in this matter. A person’s 
concerns are not  by  nature of an inescapably private character. They  attain 
this character  only  after the likelihood decreases that one’s external concerns 
will be assimilated to one’s experience. 26
That our experience becomes incommunicable since it  can  no longer be assimilated 
and integrated into the fabric of our lives or rendered in a story-telling mode is par-
ticularly  emphasized in Benjamin’s essay  “The Storyteller.”27 But his remark has to be 
understood in the context  of his ideas on the loss of the “auratic” structure of experi-
ence which he elaborates in a  number writings from the 1930s. According to his con-
cept of “aura,” in a modern society  determined by  capitalist  industrialism, urbanism 
and mass media there is no room for the individual to have any  authentic, significant 
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24. See the “rapport de lecture” by Jacques Madeleine (pseudonym  of the poet Jacques Nor-
mand) in Marcel  Proust, Du côté  de  chez Swann. À la recherche  du temps perdu I, ed. Antoine Com-
pagnon (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), 446-450.
25. Gérard Genette, Discours du récit. Essai de  méthode  (Paris: Éditions du  Seuil, 2007), 
111-127.
26. Benjamin, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” 315; emphasis added.
27. Benjamin, “The Storyteller. Observations on the Works of  Nikolai Leskov,” in  Selected 
Writings, vol. 3, 1935-1938, trans. Edmund Jephcott, Howard Eiland, et al., ed. Howard Eiland and 
Michael W. Jennings, 143-166.
experience. Three aspects of modern society  prove to be particularly  resistant to the 
assimilation of experience: (1) the isolation of informative content in the newspapers, 
the only  virtue of which consists in its novelty; (2) the dull and repetitive character  of 
work in the factories that consists in a constant repetition of the same routines; and 
(3) the acceleration of urban traffic and the resulting changes in the structure of per-
ception, such as a perpetually  heightened consciousness that is necessary  in order to 
react to the impulses from  the streets.28 As a result,  it  is impossible for individuals to 
incorporate their experiences and they  are at the mercy  of a  discontinuous chain of 
“inescapably private” sensations.
Cavell and Benjamin on Baudelaire and Film
There is an easily  recognizable parallel between the incommunicability  that Benjamin 
finds so disturbing about the “sensational” character  of modern life and Cavell’s worry 
over the individual’s isolation that  is a result of skepticism. This parallel appears all the 
more striking in face of the fact that Cavell is primarily  concerned with epistemological 
issues whereas Benjamin’s is essentially  a historical-materialist perspective.29 Conse-
quently, Cavell sees skepticism as a recurring condition that defines the modern era 
since Descartes, while Benjamin regards the loss of authentic experience mainly  as a 
result  of socio-economic developments that  occur  during the 19th century.30 These dis-
tinguishing features render the affinities between the two thinkers in their  respective 
CONVERSATIONS                                                                                                                                                                        4 12
28. All  these factors play  an  important part in  Benjamin’s “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire”  as 
well  as in  the famous “The Work of Art in  the Age of Its Technological  Reproducibility: Second Ver-
sion”  in Selected Writings, vol. 3, 101-133. There are three, slightly  differing versions of Benjamin’s 
famous article of which we generally  quote the second version, which the author himself intended to 
have published. On  the loss  of  aura  see also: Eli  Friedlander, Walter Benjamin. A Philosophical Por-
trait (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University  Press, 2012), 147-152. I follow Friedlander  in  applying the 
term “aura” not only to the experience of artworks, but to the structure of significant experience in 
general (262, n. 5); cf. Miriam Bratu Hansen, “Benjamin’s Aura,” Critical Inquiry 34 (Winter 2008), 4.
29. The importance of this difference in  outlook must not be underrated but will  not be our 
primary concern in this paper.
30. Giorgio Agamben, in enlarging Benjamin’s  argument in Infancy and History, has shown 
the problem of the loss of aura to be related to modern  science from its very beginning  in the 16th  cen-
tury: Giorgio Agamben, Infancy and History. The  Destruction of Experience, trans. Liz Heron (Lon-
don and New York: Verso, 1993), 11-63. Eva Geulen  has very convincingly argued that Benjamin’s 
identification of aura is a performative gesture which  depends on the prior loss of the auratic structure 
of experience: “[…] the aura, ephemeral  and altogether  immaterial, is less a  concept than a performa-
tive intervention. The theory of aura developed in sections 2 through 4 undoubtedly unfolds under the
treatment  of Baudelaire, film and modern art even more important.  Both Cavell and 
Benjamin think that the cinema can still take the audience’s interest for  granted at a 
moment in history  when all the other  arts are marked by  a gap between pleasure and 
what  Benjamin calls the “attitude of expert appraisal.” 31 Benjamin explains this by  re-
ferring to changes in the structure of perception: the speed of a sequence of moving pic-
tures corresponds to the structure of perception of a citizen who is used to react to the 
shocks and impulses from urban traffic.  The sensational effect of these impressions is 
due only  to their novelty  and is lost at the exact moment they  reach the level of con-
sciousness. Therefore, they leave no traces in memory.
Film is the art form corresponding to the pronounced threat to life in which 
people live today.  It corresponds to profound changes in the apparatus of ap-
perception—changes that are experienced on the scale of private existence by 
each passerby  in big-city  traffic,  and on the scale of world history  by  each 
fighter against the present social order.32
The same habits that make us turn to movies render the reading of poetry  a much 
harder task than it used to be in former ages, since poetry  usually  relies on the reader’s 
ability  to concentrate. Baudelaire, however, as Benjamin  tells us,  was the first poet to 
take into account the difficulties that a modern reader of poetry has to face:
Baudelaire envisaged readers to whom the reading of lyric poetry  would pre-
sent difficulties. […] Willpower and the ability  to concentrate are not their 
strong points. What they  prefer is sensual pleasure; they  are familiar  with  the 
“spleen” which kills interest and receptiveness.33
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rubric of the last sentence of  section I. Nothing is more revealing  for the analysis of  modern  technolo-
gies of reproduction, Benjamin  writes, ‘than  the way  in which the two manifestations – reproduction of 
the artwork and cinematic art – retroactively  effect art in its received form’ […]. More exactly: aura can 
only be described retrospectively, for the knowledge that the essence of  art has up until  now been con-
stituted in  the aura can  only  appear  once it has lost this  character. Thus aura  as  aura  arises only in  its 
loss”; Eva  Geulen, The End of Art. Readings in a Rumor after Hegel, transl. James McFarland (Stan-
ford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 84.
31. Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility: Second Ver-
sion,” 116.
32. Ibid., 132, n. 33.
33. Benjamin, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” 313.
Cavell sees a very  similar connection between Baudelaire’s depiction of modern ur-
ban life and the invention of film. In The World Viewed he draws on Baudelaire’s fa-
mous text The Painter of Modern Life for his explanations on the origin of cinema. 
Astonishingly,  he claims that  Baudelaire anticipated the cinema in what  Cavell calls a 
“prophetic hallucination.”34  The occasion for this unlikely  assertion is another in-
stance of a  missed experience: How  is it possible, Cavell wonders, that Baudelaire 
took only  a very  casual interest in what we would regard as the most important paint-
ers of his day, Courbet and Manet? Yet, at  the same time, he dedicated his manifesto 
of modernism, The Painter of Modern Life, to the comparably  insignificant painter 
Constantin Guys? According to Cavell, Baudelaire saw  in  Guys’s drawings something 
more (than what they  are), i.e., a  hint  at the possible fulfillment of his anticipatory 
wish for motion pictures:
Out of his despair of happiness, out of his disgust  with its official made-up 
substitutes, and out of his knowledge of his isolation and estrangement from 
the present and the foreignness of the past  […], he found the wish for photog-
raphy, in particular  for motion pictures—the wish for that specific simultaneity 
of presence and absence which only the cinema will satisfy.35
Cavell’s and Benjamin’s diagnoses could not possibly  be more fully  in accord. Accord-
ing to them, Baudelaire perceived the sensations that life in the urban surroundings 
of his time provided as faked, as having lost the character of truly  significant experi-
ence. In his poetry, he tried, therefore,  to expose the illusory  character  of life in a 
world of things that are devoid of any  intrinsic history  or value since they  have taken 
on the commodity  form. Benjamin shows that allegory  is the crucial rhetorical device 
that Baudelaire employs to this purpose.36 Cavell is more interested, however, in  the 
connection between Baudelaire’s perception of his urban environment and the possi-
bilities of the medium of film:
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34. For  the following see: Cavell, The  World Viewed, 41-46; for  Baudelaire’s text see Charles 
Baudelaire, Œuvres complètes, 2 vols., ed. Claude Pichois (Paris: Gallimard, 1975-1976), vol. 2, 683-
724.
35. Ibid., 42. That Baudelaire did not appreciate the new technology of photography is taken 
into account by Cavell; ibid., 42: “Photographs did not look like photographs  to him; they  looked like 
imitation paintings […].”
36. Ibid., 43-44.
Read as an anticipation of film, Baudelaire’s little book seems to me, in dozens 
of its terms,  insights and turns of phrase,  to take on the power it must have 
had for  him. […] When Baudelaire speaks of “the pleasure that the artistic eye 
obtains … from  the series of geometrical figures that the object  in question … 
successively  and rapidly  creates in space,”  he is not describing anything a 
draftsman showed him; he is having a prophetic hallucination.37
Cavell finds a connection  between Baudelaire’s appreciation  of Guys’s drawings and 
film  in the former’s description of the way  in which movement is captured by  the 
draughtsman’s pencil. Whereas drawings can record movement only  in an approxi-
mate fashion, motion  pictures made it a natural constituent of their own medium. 
Thus, they  are much better suited to the task of capturing  the ephemeral, fleeting ap-
pearances of everyday  life in the city.  Capturing these fugitive moments constitutes 
an essential part  of the modern manifestation of beauty  for  Baudelaire. What fasci-
nates him in fashion and cosmetics is as much their changing appearance as it is the 
artificiality  of the human life-form  itself,  i.e., that the human mode of existence must 
manifest itself, not necessarily  in  this or  that particular type of fashion, but in some 
contingent way of dressing, moving, behaving, etc.
In praising Cosmetics,  he refers not merely  to make-up, but also to fashion 
generally  and beyond that to the artifices necessary  to civilized life as a  whole: 
its streets, parks, buildings, furnishings, commodities—the secretions and 
scaffoldings of our forms of life.38
These ordinary  circumstances of human life that are unobtrusive but typical in their 
particular appearance for  a certain  historical time and age are what Baudelaire is in-
terested in when he praises Guys. In the guise of the draughtsman, Baudelaire pays 
his homage to the ordinary. 
In comparing  the cinema to Freud’s Psychopathology of Everyday Life, Ben-
jamin equally observes film’s particular capacity for the visualization of the ordinary:
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37. For the passage Cavell quotes see Baudelaire, Œuvres, vol. 2, 724.
38. Cavell, The World Viewed, 44.
Since the publication of Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens  (On the Psy-
chopathology  of Everyday  Life),  things have changed.  This book isolated and 
made analyzable things which had previously  floated unnoticed on the broad 
stream of perception. A similar  deepening of apperception throughout the en-
tire spectrum of optical—and now  also auditory—impressions has been ac-
complished by  film. […] Our bars and city  streets, our offices and furnished 
rooms, our railroad stations and our factories seemed to close relentlessly 
around us. Then came film and exploded this prison-world with the dynamite 
of the split second, so that now we can set  off calmly  on journeys of adventure 
among its far-flung debris.39
Thus, Cavell and Benjamin essentially  agree on the way  in which film  allows the ordi-
nary  to become visible. If Cavell regards Baudelaire as anticipating the cinema, Ben-
jamin sees a quite similar prefiguration of cinema in the aesthetic shock principle of 
the Dadaists.40  Benjamin, however, emphasizes the fact that the discontinuous 
stream of images makes film the natural prolongation of the modern citizen’s habits 
of perception, whereas Cavell is more interested in  the relation of the movies to the 
world they  project and to their cinematic audience. He attributes a “magic character” 
to the peculiar mode in  which  the cinema reproduces the world. This magical charac-
ter is due to the automatism of film,  the way  in  which the appearance of the world is 
wholly  accounted for by  the technical mechanism  of the cinematic projection, be-
cause it renders the viewers’ acknowledgment of the world’s appearance superfluous. 
The viewers can indulge in their  invisibility  in a  way  that makes their anonymous and 
private condition appear completely natural.
How do movies reproduce the world magically? Not by  literally  presenting us 
with  the world, but by  permitting us to view it unseen. This is not a wish for 
power over creation  (as Pygmalion’s was),  but  a  wish not to need power,  not to 
have to bear its burdens. […] In viewing films, the sense of invisibility  is an ex-
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39. Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Its  Technological Reproducibility: Third Ver-
sion,” in Selected Writings, vol. 4, 265. Eli  Friedlander highlights the connection of  the ordinary and 
film in Benjamin, Walter Benjamin, 171-180. 
40. Benjamin, “The Work of  Art in the Age of Its  Technological  Reproducibility: Second Ver-
sion,” 118-119.
pression of modern  privacy  or anonymity. It is as though the world’s projec-
tion explains our forms of unknownness and of our inability  to know. The ex-
planation is not  so much that the world is passing us by, as that  we are dis-
placed from our  natural habitation within it, placed as at a distance from it. 
The screen overcomes our fixed distance; it makes displacement appear as our 
natural condition.41
In making anonymity  and privacy  a condition for the viewing of films, the auditorium 
in  a cinema provides a habitat  of modern citizens and relieves them temporarily  of 
the burden of responsibility  for their  own isolation. In this respect, Cavell stresses the 
way  in which viewing a film  differs from  our lives outside the cinema, whereas Ben-
jamin sees a continuity  between our everyday  modes of perception and the discon-
tinuous stream of images that we watch on screen.
Media and Modernism
But isn’t  Cavell’s idea of Baudelaire having anticipated the cinema completely  in-
congruous,  if we consider  the fact that the technical preconditions for the possible 
realization of film were not even given at the time of Baudelaire’s writing? Cavell’s 
assertion that Baudelaire’s wish was able to anticipate the possibilities of film may 
seem to idealize and overly  simplify  the complex history  of technological progress. 
His intention, however, is to counterbalance the opposite oversimplification that 
identifies the origin of the cinema with the availability  of the technical prerequisites 
for  its realization. Cavell emphasizes that we must understand the cinema as corre-
sponding to and satisfying a human wish or desire.42 Thus, the invention of film is 
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41. Cavell, The World Viewed, 40-41.
42. Ibid., 38ff. For  this fundamental  idea and many more besides Cavell  is  indebted to André 
Bazin  to whom  he refers numerous times in  The  World Viewed: “The way things happened seems to 
call for a  reversal  of  the historical  order of causality, which  goes from  the economic infrastructure to 
the ideological  superstructure, and for us to consider the basic technical discoveries as fortunate acci-
dents but essentially second in  importance to the preconceived ideas of  the inventors. The cinema is  an 
idealistic phenomenon. The concept men had of  it  existed so to speak fully  armed in  their  minds, as if 
in  some platonic heaven, and what strikes us most of all  is the obstinate resistance of matter to ideas 
rather than of any help offered by  techniques to the imagination of the researchers”; André Bazin, “The 
Myth  of Total  Cinema,”  in  André Bazin, What is  cinema?, select. and trans. Hugh  Gray  (Berkeley  and 
London: University of California Press, 1967), 17.
essentially  more than just a matter  of technological progress. Rather, a possibility 
provided by  a technological innovation can be grasped as a possibility  only  by  the 
specific application that  is given to its technical or material basis. This idea is fun-
damental in Cavell’s history  of the cinema (or  of the modern arts in general) and it 
finds expression in his deliberately  ambiguous use of the term “medium” to denote 
both the material basis of an art  and the forms or  genres realized by  the paradig-
matic instances of that  art.43 An artistic medium  is the realization of a particular 
possibility  of its physical elements that can be understood as such a possibility  only 
in  retrospect. Yet, it has to be regarded as having already  been present, slumbering 
so to say, in the material basis. Therefore, an artistic medium  is never simply  de-
ducible from its material components.
In Cavell’s reflections on media,  we can detect more than a slight resemblance 
to his conception of criticism, and this is hardly  surprising, since the idea of art as in-
ternalizing its own criticism  is part of the romantic legacy  inherited by  Cavell.44 In its 
material basis a  medium renders discernible a  possibility  that one can grasp as such 
only  in  hindsight but that has to be understood as having been present already  before 
its discovery. In a similar  manner,  criticism  discovers a  significant  aspect of an expe-
rience that  remained hidden in the presence of the event but has to be regarded as 
already  there when it is discerned in retrospect.  We can thus understand Cavell’s 
transcendental criticism as the complement to an art  the development of which con-
sists essentially  in the invention of new media or “automatisms.”45  This is the case 
with  modern art  that  cannot  simply  rely  on its tradition as something given, but has 
to reestablish  the connection with its past and its present in order  to compel us to ac-
knowledge its continued existence. 46
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43. Cavell, The World Viewed, 105.
44. This is meant by the famous notion of  “Transzendentalpoesie”  (transcendental  poetry) 
coined by the German romantic critic Friedrich  Schlegel and referred to by Cavell  on several  occasions, 
for  example in  Cavell, “Macbeth  Appalled,”  in  Disowning Knowledge in Seven Plays  of Shakespeare, 
updated edn., (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University  Press, 2003), 232 and Cavell, “The Investiga-
tions’ Everyday  Aesthetics of  Itself,”  in  The  Literary Wittgenstein, ed. John Gibson  and Wolfgang 
Huemer (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 30ff.
45. Cavell, The World Viewed, 104.
46. That artworks are no longer  perceived as naturally  embedded in a  tradition  is one of  the 
crucial  aspects  of the loss of aura: “The uniqueness of the work of art is identical  to its  embeddedness 
in  the context of  tradition.”  Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Its  Technological Reproducibil-
ity: Third Version,” 256. On  the importance of  tradition  for the notion  of aura cf. Friedlander, Walter 
Benjamin, 148; Geulen, The End of Art, 88.
Modernism signifies not that the powers of the arts are exhausted, but on  the 
contrary  that it has become the immediate task of the artist to achieve in his 
art the muse of the art  itself—to declare, from itself, the art as a whole for 
which it  speaks,  to become a present of that art. One might say  that the task is 
no longer  to produce another instance of an art but a new medium  within it. 
[…] It follows that in such a predicament, media are not given a priori.47
Whereas the cinema is naturally  related to its tradition without having to establish 
this connection in  an  effort to keep the art of film itself alive,48 modernism compels 
the other  arts to a logic that is sometimes characterized as a  perpetual strive for 
originality  so as to surpass all  earlier attempts.49 However, originality  is not  to be 
confounded with  novelty: In order  to achieve true originality, the creation of a new 
medium  has to be an expression of faithfulness to an artistic tradition that  can be 
continued in no other way  than by  a  break with the predefined conventions. Cavell 
calls this
[…] the modernist  predicament in which an art has lost its natural relation to its 
history, in  which an artist, exactly  because he is devoted to making an object that 
will bear the same weight of experience that such objects have always borne 
which constitute the history  of his art, is compelled to find unheard-of structures 
that define themselves and their history  against  one another. […] When in such 
a state an art explores its medium, it is exploring  the conditions of its existence; 
it is asking exactly whether, and under what conditions, it can survive.50
In creating a new medium within  an art, the artist acknowledges his indebtedness to 
the tradition that influenced him. In challenging the preexistent  conventions of his 
art, the artist is thus not trying to forgo conventionality  as such, but acknowledging 
and reaffirming its true depth.
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47. Cavell, The World Viewed, 103.
48. With  regard their  respective historical  situation, it  makes much  more sense to speak of  a 
cinematic “tradition” in Cavell’s case, of course, than in Benjamin’s.
49. See, for  instance Peter  Gay  on the “lure of  heresy”  in Modernism. The Lure of Heresy. 
From Baudelaire to Beckett and Beyond (London: Vintage, 2009), 3ff.
50. Cavell, The World Viewed, 72.
In the light  of this “modern predicament”  of the arts, film’s ability  to capture 
the ordinary  can be seen as a different way  of expressing its natural relation to tradi-
tion. If the movies can present the ordinary  on screen, they  can do so because of the 
audience’s particular presence-in-absence.  If the ordinary  can normally  only  be expe-
rienced as absent in our presence, then film allows the ordinary  to appear  because the 
automatism causes us to be absent  from  whatever  is happening in the projected 
world.  For the other  arts, the necessity  to affirm their  existence by  the production of 
new media  goes along with the retrospective character  of their experience that is typi-
cal of the ordinary  also.  Modernism  according to Cavell’s notion of it  is characterized, 
then, by  an asynchrony  in the experience of the present.  Modernism defines itself as 
modern not  because of its being in the present, but because of a particular  relation to 
time in which presence, i.e., being related to one’s time and to the past, has become a 
task, something to be achieved, instead of a natural part of our condition. 51
Experience, Language and the Arts
A further  inflection that Cavell gives to the idea  of the modern as characterized by  the 
task of acknowledging our relatedness to the present, i.e., our  existence, is expressed 
in  his saying: “Art now exists in the condition of philosophy.” 52 The condition of phi-
losophy  is epitomized by  Descartes for  whom  the world and myself are no longer 
simply  there, to be taken for granted. Cavell reads Descartes not as trying to prove his 
own existence once and for  all, but as affirming that existence has to be accepted by 
thinking it  through, by  going back over it again, acknowledging it.53  Benjamin also 
characterizes the reaction of the arts to the modern loss of aura by  a  reference to Des-
cartes and modern science, when he says:
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51. Michel  Foucault finds this attitude characteristically  expressed in  Baudelaire’s Le  peintre 
de  la vie moderne  in  “What is Enlightenment?,”  trans. C. Porter, in The Foucault Reader, eds. Paul 
Rabinow et al. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 38.
52. Cavell, The World Viewed, 14.
53. Cavell, “Hamlet’s  Burden  of Proof,” in  Disowning Knowledge  in Seven Plays of Shake-
speare, 187: “In  philosophy I take it  to have been expressed in Descartes’s Cogito  argument, a point 
perfectly  understood and deeply  elaborated by  Emerson, that to exist the human being has  the burden 
of proving that  he or she exists, and that this burden  is  discharged in  thinking your  existence, which 
comes in  Descartes (though  this is controversial) to finding  how to say  ‘I am, I exist’; not of course to 
say it just once, but at every instant of your existence, originate it.”
For what does poverty  of experience do for the barbarian? It forces him  to start 
from  scratch; to make a new start […]. Among the great creative spirits,  there 
have always been the inexorable ones who begin by  clearing a tabula rasa. They 
need a drawing table; they  were constructors. Such a  constructor  was Descartes, 
who required nothing more to launch his entire philosophy  than the single certi-
tude “I think, therefore I am.”  And he went on  from there. […] And this same in-
sistence on starting from  the very  beginning also marks artists when they  fol-
lowed the example of mathematicians and built the world from stereometric 
forms, like the Cubists, or modelled themselves on engineers, like Klee.54
Benjamin distinguishes the originality  of the arts from the mere novelty  of sensations 
and the industrial products of capitalist mass production by  an analogy  with scientific 
innovation. Cavell employs the same analogy  when he compares the invention of an ar-
tistic medium to Thomas Kuhn’s idea of a paradigm  shift, thus emphasizing that a 
break with a tradition or convention can result from  conservative motives.55 Benjamin 
and Cavell are united in  their  protest against the sort of pre-determined conceptualiza-
tion of experience that is most clearly  exemplified by  logic and mathematics taken as 
rigid frameworks and as measures of all possible experience. The experience of the or-
dinary  as something essentially  past, unremarkable in the present, becomes the foun-
dation for Cavell’s critical remonstrance against scientism and a view of experience that 
exclusively  allows what is present and conceptually  determinable to enter into consid-
eration. In Philosophy the Day after Tomorrow, he repeatedly  refers to Quine’s con-
ceptualization of experience as a “check-point” of the validity of scientific theories:
What is at  stake is, even before the idea of knowledge,  the sense of how human 
experience is to be called to account. The classical empiricist’s idea of impres-
sions as the origin,  or cause, of ideas, like Quine’s “check-points of experience” 
in the service of theory-building, stylizes experience. 56
Whereas Cavell developed his ordinary  language philosophy  primarily  against the 
background of positivist traditions in philosophy, Benjamin in an early  essay  on “The 
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54. Benjamin, “Experience and Poverty,” in Selected Writings, vol. 2, 733.
55. Cavell, The World Viewed, 238 (footnote no. 38).
56. Cavell, “Introduction,” in Philosophy the Day after Tomorrow, 2.
Program  of the Coming Philosophy” takes a critical stance towards Neo-Kantianism 
that shows significant parallels to ordinary  language concerns. The idea adopted from 
Hamann that Kant’s scientific orientation prevented him from seeing the decisive 
role of language in the structuring of experience is the central point in his essay:
Just as Kantian theory  itself, in order  to find its principles, needed to be con-
fronted with a science with reference to which it could define them, modern 
philosophy  will need this as well. The great  transformation and correction 
which must be performed upon the concept of experience, oriented so one-
sidedly  along mathematical-mechanical lines, can be attained only  by  relating 
knowledge to language […]. For Kant, the consciousness that  philosophical 
knowledge was absolutely  certain and a priori, the consciousness of that  aspect 
of philosophy  in  which it is fully  the peer of mathematics, ensured that he de-
voted almost no attention to the fact that all philosophical knowledge has its 
unique expression in language and not  in formulas or numbers. A  concept of 
knowledge gained from reflection on the linguistic nature of knowledge will 
create a corresponding concept of experience which will also encompass 
realms that Kant failed to truly systematize.57
Benjamin’s idea of redefining the nature of experience by  showing the ways in which 
it  is informed by  language is more than an anticipation of ordinary  language philoso-
phy, of course. The idea is indebted to a tradition that Cavell has most usefully  ex-
plored in the American transcendentalists. In commenting on Emerson, Cavell makes 
explicit  the idea that not only  the twelve categories of the understanding, but lan-
guage as a whole is in need of a transcendental deduction:
It  is as if in Emerson’s writing […] Kant’s pride in what  he called his Coperni-
can Revolution for  philosophy, understanding the behavior of the world by 
understanding the behavior of our concepts of the world, is to be radicalized, 
so that  not just  twelve categories of the understanding are to be deduced, but 
every word in the language […].58
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57. Benjamin, “On the Program  of the Coming  Philosophy,”  in Selected Writings, vol. 1, 1913-
1926, eds. Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings, 107-108.
58. Cavell, “Emerson, Coleridge, Kant,” 38.
The insight that such a  deduction of language cannot be achieved once and for all is 
fully  worked out in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations and Cavell’s writing is 
informed by  it from the start. Therefore,  Cavell’s conception of the ordinary  sketches 
our modern situation as being in a recurrent need to return to the ordinary  from  our 
flights into metaphysical emptiness or  self-delusion. The ordinary  is something we 
may  perpetually  miss, but Cavell does not wonder whether  it could ever become com-
pletely  lost  to us. In this respect, we can regard Cavell’s notion of the ordinary  as a 
“diurnalization,” so to say, of what Benjamin works out primarily  as a historical diag-
nosis and conceives of as an epochal condition with regard to the technological means 
of mechanical reproducibility and industrial mass production. 
Cavell’s stance on skepticism  and Benjamin’s attitude towards the technologies 
of mechanical reproduction resemble each other in the way  in which  both tend to be 
ambivalent about whether  to indulge in  a nostalgic regret about the loss of aura and 
to mourn the presence of the world or to embrace the modern condition as inevitable 
and as containing the essential promise of change. What is emblematized for Cavell 
by  Thoreau’s pun in the last sentence of Walden, “The sun is but a morning star,” 
which takes “morning”  as related to, since acoustically  indistinguishable from, 
“mourning,” 59 has been regarded by  many  readers as a crucial ambiguity  in Benja-
min’s attitude towards the social and technological developments that  lead to the loss 
of auratic experience. 60 There is,  at any  rate,  a decisive tension between several of 
Benjamin’s essays on the loss of aura: Sometimes the destruction of aura  by  the 
means of technical reproducibility  is considered to be a  definitive and irreversible 
situation, whereas in different  contexts, most notably  in “On Some Motifs in Baude-
laire,”  art  is regarded as still  capable of resuscitating, so to say, auratic experience.61 
For  Cavell, the difference between a purely  mechanical and an animate mode of repe-
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59. Cavell, “The Politics of Interpretation,” 53-54.
60. Hansen, “Benjamin’s Aura,”  338, speaks of “Benjamin’s  alleged ambivalence toward aura 
– his being torn between  the extremes of  revolutionary avant-gardism and elegiac mourning for beau-
tiful semblance […].”
61. A  more comprehensive discussion of Benjamin would have to devote more attention to the 
tensions that exist  concerning the notions of art  and aura between several  of his essays. I would like to 
refer  the reader to the major insights about Benjamin’s ideas on  art and aura in: Josef Fürnkäs, “Aura,” 
in  Benjamins Begriffe, ed. Michael  Opitz and Erdmut Wizisla, vol. 1 (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2000), 
95-146; Miriam  Bratu  Hansen, “Benjamin’s Aura”; Miriam Bratu Hansen, “Room-for-Play: Benjamin’s 
Gamble with  Cinema,” Canadian Journal of Film Studies  / Revue canadienne  d’études  cinéma-
tographiques 13.1 (Spring 2004), 2-27; and Robert Kaufman, “Lyric Commodity  Critique, Benjamin 
Adorno Marx, Baudelaire Baudelaire Baudelaire,” PMLA 123.1 (January 2008), 207-215.
tition in language is not a criterial distinction but the underlying condition of the 
human ability  to make use of the criteria of language at all. The doubt  whether we can 
really  tell the one from the other, whether we can, for  example, distinguish  a  machine 
like Olympia  in Hoffmann’s tale The Sandman from a human being, is precisely  what 
is at issue in skepticism. It is no coincidence that skepticism in terms of regarding the 
animate as liveless and vice versa turns up in “The Uncanniness of the Ordinary”  in 
connection with another instance of “an uncanny  anticipation of a movie camera,” 
i.e.,  the spyglass through which the protagonist Nathanael perceives his beloved Clara 
as what we could call a mechanical reproduction:
The glass is a death-dealing rhetoric machine, producing or expressing the 
consciousness of life in one case (Olympia’s) by  figuration, in the other 
(Clara’s) by  literalization, or say  defiguration. One might  also think of it  as a 
machine of incessant animation, the parody  of a certain romantic writing; and 
surely  not unconnectedly  as an uncanny  anticipation of a movie camera. The 
moral of the machine I would draw provisionally  this way: There is a repetition 
necessary  to what  we call life, or the animate, necessary  for  example to the 
human; and a repetition necessary  to what  we call death, or  the inanimate, 
necessary  for  example to the mechanical; and there are no marks or features or 
criteria or rhetoric by  means of which to tell the difference between them. 
From  which, let me simply  claim, it  does not  follow that the difference is un-
knowable or  undecidable.  On the contrary, the difference is the basis of every-
thing there is for human beings to know, or  say  decide (like deciding to live), 
and to decide on no basis beyond or beside or beneath ourselves.62
If,  on  the one hand, Cavell’s outlook on art, language and experience is likely  to be 
deemed blind to most of the socio-historical and political issues that  Benjamin is con-
cerned with, Benjamin, on the other  hand, may  be blamed for not taking into consid-
eration any  concrete examples of film in his theses on the effects of mechanical re-
producibility. In his most widely-read book, Pursuits of Happiness, Cavell,  on the 
contrary, brilliantly  spells out his notion of the ordinary  in the interpretation of indi-
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62. Cavell, “The Uncanniness of the Ordinary,” in In Quest of the Ordinary, 157-158.
vidual films by  taking the popular as being significantly  informed by  philosophical 
concerns. He repudiates the one-sided economic criticism  of the genre of the comedy 
of remarriage as “fairy-tales for the depression” by  directing his attention to the im-
portance of conversation in the early  Hollywood talkies.63 Thus, the ordinary  in lan-
guage and the ordinary  in film are both deployed in Cavell’s discussions of popular 
Hollywood comedies,  salvaging the significance of language and of the aesthetic from 
a disparaging view of the movies as a mere industrialized entertainment.
Cavell sometimes phrases the question of how seriously  we consider texts and 
films as candidates for challenging our preconceived notions of what is important as a 
matter  of letting these texts or movies “have a voice.”64 If we are inclined to discount 
the experience of Hollywood movies as mere entertainment,  then we do not to let 
them  have a voice in the matters that  are most important to our lives. Our ability  to 
do this will  depend, however, on how  far we believe that we can trust our own voice 
and on whether we are convinced that our  voice counts at all. The repression of the 
voice, whether  we take skepticism or capitalist economy  to be its cause, is what both 
Benjamin and Cavell criticize as the “inescapably  private character” of our experi-
ence. If art does not necessarily  or directly  entail the liberation of our  voice, it  does 
not  simply  let us indulge in an essentially  private and incommunicable experience 
either. By  confronting us with an experience that has to be missed in order to gain 
significance in its deferred retrieval, modern art allows us to gain insight into the 
forces that stifle our voice. Its contribution to the extension of the boundaries of pos-
sible experience resides in the way  in  which it  shows our acknowledgment  of and our 
commitment to the world as essential to its significance. Because the ordinary  is 
never  simply  given, there are possibilities inherent  in it  that call on us as readers or 
spectators to realize them by giving voice to them. 65
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63. Cavell, Pursuits of Happiness. The  Hollywood Comedy of Remarriage  (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1981), 2ff.
64. Cavell, “Something out of the Ordinary,” 10: “I mean the sort of emphasis I place on  the 
criticism, or reading, of individual  works of art. I think of  this emphasis  as  letting a work of art  have a 
voice in what philosophy says about it, and I regard that attention  as a way of testing whether  the time 
is past in which taking  seriously  the philosophical  bearing  of a  particular work of art can be a  measure 
of the seriousness of philosophy.”
65. Although  I was not able to revise the present article extensively  in  the light of our  discus-
sions  and cannot presume that she would agree with everything in it, I am  much  indebted to Aurelia 
Cojocaru for her insightful comments on a previous version of this paper.
Perlocution and the Rights of Desire: 
Cavell, Nietzsche, and Austen (and Austin)
ERIC LINDSTROM
The privileging of predication  over plea, of propositional 
knowledge over  wish, of  topical language over the atopical, can 
be reversed neither by a violent act of knowing  better  nor by 
utopian wishes. But philological experience is recalcitrant. It 
shows that the desire for language cannot be restricted to the 
forms of knowledge. Since it is itself  the advocate of this  desire, 
it is close to the conjecture that forms of knowledge are only  
stations of this desire, not its structure.
WERNER HAMACHER, “Ninety-Five Theses on Philology” 
There is  indeed a vague and comforting idea  in  the background 
that, after all, in the last analysis, doing an action  must come 
down  to the making of  physical movements with parts of  the 
body; but that is about as true as that saying something must, in 
the last  analysis, come down to making movements of  the ton-
gue.
 J.L. AUSTIN, “A Plea for Excuses”
—Is there anything really important to you?




—One can never prevent a  single human being from  any kind of 
suffering. That’s what makes one so tremendously weary.
Smiles of a Summer’s Night (1955, dir. Ingmar Bergman)
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Friedrich Nietzsche famously  and mischievously  begins the notorious Second Essay 
in  On The Genealogy of Morals (1887) with an assertion that ties the proper  breeding 
of mankind to the right to make promises.  Nietzsche maintains: “[t]o breed an  animal 
with  the right to make promises—is this not the paradoxical task that  nature has set 
itself in the case of man? Is this not  the real problem which  man not  only  poses but 
also faces?” 1 Nietzsche’s language challenges its reader from the start to comprehend 
its various possibilities of mood and mode, rhetoric and grammar: is it a bold state-
ment of authorial values or  an ironic insinuation meant to trap the bad conscience of 
civilized man? More simply, is it a “real”  question  or a rhetorical statement? The pas-
sage loses no time in deploying some of the soldiers in the army  of poetical tropes 
that Nietzsche unmasks as the producers of truth in his equally  well-known short pie-
ce, “On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense” (here prosopopoeia: speaking for na-
ture). Based on this small sampling, already  we can sense fully  how the “literary”  in-
tensity  and instability  of Nietzsche’s style are embedded in his very  conduct of philo-
sophy. The question marks on which the two sentences of this opening salvo end (or 
sort  of end, as there are original ellipses “…”) may  not indicate a  question has been 
posed at all for the reader directly  to answer. No question, at  least,  has been posed 
from the quasi-naïve and open premise that we tend to call a question on equal (epis-
temological) footing or  in (sociable) “good” faith. Not a “real” question  from  Niet-
zsche, then; but all the more a real problem. A driving interrogation in  fact: in  light of 
what the next sentence calls the “countervailing” and saving “force of forgetfulness,” 
the conduct of the human will in  verbal action becomes “the real problem” we both 
pose and face as linguistic beings engaged by  what Stanley  Cavell understands in the 
term moral perfectionism.2
A different Nietzsche text close in provenance, the 1886 preface to Human, All 
Too Human, occupies Cavell in the eponymous chapter of Philosophy the Day After 
Tomorrow. But next  to the opening of the Second Essay  of On The Genealogy of Mo-
rals, I want to adduce the chapter on “Performative and Passionate Utterance”  found 
in  Cavell’s 2005 collection.  My  essay  will focus in particular on what  Cavell terms “the 
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1. See Friedrich Nietzsche, On the  Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic, trans. Douglas Smith 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 39, for one translation.
2. I continue to draw my  language from  Nietzsche’s Second Essay loosely  from the Smith 
translation. 
rights of desire”—rights stressed beyond institutional social “responsibilities of 
implication.” 3 Cavell’s recognition of the claims of desire, imaginative expression, and 
affective responsiveness,  in contrast  to J.L. Austin’s effort to minimize the scope gi-
ven to perlocution in How to Do Things with Words,  serves in this paper as a frame 
through  which to mark (however schematically  and provisionally) the various rela-
tionships of philosophy  to literature, law  to desire, and the once philosophically  nor-
mative language of constation to a broader scope of more “poetic”  or  “literary” lin-
guistic performativity.  Further, as my  subject here, “the rights of desire” draws atten-
tion to a  compellingly  peculiar  specific literary  argument Cavell makes in Philosophy 
the Day after Tomorrow. In the title essay, Cavell shares an extended reflection, at 
first  “something of a shock”  he admits, but ultimately, I want to show, persuasive and 
resonant  for this occasion to think and converse upon The Literary  Cavell,  on the 
affective logic of a connective contrast between Nietzsche and Jane Austen.4 
In reading Austen, Cavell singles out Emma. He pays attention to the heroine’s 
mournful thought over  the continuation of her  existence after the marriage of Miss 
Taylor to Mr. Weston at the start of Emma5—thus demonstrating in the very  ground 
of Austen’s novel,  and her famously  entitled (“handsome, clever, and rich”) protago-
nist, a philosophical bafflement  most readers had not really  seen or heard before. 
And in seeking to understand the meaning of Fanny  Price’s consent  in  terms that re-
call his previous writing on a film  genre he calls the melodrama of the unknown wo-
man, Cavell subsequently  underscores the “economy  of horror  invisibly  sustaining 
the main house of Mansfield Park.”6 Fanny  Price is at  best  the convalescent philo-
sophical protagonist of a sick society  awaiting its further  constitution (a portrayal 
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3. Cavell, Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2005), 185.
4. Ibid., 122.
5. Ibid., 124. For an important study of  another realist literary genre that draws from  Cavell’s 
interest in the domestic world, beyond what he calls “headline moral  issues,”  see Toril  Moi’s presenta-
tion  of Ibsen’s  modernism and the intolerable constrictions of gender roles on  the human, in Henrik 
Ibsen and the  Birth of Modernism: Art, Theater, Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University  Press, 2006), 
esp. 223-247.
6. Cavell, Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow, 127. Here one could incorporate, regarding 
both Emma Woodhouse and Fanny Price in their individual  ways, Cavell’s discerning self-summary  of 
his work on skepticism  (the version he calls  the “melodrama of  the unknown woman”) in  Contesting 
Tears: “This withdrawal  of  the world (a  formulation that recurs in my various reformulations or re-
placements of skepticism), or  this withholding of a voice before it, is an  alternative understanding of 
[John Marcher’s character in  the Henry  James story “The Beast  in  the Jungle”  that prompts his work-
ing through Eve Sedgwick’s essay “The Beast in the Closet”] ”; Cavell, Contesting Tears: The Holly-
wood Melodrama of the Unknown Woman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 191.
reinforced by  the novel’s canniness in turning to account Austen’s, essentially  the Re-
gency’s, historical positioning in between the abolition  of the British slave trade in 
1807 and the end of British imperial slavery in the 1830s.) 
In “Philosophy  the Day  After Tomorrow,” one of Cavell’s main textual coordi-
nates in Nietzsche is from  his 1886 preface to Human, All Too Human, which sardo-
nically  calls Geschwätz the topics that ought to silence the philosopher: Geschwätz, 
“chatter,”  or Literatur.7 In the preface to On the Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche asks 
how we can find ourselves if we do not even seek ourselves. “We are unknown to our-
selves, we knowers.” If, for  Cavell,  Nietzsche’s prose takes on the recognizable role of 
maximizing the expression of discontent with the world of existing, lawful, philo-
sophical systems and social institutions, and positions literature as the properly  mu-
te—perhaps maddening, perhaps idle—antinomy  to such institutions, Jane Austen 
occupies a  position that I think most  readers would not expect of her novels, in this 
broadly  romantic dialogue about the philosophical, social, and aesthetic conditions of 
expressive relation. Austen provides not a  foil to Nietzsche’s passion (or  speaking bi-
ographically, even to his threat of isolation and madness) but signals an alternate 
scope and key  for its expression of “spiritual distress” 8—something like a “piano” key 
of the brash philosophy  of the Übermorgen—that substantiates the claim of desire,  or 
least makes for its underscoring. A basic idea that I take from Cavell’s interest in  Aus-
ten and in what he calls, in Contesting Tears,  the “feminine voice” is that philosophy 
can have a  means of emphasis that  does not work by  just making the object or  point 
of emphasis bolder. The sympathetic critical disposition toward such a  voice articula-
tes a place for  the livable (to that extent “realist”) literary  mood in (his) philosophy. 
Nietzsche sets the task as to “breed an animal with the right to make promises,”  or 
who “may  make promises”; and Cavell, precisely,  is interested in Austen (and in 
George Eliot) in this chapter as writers not only  of constrained, or unheroic, passions 
and of extracted consent, but of “good breeding.”9
Cavell reads Austen’s work under the movingly  exigent heading of Philosophy 
the Day After Tomorrow  as a whole, in the urgent, sobering project  appropriate to 
his life after  retirement from  teaching  at Harvard as well as to the remaining scope of 
CONVERSATIONS                                                                                                                                                                        4 29
7. Cavell, Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow, 116.
8. Ibid., 124.
9. Ibid., 119.
his life as a life. When Cavell states his principle concern as “experience of the re-
mains of my  day” in the early  pages of the Introduction to Philosophy the Day after 
Tomorrow, behind the allusion to Ishiguro’s novel of looking back on a life in digni-
fied misspent service, one already  senses that an encounter with an Austen novel 
must be coming soon, from  just over  the horizon that  (due to her allegedly  contained 
feminine realism) isn’t  one.10 Quite as though the belated encounter  with Austen were 
a bigger and less easily  broached topic for  Cavell than the reference to Ishiguro, and 
later, E.M. Forster, or even  his more extended history  of interaction with Henry  Ja-
mes—which  I think it proves.  One almost  is led to ask by  this tone and the foreclosed, 
future anterior tense: does Cavell’s constraint of time connect to Austen’s constraint 
of manner?
Recall that J.L.  Austin’s series of lectures detailing his disagreement with the 
sense-data  theory  of knowledge carries the Austenian title,  Sense and Sensibilia,  and 
that Cavell thinks of the genre of the essays in the collection as “celebratory  addres-
ses”11 meant to honor the occasions from which he has taken instruction, occasions 
from which to raise “the possibility  of praise”  as a mindset more worthy  and more 
currently  in need than a hermeneutics of suspicion.12  So by  the time of the 
eponymous chapter  that pairs Austen with  Nietzsche, we have been in a  sense prepa-
red to learn that (even) Jane Austen—not least because Sense and Sensibilia honors 
her—articulates the field under critical scrutiny  and helps to form  tools for a  voice of 
expressive critique.13 My  association of Austen  with  critique may  sound odd,  but it is 
intended in a  fairly  rigorous way  in its own terms, in the context of the linkage of Aus-
ten’s and Kant’s minimizing hence maintaining gesture of passion or  knowledge. Aus-
ten’s work too exposes the conditions in  response to which one intelligible option, 
one way  to help ourselves to a future,  is the fragmentation or rupture found in such 
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10. Cavell, Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow, 2.
11. Ibid., 1.
12. Ibid., 31; also see 82. Cavell  may draw here from  Eve Sedgwick’s articulation of “reparative 
reading.” Though Cavell  offers  few anti-homophobic readings apart from  his account of Bette Davis in 
the Now, Voyager and “Postscript”  chapters of Contesting Tears, in this “[e]njoining [of] a kind of 
suspicion  of suspicion  itself”  he may be compared to Sedgwick, whom  he engages at length  in  “Post-
script”; for the source of the quotation, see Anne-Lise François, “Late Exercises in  Minimal Affirma-
tives,” in Theory Aside, ed. Jason Potts and Daniel Stout (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014), 37.
13. A  Foucauldian relation to critical  discourse and cultural theory is  not beyond Cavell’s reach 
or interest. The last of the three epigraphs to “Performative and Passionate Utterance” reads: “It is in 
so far  as discourse is common that it can become at once a place and an  instrument of  confrontation.—
Michel Foucault”; Cavell, Philosophy the  Day After Tomorrow, 155. With  Arnold Davidson, Cavell  co-
taught a seminar on Foucault and Freud at the University of Chicago in 1999.
hyperbolic expression as Nietzsche’s: the joyful, cheerful,  but also stressed-out,  des-
perate, shrieking and “zany” styles of Nietzsche’s writing with “spurs.” 14 
It  is true that Jane Austen’s prose style is almost never manic, outside of a 
couple moments in  Persuasion and in the boisterous juvenilia. In fact, in the lecture 
version of “Philosophy  the Day  after Tomorrow,”  Cavell stunningly  calls the “surface” 
of her  prose style one of “lethal calm.”  He narrates his “late” fascination with her no-
vels as a response not to their  “elation” and “thrill” of identification in the main mar-
riage plots, but in response to “the stupidity, the silliness, the empty-headedness, the 
quality  of being worn-out…of so many  of her supporting players.”15 (Cavell does not 
mention particular characters, but I find it instructive and paradoxically  enlivening  to 
build the list of these “players,”  which must include the menacing boor and rattle 
John Thorpe in Northanger Abbey,  the pathetic routine of Anne Steele with her 
dead-end talk of a doctor  beau in Sense and Sensibility,  and Miss DeBourgh, Mr. 
Collins, Lady  Bertram, Mrs. Elton, and Sir Walter  and Elizabeth Elliot in  the more 
famous later  novels from  Pride and Prejudice to Persuasion.) “By  the time of Mansfi-
eld Park, in  1815, there is mostly  no one to identify  with.”16 This list of vacuous, worn-
out predicates joins with  the stakes of the conversations of moral encounter in play 
throughout Cavell’s writings about the film genre of the remarriage comedy  with un-
deniably  vibrant stars like Katherine Hepburn and Cary  Grant, because these remar-
riage “screwball”  comedies for all their  vibrant play  must answer  a comparable force 
of depletion, still “touching upon contemptuousness,  inattentiveness, brutality,  cold-
ness, cowardice, vanity, thoughtlessness, unimaginativeness, heartlessness, devious-
ness, vengefulness.” 17
Among the many  aspects of the literary  (in) Cavell are his specifications of 
medium  and genre: meaning not only  philosophy, cinema, and literature; but within 
the latter, Shakespearean and modern tragedy,  Romantic lyric poems, realist novels. I 
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14. These terms, as  used to characterize Nietzsche, are taken  from Sianne Ngai, Our Aesthetic 
Categories: Zany, Cute, Interesting (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University  Press, 2012), 184-188; 222-
232, and from Jacques Derrida’s  Spurs: Nietzsche’s Styles/Éperons: Les Styles de  Nietzsche, trans. 
Barbara Harlowe (Chicago: University  of Chicago Press, 1978). Ngai’s account of the affective condi-
tions of  labor in the “new economy” in  her chapter on  the zany  further stresses (in both  senses) the 
affect of  Nietzsche’s  tone in  terms of gender. This approach  makes  her reading  particularly  relevant to 
the discussion of Jane Austen  and the “feminine voice” of  “passionate utterance”; Ngai, Our Aesthetic 
Categories, 224ff. 
15. Cavell, Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow, 126. 
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., 121.
am aware there may  be losses in moving too quickly  between Cavell’s bodies of 
thinking about film  and the novel,  and in relating these media  without a careful criti-
cal translation to his philosophical writings. Here specifically, whatever  the genre in 
view, the qualities admitted in the list above are specifications of the forces arrayed 
against Cavell’s Emersonian “perfectionism” as a dynamic of “moral encounter.” 18 Yet 
however threatening or neutralizing they  may  prove to that encounter, the negative 
attributes are internal to the task.  Throughout his writing career, Cavell has been fi-
red,  inspired—as well as simultaneously  floored—by  the force of both of such stagge-
ring  premises of personal incomprehension, non-expressiveness, and unfeeling, and 
by  their  equivalent at the institutional level, of philosophical and cultural “discount-
ing.” From  here it is Cavell’s stimulating and rigorous contribution to Austen Studies 
as a discounted area in the study  of Romanticism, to claim that Austen’s contained 
and minimized mode of expression preserves the philosophical standing of unmet, 
unsatisfied “rights of desire” in the criticism of this (lawful) world. 
Thus Cavell can maintain of Austen: “You might say  that her prose seeks in-
cessantly  to minimize (hence maintain) the expression of distress in everyday  exis-
tence no less drastically  than Nietzsche’s seeks to maximize it.”19 Jane Austen per-
forms this role not  so much despite as via what Cavell terms her  “narrator’s re-
nowned surface of containment.” 20 Even Austen’s most limited world in  Emma can 
be shown to face down a zero-degree test for  a  sociable practice and stylistics of affec-
tive critique (rather than an official philosophy). As Emma and her father  grieve the 
passing of Miss Taylor into Mrs.  Weston through marriage, the narrator remarks that 
in  this moment “Emma first sat in mournful thought of any  continuance.”  Here is Ca-
vell’s gloss on that phrase: “I find that I am  unsure whether this meditation means 
that she is vexed not to have her friend to continue their happy  mode of existence; or 
whether  it  suggests that she is so grief-stricken that she cannot imagine wanting her 
own existence to continue; or whether,  as mostly  seems to me the case, that Emma 
herself cannot tell the difference.” 21
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18. Cavell, Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow.
19. Ibid., 124. 
20. Ibid., 124. As noted above, in  the Berkeley (Feb. 2002) Howison Lectures version  of the 
chapter, Cavell  does not say “renowned surface of containment” but instead (enunciating it with care-
ful  energy) “Jane Austen’s celebrated surface of lethal  calm.” https://www.youtube.com/watch? 
v=bTCk_u1fpxc.
21. Ibid., 124. 
In such an insight,  as well as in  such a mood of indistinction of the crucial 
difference, Cavell sees in Austen a means of expressing the limits of what is and 
isn’t experienced as livable, what the main character can recognize as a knowledge 
of the possible continuance of her life, or  is willing to face going on with under the 
auspices of an interesting, hence to that degree consented-to,  existence. This criti-
cal threshold of experience is felt as an expressive capacity, and limit,  on what Aus-
ten can write, what her  narrator  can “say,” and what the reader may  be prepared to 
“hear.”  Cavell himself hears the sentence, put there by  Austen’s narrator and tes-
tifying to Emma’s cognition, as Emma’s own stunned responsiveness: not as a  cog-
nitive statement of indirect speech, that is, but as a kind of inexpressibly  stifled and 
yet still audible perlocution. Thus to notice the almost imperceptible slightness of 
judgment in this negation of status quo life, comes in Austen as it were bound with 
a significant force and inescapable framing. Through Cavell,  we notice Emma’s mi-
nimal yet still definitive negations of the given conditions of life. (For one instance 
of such a condition: that life for Emma of such  regular  comforts and irritations, in 
Surrey, as one of many  apparently  very  numerous counties that are dubbed “the 
garden of England”: a cliché shared vacuously  and insistently  by  Mrs. Elton, and at 
one level attested to by  Austen’s narrator—because Surrey  is  called that—and con-
temptuously  negated at another as beneath  even the use of her  clarification—as al-
most  everywhere in England is called that—by  Emma herself.)22 This practice of li-
terary  critical judgment positions Austen’s novelistic program more or less expli-
citly  after Kant’s method in critical philosophy  to define limits beyond which  we 
cannot know, and hence what we can affirm  and may  lawfully  hope for. Yet  Cavell’s 
intensive concern with the challenge to sustain interest goes powerfully  against 
Kant’s affective economy  of disinterestedness. Nietzsche, contrasting  Kant to 
Stendhal’s description of the beautiful as “une promesse de bonheur,” sounds off on 
this disinterestedness: “in each of Kant’s famous definitions of the beautiful, the 
lack of a  more differentiated experience of the self sits like a  fat worm of fundamen-
tal error.”23 
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22. Jane Austen, Emma, ed. George Justice; 4th  edn. (New York: Norton, 2012), 188. The pas-
sage especially  holds my attention due to J.L. Austin’s scrupulous devotion  to reclaim from  skepticism 
“the garden of the world we live in”; see “Other Minds,” in Philosophical Papers, 90. 
23. Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, 83.
In  Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow  Cavell reminds us that  way  back in 
“Aesthetic Problems in Modern Philosophy”  (first published in 1965) from Must We 
Mean What We Say? (1969), he had come to understand and propose “Kant’s characte-
rization of the aesthetic judgment” as the model for “what we should ordinarily  say 
when, and what we should mean in  saying it.  The moral is that while general agreement 
with these claims can be ‘imputed’ or ‘demanded’ by  philosophers, they  cannot, as in 
the case of more straightforward empirical judgments, ‘postulate’ this agreement (using 
Kant’s terms).”24 Such a displacement and expansion of the role of Kant’s practice of 
“reflecting judgment,” based on his concept of “subjective universality,”  again makes 
the closely  modeled revision of Kant the pattern of a  new  philosophy, as it was already 
in German Romanticism. Cavell develops beyond a Kantian approach by  taking up or-
dinary  language philosophy  and its criteria and claims to begin with; but also—and 
overgoing Kantian and other foundations to a further extent than the post-Kantian 
Romantics of the “literary  absolute” had done—in accounting for  the “passionate utte-
rances” that J.L. Austin, Cavell’s teacher, organizes under the name perlocution.
Between Nietzsche and Austen, there is neither  a  stable binary  contrast nor a 
clear  spectrum  of some kind of measure of “passionate utterance,” not only  because 
Austen’s “renowned surface of containment”  preserves a minimal and hence irredu-
cible amount of negation and distress,  but  also because the question of lawfulness re-
gisters internally  in Nietzsche’s text on the task of creating a human being with the 
“right to make promises.”  While the mobile literary  style of Nietzsche’s writing  com-
pels us to move on in reading—rather  than stop to make one-to-one assessments of 
constative truth claims—nearly  every  aspect of this famous quotation registers the 
question, the weight, of judging the urgent  difference between conventional language 
and what Cavell would call “perfectionist” modes of expression. “To breed an animal 
with  the right to make promises”: is the tone of any  of that “straight” and free from 
contempt? But also,  isn’t every  bit of this directive instated with an almost unintelli-
gible earnestness? (For just  one instance, I have already  pointed out that Cavell 
makes use of the almost culturally  untouchable “breeding.”) Most  practically, there is 
debate over the translation  of versprechen darf. Does it  invoke even ironically  the 
discourse of contractual rights? Should it be translated simply, “who makes promi-
ses,” with an unaided relative pronoun, without the “right”? Or should the translation 
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lean more on the darf,  from  the modal verb dürfen, and render the translation as 
“who may  make promises”  (or  “is permitted” or  “can,”  which  is either the language of 
morality or of will, force, and capacity).25 
Even before we get to the classic illocutionary  act of promise-making in  the 
famous bit of language from  On The Genealogy of Morals, the challenge of transla-
ting versprechen darf demands that we consider the difference between a  pre- and 
other-authorized dimension of lawful “rights” (and consider its Nietzschean transva-
luation  into a possible dimension not of contractual but of higher and rarer, self-
authoring “rights”), as well as to consider a passional dimension. What  can giving 
oneself permission mean for  the individual citizen subject  of “right”-based law? In-
deed, Nietzsche’s first use of the language of rights in On the Genealogy, again from 
the preface,  invokes this term not in the contractual sense,  but in the language of 
what we may  say  with grounds in ordinary  language: “Mit Recht hat man gesagt.”26 
What can giving ourselves permission to speak thus mean beyond or  beside the law? 
What does it mean to think of the promise as a capacity  in which one grants a  kind of 
self-permission to feeling (to be an  animal who may/can/ is permitted to promise, 
and makes promises,  and iteratively  if not interchangeably, more than one and more 
than once), knowing that “making”  a promise is not  an  act governed by  the external 
authority  of lawful institutions?27  A promise for the “literary”  philosopher, however 
full,  is not bound determinately  to the understanding of a contractual tie to be kept 
(though if “happy” it  is kept). If the right to make promises is always open to both lin-
guistic and human sequels, partly  this is because, if we may  be happy,  it  means to gi-
ve more than we own of ourselves.28 Happiness is an evental unfolding, not a  stabili-
zed intentional structure. 
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etzsche’s  expression of  the man-animal  who “promises like a  sovereign—seriously, seldom, slow-
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merely the result of  a  passive inability to rid oneself of an impression once etched on  the mind, nor  of 
the incapacity to digest  a once-given  word with which one is never through, but represents rather an 
active will not to let go, an  ongoing willing  of what was once willed, a  real  memory of the  will: so that 
between the original  ‘I will,’ ‘I shall  do,’ and the actual  realization of the will, its enactment, a  world of 
new and strange things, circumstances, even other acts of will  may safely  intervene, without causing 
this long chain of the will to break” (ibid., 40). 
*
A fiat-like power—expressed through the unconditioned originating power of the lo-
gos—features in understandings of the “romantic Performative”  in foundational ac-
counts such as the work of Angela Esterhammer. In  his recent book Stanley Cavell and 
the Claim of Literature, David Rudrum has used Esterhammer’s work to develop an 
account of the (Austinian) performative in Wordsworth’s Preface to Lyrical Ballads by 
way  of Cavell.29 But this approach remains—as it is in Austin’s foundational enterprise 
and in a different way  in Esterhammer’s magisterial comparative study  of linguistic 
romanticisms—fundamentally  an account of illocution. A broadened concept of illocu-
tion shades into the natural supernatural by  way  of its penumbra of “force”: the aspect 
of the performative utterance that  cannot be explained grammatically, that is, cannot 
be explained apart  from situational tone, and hence leads the transition in the second 
half of How to Do Things with Words into the lectures on perlocution as “a third kind 
of act” subject neither  to referential falsification (as constative statements supposedly 
are subject internally) nor to stabilization by  context (as the official Austin of most of 
How to Do Things with Words positions his “happy” illocutions).30 
Having myself written a book on romantic fiat that considered in this more or 
less theological way  how  language not only  exists but attaches the world (and us? phi-
losophers? poets? to the world), I now put forth  perlocution as the major  alternative 
way  to reconsider this question of affective movement, sequels, and the being and 
attachment of language to the world, as well as the intersubjective zone of actual lan-
guage users in confrontation and exchange. The displacement of the unmoved mover 
of causation  that drives the classic theological way  of thought perhaps can still be re-
cognized in its change into the question of how responsibility, the over- and under-
determination of cause on passion,  “direct” or  “indirect,” adequate or  no, appears as a 
crucial but  unsolvable issue in forming any  system  of perlocution.31 Like the fiat, per-
locution is performative and evental language, but unlike the fiat (or even its Colerid-
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30. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, 101.
31. Daniel  Stout’s  forthcoming  study of modern “corporate” causation  in Justice  After Per-
sons: Corporate  Personhood in the  Romantic Novel (New York: Fordham University Press) will be of 
great help on this question, though  Stout’s interest lies more in  applications  of legal  theory  and history 
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gean echoes), perlocutionary  events unfold temporally  as sequels, not as instations of 
singular, originary  utterance, or even as such utterances proliferating in sequence. 
Beginning with the self-knowledge of their  speaker, perlocutions are not subject to 
limits and stability. Thus though so far I’ve taken Cavell to be aligned with and moti-
vated by  Nietzsche’s literary  voice in philosophy, especially  but not  only  with regard 
to Cavell’s commitment to perfectionist conversation and perlocutionary  sequels as 
forming a claim on the future (tomorrow, and the day  after tomorrow), here Niet-
zsche’s overriding emphasis on will breaks both with the experience of passionate ex-
change and with with the indeterminate nature of its assessment. 
  J.L. Austin says dryly  that such contextual/ circumstantial “resources” of lan-
guage are “over-rich.”  But on re-reading,  this time after  Cavell’s chapter on “Performa-
tive and Passionate Utterance,”  the relevant sections on perlocution in How to Do 
Things with Words, Austin comes across (to me) as less constraining than expected. 
Perlocution is afforded thirty  pages, and there are several brief but uncontainably  devi-
ous moments that more than ruffle the premise of a lawful, tidy, professorial expositi-
on. Perhaps, as a Jane Austen scholar, I am  prone to this amplifying response because 
J.L. Austin takes persuasion as his first  instance of the kind of “consequential effects 
upon the feelings,  thoughts, or actions”  that he terms the perlocutionary  realm. The 
first example he gives of this realm, filed as Act  C.a.,  is frankly  weird—definitely  mixed 
up with the experience of total warfare in the Second World War (where Austin served 
in British  Intelligence), but mixed with  something else too. It’s an example on being ur-
ged, or advised, or  persuaded “to shoot her”; and then Austin’s second example of per-
locution reverberates with a Thomas Wyatt or  Bishop Lowth-like rendition of calling 
out in Hebrew  Penitential Psalm: “He pulled me up, checked me,” followed by  the more 
empiricist and fidgety, “He stopped me, he brought me to my  senses, &c. He annoyed 
me.”32 (With just these two wildly  underdetermined examples, Austin evokes the range 
of perlocution from  wrestling with God to jostling  with  everyday  discomposure.) Austin 
can write: “It is always possible, for example, to try  to thank or inform somebody  yet  in 
different ways to fail, because he doesn’t listen,  or takes it as ironical, or  wasn’t respon-
sible for whatever it was, and so on. This distinction will arise,  as over any  act,  over lo-
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cutionary  acts too; but failures here will not be unhappinesses as there, but  rather  failu-
res to get the words out, to express ourselves clearly, etc.” 33 Apart from the big em-
bedded assumption that the philosopher speaks for  the norm against which others may 
depart (people may  fail to listen responsibly  and heed), Austin sounds like Cavell; or, 
more accurately, the derivable source of Cavell’s work in acknowledging passion is he-
ard, in a  moment such as this. Still,  granting however  much suggestiveness this produc-
tive (and not  simply  sidelined) equivocation ought to have, Austin  has a  way  of saying 
(not without fastidious charisma), “But in a  way  these resources are over-rich.”34 Hence 
Cavell’s idea that Austin’s institutional grounding demands both alterity  and oppositi-
on. But we can’t  fail to see that Cavell’s expression of critique is derived itself from  a 
perlocutionary entailment from Austin. It is derived from his gratitude. 
“A Performative utterance is an offer  of participation in the order of law,” Ca-
vell concludes in the essay  “Something out of the Ordinary.”  He goes on: “[a]nd per-
haps we can say: A passionate utterance is an invitation to improvisation in the di-
sorders of desire.” 35 So given this formulation and the discussion above,  what exactly 
is Cavell up to when he effectively, lawfully, lists and orders the “necessary  condi-
tions” for perlocution? It cannot be just an anti-enlightenment parody  like Foucault’s 
encyclopedic taxonomy,  riffing on Borges with lucid–mad laughter, in the Preface to 
The Order of Things;36  Cavell follows his own idiosyncratically  Kantian method of 
being a rigorist in critical philosophy  just so far  as he can, and a specifier in indeter-
minable aesthetic and subjectively  human matters in  the descriptions and judgments 
that go beyond rule-following.37 He also honors Austin’s insistence not only  on fin-
ding order in  the pleasures of agreement where possible, but in stressing  the richly 
plural but finite character  of linguistic experience.  But nevertheless,  the linear, al-
most bullet-point exposition of the following passage is difficult to keep free of a tone. 
Cavell’s ability  to sustain an earnest regard for  all aspects of his teacher Austin may 
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allow for  irony-free seriousness; but readers of Cavell might find they  just can’t main-
tain it. Cavell maps out the necessary conditions of passionate utterance:
I propose that something corresponding  to what Austin lists as the six  neces-
sary  conditions (he sometimes calls them rules) for the felicity  of performative 
utterance holds for passionate utterance. Austin’s are (1) there must  exist a 
conventional procedure for  uttering certain words in certain contexts, (2) the 
particular persons and circumstances must be appropriate for the invocation 
of the procedure, (3) the procedure must be executed correctly  and (4) com-
pletely, (5) where the procedure requires certain thoughts or feelings or inten-
tions for  the inauguration of consequential conduct, the parties must have tho-
se feelings or thoughts and intend so to conduct themselves,  and further (6) 
actually  so conduct themselves subsequently.  Now in  the case of passionate 
speech, in questioning or confronting you with  your conduct, all this is over-
turned, but specifically and in detail.
There is (Austin notes) no conventional procedure for appealing to you 
to act in  response to my  expression of passion (of outrage at your treachery  or 
callousness, of jealousy  over your attentions, of hurt  over  your slights of re-
cognition). Call this absence of convention the first condition of passionate ut-
terance; and let’s go further.  Whether, then,  I have the standing to appeal to or 
to question you—to single you out as the object of my  passion—is part  of the 
argument to ensue. Call standing and singling out the second and third condi-
tions of passionate utterance.  These conditions for felicity, or say  appropriate-
ness, are not given a priori but are to be discovered or refined, or else the effort 
to articulate it is to be denied. There is no question therefore of executing a 
procedure correctly  and completely, but there are further unshiftable de-
mands, or rules, that (fourth) the one uttering a passion must have the passi-
on,  and (fifth) the one singled out must respond now and here, and (sixth) 
respond in kind, that is to say, be moved to respond, or  else resist  the 
demand.38 
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In “Performative and Passionate Utterance,” Cavell reviews the perlocutionary  condi-
tions (if anything) more systematically, before adding this seventh “rule”:
I add to this list, registering a final asymmetry:
Perloc 7: You may  contest my  invitation to exchange, at  any  or all of the points 
marked by  the list of conditions for  the successful perlocutionary  act,  for exam-
ple, deny  that I have standing with you, or question my  consciousness of my 
passion,  or dismiss the demand for the kind of response I seek,  or ask to postpo-
ne it,  or worse. I may  or  may  not have further means of response. (We may  un-
derstand such exchanges as instances of, or attempts at, moral education.)39 
In another project I examine two literary  texts (poems and a letter on poetics), by 
Claudia Rankine and Keats, which  put  a curious kind of pressure on a  few  of these 
conditions: namely, that “the one singled out must  respond now  and here, and 
(sixth) respond in kind, that is to say, be moved to respond, or else resist the de-
mand”  (emphasis added); with the amplification of the last “rule”  in its apparent neu-
tralization in the questioning, denial,  dismissal, postponement, or unavailability  of 
“further  means of response.”  Cavell in The Claim of Reason articulates a  way  in 
which to respond to the suffering of others,  despite the unavailability  of the subject in 
the moment,  which allows “freedom for a further response.” Cavell’s romantic perfec-
tionism  allows for  the fluctuating (non-) succession as the future, or sequel to this re-
alm of further responsiveness beyond stable predication. The generous outward ges-
ture, which Cavell extends not only  to future readers, but to dead literary  authors and 
toward himself too, lies in  disburdening the (near) affective nullity  from  its added 
burden of pressing and disabling shame to allow space to experience both “another’s 
misery [as] unforgettable” and for “freedom for a further response” in oneself.40 
Yet here in the context of this essay  and its treatment of the Literary  Cavell, as 
opposed to the scene of face to face conversation through which Cavell insistently  mo-
dels his thinking on perlocution, it must suffice to notice the alignment of Cavell’s per-
locutionary  condition #7  with key  aspects of the space of literature itself: with the ques-
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tioning or even removal of the author’s presence; with  the scriptoral,  and with différan-
ce. As French theorists of l’ecriture as different  as Blanchot  and Foucault intimate, this 
is a  gray  space. Such an affectively  neutralizing “asymmetry”  presents a  strong challen-
ge not so much to the systematicity  (which he does not attempt) as to the possibility  of 
claiming a pre-determinate (or  an indexical, urgently  referential, right-here determi-
ned) contemporary  historical uptake of Cavell’s major project of elaborating on the in-
terests, rights, and responsibilities of the perlocutionary  realm. Already  in Part One of 
The Claim of Reason there is an instance of this important criticism  of the urgent natu-
re of present  demands, in the example of knowing the “distance” of suffering in  Keats, 
and in assessing the dimension of a “freedom  for further response”  that  anticipates the 
acknowledgment of incapacity  and non-responsiveness in his language of 2005, “I may 
or may  not have further means of response.”41 Except in a  perlocutionary  sense, it does 
not appear  “already” or “anticipate” in that  master work of 1979, because nothing in 
Cavell’s later  writings I’ve considered is being prevented in advance or  defended from, 
forestalled, by arguments offered in The Claim of Reason. 
As important  to this topic as the reflections he shares on literary  texts in 
themselves, Cavell’s literary  mode as a writer and thinker opens up a  space of intensi-
ve, non-coercible, yet specifiable thought. As the wonderful, wily  (not in the usual 
sense weary) old mother character says in an unforgettable moment when she is 
about to plan a party  at the behest  of her  daughter,  in a film that was important  to the 
young Cavell, Bergman’s Smiles of a Summer Night (1955), “One can never prevent a 
single human being from  any  kind of suffering. That’s what makes one so tremen-
dously  weary.” To end back with Nietzsche and The Genealogy of Morals (this essay 
having been a prolongation of the interval between the Second Essay’s second and 
third sentences, already  marked by  an ellipses in the original), “[t]he extent to which 
this problem”  of breeding the promise-making animal “has been solved must seem  all 
the more surprising to someone who fully  appreciates the countervailing force of for-
getfulness” as an “active…positive…inhibiting capacity, responsible for  the fact” that 
we can absorb and return the contact  of experience,  take part in conversation and 
confrontation, and respond to the word’s touch.42 The very  opacity  of perlocution to 
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traditional knowledge claims makes it a touching dimension of knowing, and 
suggests linguistic philosophy’s relation to the textural modes of literary  knowing, 
whether  the proffered reading methodology  be “close”  or “surface.” An alignment of 
the literary  in Cavell with this (in)capacity  for  active forgetfulness, also suggests to 
me an alternate route to the final sentence of The Claim of Reason and its famous 
questions, can philosophy  become literature and still know itself? Can philosophy  ac-
cept (its) knowledge back at the hands of poetry? And is the measure of Cavellian 
acknowledgment inseparable from the cost of unknowing, if knowledge is to be defi-
ned as the prerogative of a fully conscious animal?
 The three epigraphs I have taken for this essay  have been functioning so far,  if 
they  have performed a role at all for  the reader, themselves only  as resonances and 
touches, rather than to structure the line of argument  I have taken on Cavell,  Niet-
zsche, and Austen  (and Austin) with  regard to promise-making and perlocution.  So 
let me describe their explicit  contributions to my  thinking on where the literary  (in) 
Cavell leaves me. In Hamacher’s philological thesis is the idea that  we want,  we are 
tasked, to go beyond the model of language as predication, but that we cannot do so 
through  a simple irreversible act or wish—for the former is exposed as “violent,”  the 
latter  identified as “utopian”  or pious. In Austin’s “A Plea for  Excuses,” we see not on-
ly  the constative / performative distinction in play, but already  the initiation  of a 
supple critique of Austin’s own rage to order in How to Do Things With Words 
amongst types of verbal action—the demarcation between illocution and perlocution 
foremost. In Bergman’s tremendous marriage farce Smiles  of a Summer Night,  I hear 
something not only  of Keats’s vale of soul-making, but in the shared exposure to 
suffering, a mood and project  that leads curiously  back to a  language of constation 
and letting things be, if only  because the “preventing”  of suffering of “a single human 
being” is neutralized between two relations to experience that are literary, and betwe-
en which  another writer—in fact, Austen—would carve out the discursive space of free 
indirect speech: the wizened old mother’s third-person perspective, as close to a tita-
nic narrative omniscience as a human representation could be; and the mortal first-
person condition acknowledged by  her of her daughter with love and chagrin, that the 
individual cannot be spared her particular and costly  experiences even if they  only 
serve to instance such poor lessons of where the ordinary and perfectionism meet.
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DAVID KAUFMANN
After staging the shipwreck of the constative-performative distinction halfway  through 
How To Do Things With Words,  J.L. Austin goes on famously  to “make a fresh start on 
the problem.” 1 He relinquishes the original opposition between making statements and 
doing things and then introduces a ternary  account of speech acts. He distinguishes 
between locutionary  acts (in which we produce sounds with “a certain  sense and a  cer-
tain reference”[95]), illocutionary  acts (in which we perform acts such  as “asking or 
answering  a  question,  giving some information… announcing a verdict...and the nume-
rous like” [98-99]),  and perlocutionary  acts (in which  we “produce consequential 
effects upon the feelings, thoughts or actions of an audience, or  of the speaker, or of 
other persons”[101]). For all the philosophical ink that has been spilled on Austin, not 
much  has been devoted to perlocutions. Locutions and illocutions get  almost all the ac-
tion.
Stanley  Cavell has been one of the few philosophers to emphasize the impor-
tance of the perlocutionary  for  speech act theory. In his forward to the second edition 
of Shoshana Felman’s The Scandal of the Speaking Body  and in his essay  “Performa-
tive and Passionate Utterances,”  Cavell assumes, as Stephen Mulhall puts it, that  Aus-
tin believes that “the perlocutionary  effect of any  utterance [is] extrinsic to its sense 
and force” and thus that the perlocutionary  can  be opposed to the illocutionary  act. 2 
Because Austin maintains that the illocutionary  is conventional and the perlocutio-
nary  is not (121), Cavell argues that illocutions come down on the side of the Law, 
while perlocutions give voice to Desire. Where the illocutionary  is scripted and pres-
cribed, the perlocutionary  opens up space for improvisations.3 According to Mulhall, 
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Cavell proposes a radical innovation to Austin’s theory  by  suggesting that the perlo-
cution is “as internal to any  genuine speech-act as are its locutionary  and illocutio-
nary  dimensions.” 4 I am  going to argue in this essay  that  Cavell does not really  revise 
Austin’s theory. He gives voice to what Austin actually says. 
Austin’s insistence in the penultimate lecture of How  To Do Things With 
Words  on “the total speech act  in  the total speech situation” reminds us that the 
speech act encompasses more than its illocutionary  and locutionary  dimensions. Our 
utterances have not just sense and force, but purpose as well. Part of the problem that 
Austin presents to his interpreters lies with the fact that the perlocutionary  involves 
not  just effect but intention, so while actual perlocutonary  effect might sometimes 
seem  extrinsic to the total speech act, perlocutionary  aim  should not. An example: if I 
warn you that the bull might  charge, then I really  am  trying to affect  your beliefs or 
your subsequent  behavior, though you  might not take my  warning to heart. My  aim  is 
clear, but my success is not assured.
We should also note that my  warning and my  attempt to influence your 
thoughts or  your actions do not actually  constitute separate acts,  although Austin do-
es indeed talk about them as if they  did. This has to do with a trick of description, a 
question of stress,  not an actual difference.  When we describe a speech act  in terms of 
its perlocutionary  aim rather than illocutionary  force, we are emphasizing one di-
mension of the utterance at the expense of another. If we say  that in  an address on a 
given date the President persuaded Congress to authorize military  force instead of 
saying that he maintained correctly  or  incorrectly  that a Middle-Eastern dictator had 
weapons of mass destruction, we are not indicating that the President performed two 
separate acts. We are just looking at different aspects of a single one.
So, I am  claiming that  the complexity  of utterances—and the fact that we draw 
distinctions when we emphasize their  different dimensions—leads Austin to talk 
about the locutionary,  illocutionary  and perlocutionary  as if these were discrete acts, 
rather than moments in the “total speech act in the total speech situation” (148). I 
stress this, because Austin calls on us to keep that total speech act in  mind when we 
think about an utterance’s meaning, force and effect.  Austin makes it clear that to 
perform  a locutionary  act is “eo ipso to perform  an illocutionary act”  (98). When he 
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maintains that the illocutionary  and the locutionary  are abstractions (147), he is re-
minding us that they  are handy  reifications, but that they  are reifications nonetheless. 
That is why  in the end, Austin  tells us that  “what we have to study  is not the sentence 
but  the issuing of an utterance in a speech situation.” In that speech  situation, stating 
is both “performing an  [illocutionary] act” and “performing perlocutionary  acts of all 
kinds” (139). We therefore mistake him  if we imagine that we can easily  oppose illo-
cutions to perlocutions and thus pull asunder what Austin has surely  joined. A full 
account of a speech  act  will have to comprehend the whole kit. It will have to look at 
its locutionary  “meaning” (its sense and reference), its illocutionary  force and both its 
perlocutionary aims and effects as well. 
A problem  quickly  arises: when Austin tells us that the locutionary  and illocu-
tionary  are merely  abstractions,  he does not mention the perlocutionary  at  all. Why, 
then, does he let the perlocutionary  drop when it  comes time to make his pitch for the 
total speech act? There are two pertinent but ultimately  local reasons for this. The 
first  and most obvious one is that Austin has other  fish  to fly. Austin  claims that phi-
losophers have stiffed the illocutionary  in favor of the locutionary  and, to a  lesser  ex-
tent, the perlocutionary  (103). Accordingly, the purpose of his lectures is to restore 
balance by  emphasizing the illocutionary. Because he also wants to play  old Harry 
with  the worn-out philosophical distinctions between truth  and falsehood and betwe-
en fact and value, Austin does not have time to worry  about persuasion, intimidation, 
consolation and all the other flavors of perlocutionary effect.
The other  reason that Austin leaves the perlocutionary  out of his conclusions 
has to do with  the undeniable fact that not  all speech  acts have a perlocutionary  aim. 
As Austin reminds us, promises frequently  lack perlocutionary  intent (126). The same 
goes for other ritual performatives. If I swear  to tell the whole truth in a court  of law, 
I am  not trying to persuade you of anything, and if I, as a baseball umpire, call  you 
out,  I am  not particularly  interested in your  feelings.  I just  want you to scurry  back to 
the dugout as quickly as possible. 
This objection is well taken, but limited. It should not make us forget that con-
ventional procedures leave plenty  of scope for our  perlocutionary  aims. You  might  wa-
ger  a huge sum in order  to scare me into folding (I am susceptible to bluffs) or you 
might make a solemn promise in  order to impress me with  your  probity  (I am easily 
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impressed). So, while Austin is certainly  right to deny  that  every speech act has a perlo-
cutionary  moment, it is a safe bet  that most do. It might be harder  to come up with  a 
taxonomy of these moments, but that does not mean that we are free to ignore them. 
Bearing all this in mind, I want to ask what happens if we factor the perlocu-
tionary  back into our  account of Austin’s work. What must we do to give it the impor-
tance that  Austin,  in spite of his theory, is not quite willing to lend it? What  are the 
consequences for us if we take seriously  Austin’s contention that the terms “true” and 
“false” only  stand “for a general dimension of being a right or proper thing to say…in 
these circumstances, to this audience, for these purposes and with these intentions” 
(145; emphasis added)?
The quickest way  into my  argument is to look at the claims that Alice Crary  has 
spelled out in her articles “Happy  Truth”  and “Austin and the Ethics of Discourse”  as 
well as in her book Beyond Moral Judgment.5 Crary’s discussions of Austin are really 
local skirmishes in a  much broader assault on  the tradition  of modern moral theory. 
She maintains that philosophers’ habit  of banning personal sensibility  from rational-
ity  and the concomitant restriction of moral reasoning to agreements or  disagree-
ments about judgments impoverishes our understanding of the reach of moral 
thought. Crary  looks to Austin  to show that the abstractions considered necessary  to 
ascertain the literal sentence-meaning of an utterance are of a  piece with the prejudi-
cial demand that we leave our individual sensitivities at  the door when we come to 
use moral concepts. She argues that we give up too much when we reduce our as-
sessments of utterances to consideration of literal sentence-meaning, just  as we give 
up too much when we imagine that  moral thought has to be shorn  of affect. In the 
end, we can return utterances to their native habitat  in lived experience without giv-
ing up philosophy’s demand for objectivity and rationality. 
I will not follow Crary  quite that far. By  offering an account of the place of con-
vention and the perlocutionary  in  How To Do Things With Words,  I hope to induce 
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people to adopt what I take to be Austin’s most  expansive understanding of what 
meaning means. By  emphasizing the importance of both perlocutionary  aims and 
effects, I also hope to clear some space for  the ethical and the aesthetic,  though I am 
well aware that  the both the “ethical”  and the “aesthetic” serve here as indications 
that will require further discussion. 
As I have just  rehearsed Crary’s broader  argument, I will put  her claims about 
Austin as briefly  as I can. Crary  shows that Austin organizes How To Do Things With 
Words  in such a  way  as to make it impossible for  his audience to do what 20th-cen-
tury  Anglophone philosophers like to do, that is, talk about literal sentence-meanings 
that are somehow distinguishable from  the situation of an utterance’s occurrence. He 
wants to cure them of their habit of treating sentences as if they  were susceptible to 
being either true or  false, independent of their context. Austin rejects this. He is not 
interested in  statements (or in sentences for  that  matter.) Rather, he is interested in 
entire utterances and the speech situations in which they occur.
Austin’s demonstration that constantive statements are as liable to infelicity  as 
performatives are to falsehood drives home his conclusion that we cannot differentia-
te the “meaning” of a  “statement” from the force and the occasion of its saying. (The 
scare quotes are Austin’s and Crary’s.) As How To Do Things With Words  gains 
steam, Austin argues that we cannot speak, as philosophers have been tempted to do, 
of unsituated meaning. There is no such  thing as a pure locutionary  act to which an 
illocutionary  force is then somehow added. Rather, he shows that the locutionary, the 
illocutionary  and the perlocutionary  constitute related dimensions of a  single act. At 
his most radical—and it  is Crary’s point that commentators have avoided the full im-
plications of his argument—Austin indicates that we don’t begin with “meanings” at 
all. We don’t start off with an utterance’s detachable “sense and reference”  which we 
then recast as questions or assertions or demands. Rather, force and effect are as in-
tegral to the total speech act as its sense and reference. Thus to reduce an utterance to 
its locutionary  “meaning”  gives us an  inaccurate and impoverished notion of how it is 
that utterances mean. As I have already  had occasion to mention,  in the second-to-
last  lecture of How To Do Things With Words, Austin shows that  we can only  pro-
perly  speak of meaning in the same way  that  we talk of truth, that  is,  in light  of all the 
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dimensions of an utterance’s occurrence. We have to consider  its sense and reference, 
its force, its context and its intended (and actual) effects.6
Austin’s rejection of the idea that a  statement’s meaning is independent of that 
statement’s linguistic conventions and effects does not  mean that he foregoes the 
possibility  of objective truth. According to Crary, the idea that objective truth will go 
by  the board as soon as we do away  with literal sentence-meaning (a notion that Der-
rida and Searle seem to share) is based on a sneaking metaphysical assumption that 
Austin’s conclusions do not  allow. According to Crary,  it is a fundamental feature of 
Austin’s position that there is no such thing as a “non-conventional alternative to our 
current conception of the world” (emphasis added). There is thus “no such thing as a 
comparison between our current conception and such an alternative.”  If we are rigo-
rous in our refusal of literal sentence-meanings, we have to forego “the sort of me-
taphysical vantage point from which to discern that our efforts thus to separate our-
selves [from literal sentence-meanings] cut us off from objective truth.” 7 In other 
words, to get rid of literal sentence-meaning is also to get rid of the idea that we could 
stand somewhere outside of language or convention. 
Crary  thus reminds of two important points. The first  is that  How To Do 
Things With Words is constructed as a  pedagogical text, an exemplary  demonstra-
tion of how to think a problem through. At one moment, Austin imagines that his 
audience is impatient and wants him “to cut  the cackle”  and cut to the chase (123). 
But it takes him a long time to do that.  The categorical distinction between the per-
formative and the constative, which looked so promising at  the start, has to founder 
midway  so that can see that we are not talking about separate kinds of sentences, 
but rather about features that are common to all sentences. It  takes Austin a num-
ber  of pages to show that the formulae that  might distinguish the illocutionary  from 
the perlocutionary  are not conclusive. In other words, Austin works them through 
in order to work them—and his audience—over, or, to use one of his own jokes, he 
is flogging us until we are converted. This means some of his moves are tactical 
feints.
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Crary  also reminds us of the centrality  of convention to Austin’s argument. As 
the illocutionary  is eo ipso conventional—a point that Austin makes on several occa-
sions—and as there is no non-conventional conception of the world to which we can 
appeal, a lot is riding on what he means by  “convention.” Even so, we have to come to 
terms with the fact that Austin never  provides us with  a full-blooded account of what 
“convention” means.  It might well be that some of the misunderstandings that  Aus-
tin’s work is heir to turn on a misapprehension of what Austin thinks conventionality 
actually entails. 
How To Do Things With Words begins with clear and clearly  delimited forms 
of convention,  with the ceremonies and rituals of marrying, playing cricket,  pronoun-
cing verdicts and christening ships. Austin also dwells on less institutionalized, but 
nevertheless equally  ritualized performative acts such as betting and choosing up si-
des for  games. And of course, central to his preoccupations lies the act of promising, 
which though not in itself either a ceremony  or a  ritual, serves as the basis of any 
number of rituals as well as performances of the law.8 But as Strawson noted early 
on,  Austin’s account of ritual convention does not apply  to most  of the performatives 
or illocutions that  concern him. While there are set gestures for begging and entrea-
ting, there is no ritual, per  se, for  either. Nor is there a ritual script for demanding or 
requesting or asserting or warning, let alone recommending, claiming, favoring,  pos-
tulating or  deducing. You cannot draw a straight line from  christening a baby  to re-
commending a wine or wondering if it will rain.9 
By  the same token,  we cannot say  that Austin is arguing that, as illocutionary 
acts rely  on language and as language is merely  a “conventional, convention-em-
ploying means for  getting things done,” then all  illocutionary  acts are conventional by 
virtue of their use of words.  In this view, what  makes the illocutionary  conventional is 
merely  an  the fact that it is part of an “act of speaking” or a “making use of language.” 
10 This will not do,  as Warnock notes,  because such a definition is at  best  trivial and at 
worst incorrect. Trivial, because it states the obvious: all speech acts are, by  virtue of 
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being speech, based on language. Incorrect, because some illocutionary  acts do not 
actually  require words at all. You can  make gestures of entreaty  or  deny  an allegation 
with  a mere shake of your head. So illocutionary  acts are not necessarily  linguistic. 
You cannot say  the same of locutionary  acts. You  cannot perform a locutionary  act 
without language. If any  dimension of the speech act situation is solely  and thus 
“conventionally” linguistic (in this broad sense), it is the locutionary. 
Strawson suggests that what is at stake in Austin’s insistence on the conventi-
onality  of illocutions is not conventionality  in itself, but intention. A speaker’s inten-
tion in a ceremonial speech act is not ambiguous.  What Austin calls uptake—“brin-
ging about the understanding of the meaning  and the force of the locution” (117)—is 
not  an issue in ceremonies and games, because the verbal formulas of ritual perfor-
matives leave no doubt about the meaning and the force of the formulas. This is not 
the case with other  illocutions, hence the importance of the explicit  performative (“I 
claim” or “I assert” or “I suggest”). Warnock, who agrees with Strawson, puts it this 
way: the explicit performative “conventionalizes” non-conventional illocutions. It 
makes their intended force clear.11 
This account finds the warrant  for  the explicit performative in the relative un-
der-determination of many  illocutionary  acts. Unless I make it  plain, you  might not re-
alize that my  warning is a warning, rather than a terse description of a bull or a sniper 
or an impending storm. Strawson and Warnock maintain that unless I do make it  plain, 
you might not know which illocutionary  act I intend. Their  explanation makes sense, 
but it  begs the issue of why  Austin might want to call an estimate, a recommendation or 
assurance conventional. Strawson and Warnock show  that the explicit  performative 
behaves like a convention, not  that it  is a convention. While the explicit  performative 
might serve the same function as a ritual formula, that does not make it one.
I would like to take a  crack at this problem  by  splitting the difference between 
Austin’s initial strong identification of convention with ritual and the trivial definition 
of illocutionary  convention as a mere “making use of language.”  Austin suggests that 
illocutions produce a certain range of consequences. These are different from the 
consequences that attend the perlocutionary, because they  are narrower. Perlocutio-
nary  effects sometimes—even often—depend on the idiosyncrasies of the people who 
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are addressed. In spite of my  best efforts, you might refuse to be intimidated, fail to 
be convinced, or remain unwilling to be moved by  what I say. Illocutions, on the 
other hand,  “invite by convention a  response or  a sequel” (117; emphasis added).  The 
range of this response and sequel is delimited by  the illocutionary  verb itself. If you 
ask me a  question, the question by  its very  nature invites me to answer.  (My  silence 
might in itself be an answer.) If you order me to do something, the command by  its 
very  nature invites me to obey, just  as your request invites me accede. Austin says 
that “the response or sequel might be ‘one-way’ or ‘two-way’”  (117) because there is a 
difference between committing myself by  making a promise (or claiming that I know 
something) and asking you to wipe your feet. The rules that govern these acts and 
their sequels might  be governed by  social rituals or  by  the informal sanctions we call 
manners, but they  all form part of our ability  to speak the language. If I know how to 
offer you a drink, I know that you can decline the offer.  Part of the point of uptake, 
then, is recognizing not  just  what act is being performed, but also understanding 
what sequel or response is being solicited. Illocutions are vulnerable to misfire preci-
sely because their force and thus their sequels can so easily be mistaken. 
While in  some cases my  ability  to tell the difference between a demand, a re-
quest and an entreaty  might require both  tact  and insight, the ability  to tell this diffe-
rence ultimately  lies not with my  psychological acumen or my  good manners, but  with 
my  basic linguistic competence.  The important distinctions between these acts are ins-
cribed in, or  prescribed by, our  language. They  are intrinsic to our description of the 
acts we perform and our understanding of the sequels that those acts invite. Illocutio-
nary  conventions, then, lie below the level of ritual and etiquette (although it might be 
rude not  to answer a question).  They  rest on the distinctions that we enact when we 
perform, describe or  respond to illocutionary  acts.  If I misunderstand your  request as a 
demand—if there is a  catch  in the uptake—my  response will not be the conventional 
one. The result could turn out well or badly, as either comedy or tragedy, depending. 
The linguistic rules and expectations at  play  in illocutionary  acts make their 
sequels and responses more predictable than is possible with perlocutionary  acts. 
This is because illocutions are conventional in ways that a  perlocution cannot  be.  Be-
cause I cannot say  “I persuade you,”  I cannot put you in a position where the possible 
range of sequels to my  attempt is set. I can come close to an  explicit perlocutionary 
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act by  admitting that I am  trying to persuade you, but such a statement of intent is 
usually  taken to be a sign of failure. As it is, the perlocutionary  always requires other 
means to achieve its ends—it makes use of locutionary-illocutionary  acts—and it  can-
not  speak its name except in  retrospect or  in disappointment. These are indications of 
its constitutional vulnerability.
In the end, perlocutionary  effect depends on a wide array  of context-specific 
variables,  and can never  simply  rely  on our linguistic competence the way  the illocu-
tionary  can. This is why  Cavell sees it  as a form  of improvisation. The perlocutionary 
is often the scene of surprise or disappointment.  I can  accept  your argument, but I 
might find it trivial—you have not impressed me. (If you  meant to impress me, you 
have failed.) I might not agree with your assertion  that “all flesh  is grass,” but I might 
take heart  from  your having said it. (You  have succeeded in consoling me, but not as 
you had planned.) When you warn me that jumping from the second story  into the 
snow is dangerous, I, being foolhardy, might find myself moved to fling myself from 
the window for fun. (You have persuaded me to do it, in spite of your intention. This 
can either be counted as a  failure or  as an ironic success.) In short, with the perlocu-
tionary, there is no telling how things will go. 
So, we can say  that  speech acts are conventional to the extent  that they  derive 
their locutionary  sense and their illocutionary  force from the established conventions of 
our language. Their  sense comes from our shared definitions and their force from the 
set range of responses and sequels that illocutionary  verbs invite. But there is no reason 
to take this pervasive conventionality  as a call for  skepticism. Post-Saussurean appro-
priations of Austin go against the grain  because Austin was trained as a philologist and 
had an essentially  historical view of language. He did not assume that  words get  their 
meaning from their  place in an  arbitrary  differential system  nor did he see that  conven-
tion was conclusively  arbitrary. Austin refuses to be drawn into a latter-day  Idealism 
much  in the same way  that he refuses the pragmatist doctrine “that the true is what 
works, &c.” (145). This is because he sees a cognitive value in linguistic convention and 
it is this belief that underwrites his commitment to ordinary language.
At base, Austin’s “linguistic phenomenology” consists of using “a sharpened 
awareness of our words to sharpen our perception… of the phenomena.”12  Even 
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though our expressions still incorporate “superstition and error and fantasy  of all 
kinds” (“A Plea for Excuses,”  184),  the history  of our language provides us with a rich 
inheritance of useful distinctions. Austin maintains,  famously, that “our common 
stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have found worth drawing, and the 
connexions they  have found worth marking,  in the lifetimes of many  generations”  (“A 
Plea  for Excuses,” 181).  One could hear  in this claim  a rather Burkean conserva-
tism—language here taking the place of a settled system  of manners—were it  not for 
the fact that Austin works from the premise that the history  of language forms part  of 
a larger history of social rationalization.
Austin offers an account of this rationalization in a  little bit of counter-intuiti-
ve conjectural history  about halfway  through How To Do Things With Words.  He 
suggests that the “constative statement,” the act of naming or describing is not—as 
many  philosophers have assumed—the most  primitive form  of language. In fact, the 
constative marks a late and rather sophisticated linguistic development:
[I]t  seems… likely  that  the “pure” statement  is a  goal, an ideal,  towards which 
the gradual development of science has given the impetus, as it  has likewise 
also towards the goal of precision. (73)
As he says in  an extended passage, we do not know what primitive language actually 
sounded like. It probably  consisted of imprecations rather than of flat-out assertions. 
Austin suggests that as society  has progressed, it has become increasingly  complex. 
This complexity  requires greater specialization. As a result,  language becomes more 
precise,  more fitted to the specific tasks that it is required to undertake.  In this parti-
cularly  way, our usage becomes more accurate and more rational. The explicit  per-
formative is an index of this rationalization in that responds to our need for increa-
singly  fine linguistic instruments. The same is apparently  true of the constative. In 
Austin’s eyes,  society  has to come a long way  before it  produces utterances that are 
not warnings, prayers or  commands, utterances that are only  concerned with esta-
blishing facts. The intellectual abstractions that  make up “statemental or constative” 
sentences are therefore not primitive in the slightest, but an achievement of scientific 
progress. In  this way, “statemental”  utterances represent a latter-day  accom-
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plishment in both  language and knowledge, not the zero degree from  which all lan-
guage or knowledge begin. 
It  follows, then,  that for Austin the conventions of natural language serve as 
valuable cognitive tools because they  provide relatively  up-to-date and readily  servi-
ceable distinctions and connections. He assumes that a good deal of solid knowledge 
inheres in our  linguistic conventions, provided that we have the wit  and the training 
to use those conventions with discretion. They  are, in the jargon of another tradition, 
world-disclosive. 
Convention is thus central to Austin’s account of speech acts and to his linguis-
tic phenomenology. The illocutionary  is conventional to the extent that illocutionary 
verbs entail set or predictable responses and sequels. Their intention can be made 
explicit  and that very  explicitness (in a felicitous utterance at least) then prescribes or 
limits the kinds of sequel or response that can follow. As we have seen,  the same is 
not  true of the perlocutionary.  The relative absence of conventions that could insure 
perlocutionary  effect makes that dimension of the speech act harder to schematize. 
That is not to say  that perlocutionary  acts are completely  unconventional.  They  are 
propped, after all, on the conventionality  of the both  the locutionary  and the illocuti-
onary. Nor is it to say  that we cannot predict the perlocutionary  effects of our  utte-
rances. We can reasonably  expect a certain  range of reactions to our utterances, 
though we might not always achieve our intended—or rather, our desired—goal. 
As Cavell argues, if we could shore up the perlocutionary  consequences of our 
utterances by  making our  intentions explicit,  our speech would quickly  shade over into 
magic. To persuade you by  merely  uttering the formula “I persuade you” would be tan-
tamount  to casting a spell.13 (Part of the anthropological thrust  of Austin’s speech-act 
theory  is to make speech a form  of action without turning it  into efficacious magic.) But 
if we were unable to predict any  perlocutionary  effects at all, then our conversation 
would shade over into solipsism  or  madness. Cavell puts it nicely: if the performative 
and the illocutionary  bring the “I”  primarily  into the picture, the perlocutionary  cedes 
that place to the “you.”14 That “you” might  be skittish, but its responses are not comple-
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tely  unforeseen. After  all, we have developed canons of persuasion to help speakers re-
ach their desired perlocutionary  ends. If the achievement  of perlocutionary  effects were 
entirely a matter of luck, there would be no study of rhetoric at all.
The speech act necessarily  summons forth both that “I” and that “you;”  a 
speech situation will encompass both  poles. All this is merely  to say  that the perlocu-
tionary  and the illocutionary  are not really  opposing speech acts, but distinct and 
complementary  dimensions of a single complex action that Austin calls the utterance. 
They  only  seem  to be separate acts because in  our descriptions of the speech situation 
we choose to emphasize one aspect of the utterance at the expense of the other. The 
illocutionary  dimension of the utterance tells us how  we say  things. The perlocutio-
nary dimensions tells us why. 
It  makes sense to see How To Do Things With Words not as a philosophy  of 
language,  nor as a contribution to linguistics,  but as a part  of Austin’s attempt  to 
come up with “a cautious, latter-day  version of conduct” (“A  Plea for Excuses,”  177). 
In other words, it is about human action and everyday  ethics.  How To Do Things 
With Words asks us to look at our conduct  in language. It  analyzes in some detail 
what Austin calls in the essay  on excuses “the machinery  of the action.” He induces us 
to break down the speech act  into (logical) stages, which, for  our  convenience and 
perhaps to our confusion, he sees as separate “acts.” 
Austin insists on taxonomies because he considers the problem  of “how we de-
cide what  is the correct name for 'the' action that somebody  did” (“A Plea for  Excu-
ses,” 179) to be one of the more vexing issues in the philosophy  of action. Part  of the 
problem of describing a speech act obviously  lies with determining its force and thus 
its intention. But that is not the entire problem. If we are to decide what kind of 
speech act is being performed, we also have to decide how far we should follow its 
consequences. In this, the difficulty  that faces our judgment of speech acts is no diffe-
rent than the difficulty that faces us with all other actions: 
If we are asked what a person did, 
we may  reply  either “He shot the donkey” or  “He fired a gun” or  “He pulled the 
trigger”  or “He moved his trigger finger,” and all  may  be correct. So, to shorten 
the nursery  story  of the endeavours of the old woman to drive her  pig home in 
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time to get  her  old man’s supper,  we may  in the last  resort say  that  the cat dro-
ve or got the pig, or made the pig get, over the stile. (107-8)
There are many  different  ways of describing what happens in  that nursery  tale.  Per-
haps, as Austin suggests, the cat drove the pig over  the stile.  But  the story  is about the 
old lady’s intentions and not  the cat’s success with the pig. So we might do better to 
say  that the woman got the cat  to drive the pig over the stile, or, if we want to take the 
longest view, we can reduce the story  to its nub and can say  that old lady  (finally!) got 
the pig over  the stile and got her  old man’s supper. This description, though accurate, 
would beggar the story. It would elide the cat and the dog, and the rat and the cow 
and everything else that makes it so much fun. All description comes at  a cost. It de-
pends on what you think is important. 
How we might describe an action depends on how  expansive we want to be in 
our views and what it is that we want to assess. If we emphasize the illocutionary  for-
ce of a given speech act, then we will concentrate on the relatively  short  time that 
spans the utterance’s articulation and its sequel. We will end our  account when the 
utterance achieves uptake, takes effect and is greeted with a conventional response. If 
we emphasize an utterance’s perlocutionary  aim or its effect, then we will have to take 
a longer view  of the total speech act. We will have to canvas the ways in which the 
speech act encompasses both  its perlocutionary  intention and its “consequential 
effects upon the feelings, thoughts or  actions of the audience” (101). Because our inte-
rest in the perlocutionary  dimension of an utterance necessarily  means that we can-
not  appeal to the explicit  performative to name the act and locate its intention, we 
will need to engage in  reconstruction—or depend on others’ reconstructions—to tell 
us what kind of effect was aimed at. And we will need to depend on testimony—even 
our own reports—to gauge the extent  to which that effect was achieved. More often 
than not, intention is secured retrospectively.15 
It  would seem  then that our  descriptions of speech  acts will shift with our 
emphases, and that our assessments will hew to those emphases as well. Our 
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15. Felman reminds that psychoanalysis teaches us that the utterance is  vulnerable to disruption 
so that “the act cannot know what it is doing.” I wonder if  it cannot know it, or usually  does not know it, 
at least beforehand. The intention  that marks the illocutionary  force of an utterance is  often  as opaque as 
the perlocutionary aim  of an utterance, especially  to the speaker. But that just means  that the intentions 
we ascribe to any dimension  of the speech  act are always  liable to reconstruction. Were they not, the 
course of psychoanalysis would truly be impossible, rather than merely unlikely. See Felman, 96.
judgments derive from  the scope of our descriptions. This is not unimportant. What 
we look at and how we describe a speech act will  determine how we assess it.  To fact-
check a political speech is not to judge what happens when that speech  moves an au-
dience,  and Austin’s account  reminds us that the politician is responsible for more 
than just the nimbleness of her  arguments or the accuracy  of her facts. To put it  poin-
tedly: to assess the President’s success in convincing the country  to go to war is not 
the same as judging the acuteness of his reasons. The two are related, to be sure, but 
the President in  this case is responsible for  more than just being correct. He bears a 
responsibility—it is an open question just  how far this responsibility  should ex-
tend—for  his perlocutionary  aims. As Austin  reminds us, appropriateness counts. The 
perlocutionary  dimension reminds us to take this long view. It  makes us ask about 
the reach of consequences.16 
Given all this,  we can again see why  Austin’s followers expend so little effort  on 
the perlocutionary. The perlocutionary  is messier and less visibly  conventional. It re-
quires more tact. It  also smacks of the “merely  subjective.” The illocutionary  looks—
on the surface, at  least—a lot  more solid. It can be studied by  paying attention to the 
distinctions that already  inhere in language, distinctions that seem  more objective 
and thus can be more readily  schematized. The perlocutionary, which is harder to 
abstract  and seems more or  less inextricable from context, will inevitably  turn on 
special circumstances. It  extends farther in time and brings into play  considerations 
that might at  first  seem  extraneous to the illocutionary. In short: an emphasis on the 
perlocutionary makes the boundaries of the act all that much harder to determine. 
There is also the matter of Austin’s audience’s interests. The insight of the 
early  lectures in How  To Do Things With Words—the relation of “meaning” to for-
ce—speaks to many  of the preoccupations of modern philosophy  in a  way  that the 
Austin’s claim that our task is to analyze the utterance “in these circumstance, to 
this audience, for these purposes and with these intentions” does not. But  as my 
handling of these issues undoubtedly  shows, I am not by  profession a philosopher. I 
was trained to read and write about literature and I come to Austin to help me think 
about  the particular  issues that concern someone who teaches novels and poems for 
a living. 
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16. See Cavell, “Performative and Passionate Utterances,” 164, 174.
While I have wanted to remain true to what I see as the unacknowledged radica-
lism  of Austin’s thought, I have purposefully  resorted on a number  of occasions to a 
more traditional language of discrimination and judgment to describe what I unders-
tand as the task that Austin sets for  us. It  strikes me that a due consideration of the per-
locutionary  dimension of speech acts returns us to both ethics and aesthetics. If that is 
the case, then my  interests here differ  from the usual literary-critical appropriation of 
Austin’s work in the English-speaking world since the deconstructive turn of the late 
1970s. That  interpretation has tended to emphasize the inaugural and the dramaturgi-
cal possibilities of the performative—what it sees as the scandal of reference—and thus 
has ignored the perlocutionary  dimension almost completely.17 There are any  number 
of reasons for this particular  bias, not the least of which  is the (relative) distrust that 
much—though certainly  not all—contemporary  literary  criticism  has shown towards 
effects, affects and aesthetics as a whole. 18 I am wagering  that an interest in the perlo-
cutionary would prompt us to take longer and broader views than we now entertain.
 A reassessment of the perlocutionary  should also lead us to reassess the place 
that Austin assigns to literature in How To Do Things With Words. Early  on,  Austin 
notoriously  dismisses the literary  uses of performatives as “not serious” and “para-
sitic”  (22). He makes a similar claim in “Performative Utterances”  where he main-
tains that what is said in poetry isn’t “seriously meant.” 19 
Much has been made of this claim over the years.  I wonder if in fact too  much 
has not been made of these comments and not  enough—except perhaps by  sympathetic 
CONVERSATIONS                                                                                                                                                                        4 58
17. See Jonathan Culler, “Philosophy and Literature: The Fortunes of the Performative,” Poe-
tics Today 21.3 (2000), 503-519 and his discussion of  Austin  in  Theory of the  Lyric (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University  Press, 2015) 109-31. Literary  theorists  like the drama  of  the performative and thus 
tend to ignore the second half  of How To Do Things With Words,  which puts the performative in its 
place. This is true even in  J. Hillis Miller’s oddly uncharitable account of  Austin  in Speech Acts in Lite-
rature  (Stanford: Stanford University  Press, 2003). As Glen  Odom  has noted, Miller  treats  perlocutio-
nary effects  as if they  were performative acts. See Glen Odom, “Finding  the Zumbah: An  Analysis of 
Infelicity  in Speech Acts in Literature,” in  Provocations to Reading: J. Hillis Miller and the  Demo-
cracy to Come  ed. Barbara  Cohen and Dragan  Kujundzic (New ork: Fordham University  Press, 2005), 
269. In a different sphere, Judith Butler  has been  remarkably creative in  her use of speech act theory. 
For a critique of  her reading of Austin, see Geoff Boucher, “The Politics of Performativity: A  Critique of 
Judith  Butler,” Parrhesia 1  (2006), 112-41. I expressed similar misgivings, though  in  a Habermasian 
vein, in "Going Public: Habermas, Butler and Discursive Action," Anglistik 5.2 (1995), 115-130.
18. My own interest in Austin  and the perlocutionary  owes everything  to Sianne Ngai’s  Our 
Aesthetic Categories: Zany, Cute, Interesting (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012).
19. “And I might mention that, quite differently again, we could be issuing any of these utte-
rances, as we can  issue an  utterance of any  kind whatsoever, in the course, for example, of acting  a play 
or making  a joke or writing a  poem—in which  case of course it would not be seriously  meant  and we 
shall  not be able to say  that we seriously performed the act concerned.” J. L. Austin, “Performative Ut-
terances,” Philosophical Papers, 241.
readers such as Maximilian de Gaynesford20—has been made of Austin’s telling obser-
vation  that a performative utterance will  “be in a peculiar way hollow or void if said by 
an actor on the stage, or if introduced in a poem” (22; emphasis added). De Gaynesford 
argues, correctly  I think, that Austin is not  saying all that  much about poetry  here.  He is 
merely  observing—and this is hardly  a revolutionary  insight on Austin’s part—that per-
formative utterances in poems do not take effect in the way  that performative utteran-
ces might  take effect in everyday  life. Poetry  exempts the poet from  her commitments 
to some degree. The promise that the poet makes in a poem is not one that she is expec-
ted to keep. In literature, our performatives act “in a peculiar way.”21
Given my  emphasis on conventions above,  I would like to recast de Gaynes-
fort’s point  in  slightly  different terms. Literature is highly  conventional in almost 
every  sense, from the complications of literary  form to the specialized modes of rea-
derly  attention that those complications require. Competence in literary  reading re-
quires training beyond mere linguistic mastery, and competence in literary  writing 
requires training beyond the shibboleths of grammar and usage. Our education in li-
terature and its conventions teaches us to accept forms of thought  and expression 
that we would consider  suspect in  other parts of our  lives. In other  words, literature is 
different because it  works differently  and its difference is why  we call it  “literature”  in 
the first place. We distinguish it from other kinds of utterance for a reason.
In literature, the performative utterance becomes “peculiarly”  hollow  or void 
because the conventions of literature supervene and trump those of everyday  use. On 
stage, the conventions of the performative that  would, in  ordinary, non-literary  con-
texts govern the force of an utterance, do not obtain or else they  obtain differently. 
We know from  our competence in literature that  we are not obliged to rush out to 
obey  an order even though Donne has delivered it. (And because we are competent 
readers of literature, we know that his command that we catch a falling star is impos-
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20. See Maximilian de Gaynesford, “How Not  To Do Things With  Words: J. L. Austin on Poe-
try,” British Journal of Aesthetics  51.1 (2011), 30-49. See also Christopher Ricks, “Austen’s Swink,” 
University of Toronto Quarterly 61.3 (1992), 297-315.
21. This is a different claim  than  Searle’s assertion that fiction is made possible by “a  set  of 
conventions which suspend the normal operation of the rules relating illocutionary acts to the world.” 
Searle is perhaps too imprecise here. He is talking  about the rules of reference and therefore locution-
ary ‘meaning’ (sense and reference) rather  than  illocutionary force. In the discussion that follows, I am 
claiming that one of the conventions of literature is  that it suspends in ‘a  peculiar way’ the conventions 
that govern locutionary reference and illocutionary  force. See John Searle, “The Logical  Status of  Fic-
tional Discourse,” Expression and Meaning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 67.
sible to begin with.) Something happens to the illocutionary  force in  literature and 
this “something” affects the sequel and the response that it solicits as well. 
So far so good: none of this is particularly  novel. Just  as we know that “it is on-
ly  a story,”  we know that it is “only  a poem.” This means that the “hollow”  or  “void” 
performatives that appear in a literary  work more often than not do not serve their 
usual illocutionary  ends. Orders are not meant to be taken as orders; promises do not 
take effect as promises.  Instead, they  are serving perlocutionary  aims. Literature thus 
can be said to follow  the loose perlocutionary  formula (“By  saying x, I was doing y”).22 
By  ordering us to “Go and catch a falling star,”  Donne is trying to convince us that 
women are naturally  (and therefore inevitably) inconstant.  Put most crudely, illocuti-
onary  force, which undergoes in  literature what Austin calls the “sea-change of speci-
al circumstances” (22), is directed towards perlocutionary  goals, such as boring, exci-
ting, enervating, amusing,  entertaining, perplexing, scaring, consoling, convincing, 
reassuring, horrifying, annoying or just  plain  moving an audience. If I am correct that 
literary  conventions supervene (or suspend) conventional illocutionary  force, then 
the literary, by  Austin’s lights, becomes precisely  the realm  of the perlocutionary. Let 
me stake my  claim  as clearly  as possible: against the deconstructive reading of Austin, 
I am suggesting that the literary  is not  “performative” in  any  scandalous way. I am 
suggesting that the performative in literature serves largely  perlocutionary  aims. I am 
thus dragging the literary back to pragmatics, aesthetics and everyday ethics.
If I had more space, I would try  all this out on an actual literary  text, but there 
is only  time for a peroration here,  and a short one at  that. So here goes: in this essay, 
I have asked if we want to rise to Austin’s provocations. As I have really  only  concen-
trated on one of those provocations—the unacknowledged importance of the perlocu-
tionary  in his work—I will limit my  final question to this.  How seriously  do we want 
to take the perlocutionary  dimension of our  utterances? If we do want to take it, and 
therefore Austin, seriously, then we must learn to measure meaning—all mea-
ning—on our pulses.23
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22. For this “slippery” perlocutionary formula,” see How To Do Things With Words, 122-132.
23. I owe a  deep debt of gratitude to two colleagues. Charles Jones, a  linguist and keen  reader 
of Austin ruffled up my  all-too-placid interpretation  of Austin  and kindly  pointed out my  errors. Ted 
Kinnaman, a philosopher, also saved me from  some silly mistakes. The mistakes  that  remain are my 
responsibility, not theirs.
Little Did He Know: Cavell Absorbed 
by Nietzschean Esotericism
BRUCE KRAJEWSKI
If he gets the crime into the prose…
CAVELL, in response to Charles Bernstein’s question about 
whether it matters that a philosopher or poet’s criminal or 
morally questionable life impacts their work’s relevance 
Through Nietzsche, tradition  has been shaken to its roots. It has 
completely lost  its self-evident truth. We are left  in  this  world 
without any authority, any direction.
LEO STRAUSS, “Religious Situation of the Present”
Continental philosophers and their  followers seem  to be,  for the most part,  un-
troubled by  the machinations, lies, political accommodations, inactions, and ethical 
breaches by  major figures in that tradition.1 This does not lead to recognition of irony 
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1. The problem  stretches back to Plato and the foundational  political  paradigm that  there are 
supposed to be rulers and those ruled (the Republic), which  doesn’t prevent interpretations of that 
work as “a democratic epic poem.” See James Kastely, The Rhetoric of Plato’s Republic (Chicago: Uni-
versity  of  Chicago Press, 2015). Besides the thinkers addressed in  this essay  (e.g., Friedrich  Nietzsche, 
Martin  Heidegger, Stanley Cavell), many  others have long ignored ethico-political  problems in  philo-
sophical  esotericism. A  short bibliography  on  the matter includes: Steven Ungar’s Scandal and After-
effect: Blanchot and France  since  1930 (Minneapolis: University  of Minnesota Press, 1995); Gada-
mer’s Repercussions: Reconsidering Philosophical Hermeneutics, ed., Bruce Krajewski (Berkeley: 
University  of California Press, 2004), hereafter  GR; Peter  Brooks, “The Strange Case of Paul  de Man” 
in  The  New York Review of Books  (April  3, 2014), 44-47, an article that mostly  makes excuses  for  de 
Man; Shadia  Drury, Leo Strauss and the American Right (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999); 
Thomas Sheehan, “Emmanuel  Faye: The Introduction of Fraud into Philosophy? In Philosophy Today, 
59.3 (Summer 2015), 367-400, an  essay  that thinks it sensible to ask “Is  there anything at all  in the 102 
volumes of  [Heidegger’s] Gesamtausgabe  that is  not contaminated…?”; Geoff  Waite, Nietzsche’s 
Corps/e: Aesthetics, Politics, Prophecy, Or, the  Spectacular Technoculture  of Everyday Life  (Dur-
ham: Duke University  Press, 1996) – Tim Brennan calls Waite’s book “the most informed and creative 
take on Nietzsche’s writings in  English”; Bruce Krajewski, “The Dark Side of Phrónēsis: Revisiting the 
Political Incompetence of Philosophy,” Classica, Vol. 24, 1&2 (2011): 7-21. Accessed 16 January  2016. 
http://revista.classica.org.br/classica/article/view/166/155.
by  the scholars who then recommend these major  figures as guides for ethics.2 Cathe-
rine Zuckert goes so far as to that “philosophical dialogue and textual hermeneutics 
are essentially  ethical” (GR, 234).  Cavell has chosen to declare an ethics as well. The 
theme of “moral perfectionism” that one can find in many  of Cavell’s books, particu-
larly  the works dealing with the repositioning of Thoreau and Emerson, is part of an 
ongoing project  to locate something “American” in concerns about “moral perfectio-
nism” and the everyday.  We even have a  book about what “Christians might learn 
from [Cavell].” 3 Stanley  Bates can serve as a representative of a chorus of writers who 
not  only  embrace Cavell  as someone presenting an ethical viewpoint, but  who also 
have become proponents of that viewpoint.4 Bates has no hesitation in  claiming on 
Cavell’s behalf a  connection between ethics and politics: “Cavell is interested in the 
dimension of moral life that  must be lived by  an individual within a political setting, a 
life that  a ‘good enough’ state of political justice makes possible,  but that is not, and 
cannot be, determined by  rules” (SCE,  42-43). Bates ends his essay  by  telling us that 
in  at  least one important way, Cavell is like Nietzsche, and it seems as if Bates intends 
that to be a  positive comparison. Bates seems free of any  knowledge of Nietzsche’s 
posthumous “political setting” in the National Socialist period.
While this essay  will provide evidence that Cavell has been coopted by  Niet-
zsche and Nietzsche’s followers, I do not expect  the data or the argument to convince 
people, especially  Cavell’s acolytes. “Facts don’t necessarily  have the power  to change 
our minds.” 5 In part, the problem  becomes, as with Nietzsche himself, a  bifurcation at 
fundamental levels of understanding. As Stanley  Corngold and Geoff Waite have re-
ported: “For every  person who reads Nietzsche as the step-grandfather  of fascism  or 
German National Socialism’s indirect apologist, at least two embrace him  as a man of 
the Left: whether allegedly  for having made himself fascist in order to better fight  fas-
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2. Johanna Hodge, Heidegger and Ehtics  (New York: Routledge, 1995); Heidegger has even 
been appropriated as an  environmental  ethicist—see David E. Story, Naturalizing Heidegger: His 
Confrontation with Nietzsche, His Contributions to Environmental Philosophy  (Albany: State Univer-
sity of New York Press, 2015).
3. Peter Dula, Cavell, Companionship, and Christian Theology (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), x.
4. Stanley Bates, “Stanley  Cavell  and Ethics,” in Stanley Cavell, ed. Ricahrd Eldridge (New 
York: Cambridge University  Press, 2003), 15-47; hereafter  SCE. See almost all  the articles  in The 
Journal of Aesthetic Education 48.3 (Fall 2014).
5. Joe Keohane, “How Facts Backfire,” The Boston Globe, July 11, 2010, http://www.boston.com 
/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2010/07/11/how_facts_backfire.
cism [a jaw-dropping quotation  from  the philosopher François Laruelle] or  for his 
deconstruction and rejection of the moral and conceptual preconditions of fascism.” 6 
One might take the Nietzsche case as paradigmatic for a host of thinkers, almost all of 
whom were, or have been, infected by  Nietzsche—Heidegger,  Wittgenstein, Maurice 
Blanchot, Paul de Man, Leo Strauss, Gadamer, Irigary,  Derrida, Donna Haraway, and 
Judith Butler, to name a few. 
My  narrative is akin to a detective story. The important details of the case are 
not at the crime scene however. Remember, if the crime gets into the prose. The detec-
tive genre brings me back to Cavell. Cavell remarks in his autobiography, Little Did I 
Know, that  Edgar  Allan Poe’s writings make a “decisive cameo appearance”  in Cavell’s 
own work.  As Stephen Mulhall notes in his book Stanley Cavell: Philosophy’s Recoun-
ting of the Ordinary,7  Cavell undertakes some impressive close reading of Poe’s “The 
Imp of the Perverse” by  focusing on the plethora of words in the tale that that  contain 
“imp.” The level of attention given to that tale by  Cavell equals the kind of intensive 
hermeneutical scrutiny  Cavell brought to Thoreau in Senses of Walden. Both Cavell and 
Mulhall claim that the “imp” text demonstrates how the ordinary  and the everyday  ope-
rate beneath human radar. The argument from  both Cavell and Mulhall is that most  
readers (except perhaps for some gifted philosophers) do not notice the recurrence of 
the “imp” words in Poe’s own tale. This overlooking will serve as a  framing device for 
what  follows. The first bit of evidence lies in  Cavell’s “The World as Things”  in Philo-
sophy the Day after Tomorrow.8  That piece brings Cavell to Poe’s famous detective 
Dupin, and to “The Murders in the Rue Morgue,” a narrative that allows Cavell to enter 
the contemporary  discourse of the Posties: the postmodernists,  postcolonialists, post-
capitalists, and in this case, the posthumanists,  whose discourse, among other things, 
questions distinctions between animals and humans, as if we can always tell the one 
from  the other.  More importantly, I want to dwell on Cavell’s comment about the genre 
of the detective story,  its “function of warding off the knowledge that we do not know 
the origins of human plans, why  things are made to happen as they  do.”9 On this rea-
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6. Stanley Corngold and Geoffrey Waite, “A  Question of  Responsibility: Nietzsche with Hölder-
lin  at War, 1914-1946,” in Nietzsche, Godfather of Fascism?: On the Abuses of a Philosophy  (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 196, emphasis added by Corngold and Waite.
7. Stephen  Mulhall, Stanley Cavell: Philosophy’s Recounting of the  Ordinary  (Oxford: Clar-
endon Press, 1999). 
8. Cavell, “The World as Things,”  in Philosophy the  Day After Tomorrow  (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2005), 236-80.
9. Cavell, “The World as Things,” 247.
ding, the detective genre, even of the cozy  mystery  variety, is not what it seems; it  ope-
rates beneath the human radar that takes the genre as following in  the footsteps of Aris-
totle’s Poetics.  Aristotle and his followers insist that a proper  tragic narrative leaves 
threads that come together in a  knot,10 in a fashion that  produces a comforting etio-
logy—things happened for a reason. Cavell’s insight is that the detective genre is exactly 
what  is non-Aristotelian, and it  deceives its readers by  frequently  offering us detectives 
who seem  to wrap up cases by  retrospectively  imposing Aristotelian knots where Poe’s 
knots are slipknots demonstrating that  crime stories expose holes in  epistemology 
rather than producing closure that allows people/characters to move on  with their 
everyday lives in the face of further, apparently ceaseless, criminality.11
My  aim is to show, using Cavell’s own trope in his section on Nietzsche in Ci-
ties of Words, that  Cavell is a victim of Nietzschean vampirism  (etymologically,  ab-
sorption is being “sucked in,”  or  less politely, being a sucker).12  When it  comes to 
Nietzsche, Cavell has it right that he missed something  important. His description of 
the detective genre captures Nietzsche’s strategy—not knowing the origin of human 
plans.  Cavell seems unaware of Nietzsche’s Nachlass, in which Nietzsche addresses a 
kind of writing  that deliberately  places its agenda inside what  looks to be clear packa-
ging. It’s a  version of clear air turbulence.  You don’t  see the danger  until you have 
flown into it  and become its victim. We don’t  have interpretive radar for  that. Note 
how Cavell  emphasizes Nietzsche’s “clarity”  and plainness in his defense of Nietzsche 
against Rawls in the section from Cities of Words. 
Here is my  thesis, since some readers might feel uncomfortable without such 
an announcement. While Cavell has applied “logical esotericism”  to his understan-
ding of Wittgenstein,13 Cavell fails to read Nietzsche as well as Heidegger as esoteri-
CONVERSATIONS                                                                                                                                                                        4 64
10. Aristotle, Poetics, 1455b24. See the Gerald Else English translation of the Poetics.
11. See Slavoj Žižek, Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan through Popular Cul-
ture  (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology  Press, 1991), especially  the chapter “Two 
Ways to Avoid the Real of Desire.”
12. Cavell, Cities of Words: Pedagogical Letters on a Register of the  Moral Life  (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University  Press, 2004). The telling  section begins on 219, in which  Cavell  objects to John 
Rawls’s reading of Nietzsche as non-egalitarian. Cavell  wants Nietzsche in the democratic camp, despite 
evidence to the contrary. Cavell  notices that when Nietzsche makes certain claims about human  beings in 
general, those claims can “sound bad,” but Cavell  presses  on to make Nietzsche’s case for Übermenschen, 
all the while denying that Nietzsche believes that ruling others is only for a special few.
13. Waite, Nietzsche’s Corps/e, 199-205. “Just as Cavell’s ‘esoteric’ does not take seriously 
enough  the possibility  of  intentional manipulation by authors at the level of textual production, so 
also it does not suggest a way  of  analyzing  texts appropriately at the  level of consumption. This failure 
is unacceptable in dealing with Nietzsche/anism” (201).
cists, and thus falls victim to their  pernicious ideology. Nietzsche in his Nachlass  had 
proclaimed: “My  writings should be so obscure [dark] and incomprehensible!” (Mei-
ne Schriften sollen so dunkel und unverständlich sein!).14 In Cities of Words, Cavell 
portrays Nietzsche as a champion of a kind of independence, a methodology  for  “be-
coming who you are,” à la Charlotte in Now, Voyager.  It  is a  crucial hermeneutical 
problem that Cavell takes Nietzsche at face value, despite ample evidence, which  you 
can find,  among other  places in Geoff Waite’s book Nietzsche’s  Corps/e, that Niet-
zsche, like Heidegger and Wittgenstein, kept the real, anti-egalitarian agenda  off the 
main stage. 
If Cavell read the Nachlass, perhaps he could have read this 1884  Nietzsche 
passage plainly, and come to a different conclusion about  Nietzsche’s intentions: 
“First  Basic Law: no consideration for  numbers: the masses. The suffering and 
unhappy  concern us little—only  the foremost and most successful exemplars, so that 
they  don’t get short shrift out of consideration for the ill-bred ones (i.e.,  the masses). 
Destruction  of the ill-bred—to this aim  one must emancipate oneself from  previous 
morality.”15 
Hardly  anyone, including philosophers who make a  living teaching and pu-
blishing about Wittgenstein, read Wittgenstein’s Koder  diaries or  the Geheime Ta-
gebücher,  secret  diaries, which have yet  to be translated into English. Here was the si-
tuation in the early  1990s, as described by  Jaako Hintikka, a well known Wittgenstein 
scholar: Wittgenstein made double use of his notebooks. Besides using them to jot 
down philosophical ideas as they  occurred to him, he used the very  same notebooks to 
record other observations. In order to prevent any  casual reader from  having access to 
his private thoughts, he used a code to record the private matters. The coded passages 
have been deciphered. A pirated edition of the coded parts of the 1914-16 notebooks 
was published in 1985 in  the magazine Saber in Barcelona.16 Much  as Heidegger’s fa-
mily  has kept a tight rein on how Heidegger’s works have been published, Wittgens-
tein’s literary  executors restrict access to the coded passages.  They  are supposed to be 
censored from the microfilms distributed by  the Cornell University  Library,  though  at 
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de Gruyter, 1974, 71. Hereafter as KGA.
16. See Wittgenstein in Florida, ed. Jaako Hintikka (Boston: Kluwer Academic, 1991).
least one major university  library  received an unexpurgated copy. This is the kind of 
situation in which close reading is useless. You  cannot read closely  what is not  availa-
ble,  but people can do their homework. That is, with a little digging, it’s possible to 
learn about the secret  writings of these philosophers. The North American audience for 
this essay  is familiar  with the TMZ-like electricity  that  has taken place in the Heidegge-
rian world of scholars over  the publication of the Schwarze Hefte, the “Black Note-
books,”  which were “under seal” until their publication in  German in 2014.  The release 
of those notebooks caused the chair  of the Martin Heidegger  Society, Günter Figal, to 
resign his position this time last year. Günter Figal’s epiphany  that  one of his favorite 
authors had written numerous passages that reek of anti-Semitism, late in  coming as 
that Aha-Erlebnis was,  lends credence to a view that  foregrounding the esotericism  in 
Continental philosophy  is not fruitless. Others might also be saved from thinking  that 
Nietzsche, Cavell, Heidegger  and company  are misread leftists,  or benign conservatives, 
or truly  wretched beings whose philosophies must be bracketed from  their personal li-
ves,  as if the personal lives and the philosophies were not, in these particular  cases, 
reinforcing. You  are also familiar with the rhetorical move of claiming certain  thinkers 
have early  and late phases, and one phase needs to be ignored while another  elevated. 
Those versed in the scholarship on Wittgenstein will recognize that move as a 
commonplace. This is the same tactic Cavell uses with Nietzsche to ease Cavell’s consci-
ence, I suppose, about  the obvious impact that a  word like Übermenschen has on  a 
post-Hitlerian audience. Cavell prefers to think of the Nietzsche of Beyond Good and 
Evil as the untainted Nietzsche, despite claims by  Nietzsche scholars like James Porter 
in his Nietzsche and the Philology of the Future,  who writes: “What is less well recogni-
zed is that in his later writings Nietzsche continues to treat  the same problems that he 
had treated in his earlier writings, and often in the same ways.” 17 
Porter’s claim works in a  world of close reading, when the important materials 
are there for the reading. The claim becomes problematic in the world of esotericism. 
The context of philosophical esotericism in the West, connected to the thinkers alre-
ady  mentioned, is now better known, thanks to the work of Arthur  Melzer.18 In Ber-
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17. James I. Porter, Nietzsche  and the Philology of the  Future  (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2002), 2.
18. Arthur  M. Melzer, Philosophy Between the  Lines: The Lost History of Esoteric Writing 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014). 
nard Yack’s review of Melzer’s 2014  book, Yack writes: “Melzer amass[es] an enor-
mous amount of testimony, testimony  from major  figures in every  age from Classical 
Antiquity  through the Renaissance and Enlightenment,  confirming knowledge and 
approval of these ways of esoteric means of communicating philosophic ideas. Esote-
ric writing, this testimony  makes clear, was no secret.  It was a familiar and unre-
markable feature of the Western philosopher's intellectual landscape right up to the 
beginning of the 19th  century.”19 Yack is a bit  flippant with the acceptance of esoteri-
cism among philosophers and academics. Yack makes it seem as if what Melzer offers 
is uncontroversial, but a great  deal is at stake. Plato’s Seventh Letter might serve as 
an example. Plato’s letter  is a text unimportant to Cavell’s thinking, though Cavell has 
a great deal to say  about Plato’s Republic. As you  will recall it’s in the Seventh Letter 
that Plato makes the claim  that philosophers would be better off not making public 
their real ideas.  It is too dangerous, and he obviously  must have the fate of Socrates 
in  mind in making that statement. Yet,  classicists and philosophers are still working 
to discredit  the Seventh Letter as an authentic Platonic text. In  a 2015 book entitled 
The Pseudo-Platonic Seventh Letter by  Myles Burnyeat and Michael Frede,  the 
authors attempt a weak case in that direction, one easily  dismantled by  Charles 
Kahn.20 Plato’s explanation of the motivation of philosophical esotericism  in the Se-
venth Letter was one of the motivations for Leo Strauss’s famous work Persecution 
and the Art of Writing, one of the key  texts in thinking through  the political implica-
tions of the ongoing history of esotericism, close reading, and cryptography.21 
On to the serious business about Cavell. Cavell admits in his autobiography 
Little Did I  Know  that Cavell thinks Heidegger’s dalliance with National Socialism 
was “impermanent,” and does not seem to link it to Heidegger’s extended interest in 
Nietzsche nor Heidegger’s propagation of Nietzsche’s work in Heidegger’s famous 
two-volume study  of Nietzsche, published in 1961, but based on earlier  lectures which 
arose out of Heidegger’s so-called discovery  of Nietzsche sometime between 1927  and 
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1933.22 As early  as 1921,  Heidegger  had written to Karl Jaspers about forming an “in-
visible community”  of those interested in the philosophical topics occupying Hei-
degger. In Being and Time, Heidegger  writes that “the ultimate business of philosophy 
is to preserve the force of the most elemental in which  Dasein expresses itself, and to 
keep it  from common understanding.”23 This is of a piece with  Nietzsche’s comments 
in his Nachlass that his works are not meant for common, ignorant people.
In a recent brief and elliptical discussion, the poet Charles Bernstein has with 
Cavell about Heidegger and National Socialism, Cavell is at pains to suggest that he 
would think differently  about Heidegger, had Heidegger “actually  laid hands on peo-
ple.” This misses the point of esoteric politics bent on war. One has others put hands 
on people, while one’s own hands remain seemingly  unstained. It’s a version of drone 
wars at which philosophers excel.  Cavell seems to have no idea of what it means for 
Nietzsche to have described himself as “dynamite,” and to have predicted his own rise 
from the dead: “To be ignited in 300 years—that is my  desire for  fame.” 24 A contem-
porary  analogue to this is playing out in Germany  at the moment, with the success of 
a book about the return of Hitler  by  Timur Vermes and the subsequent film entitled 
Er ist Da Wieder (Look Who’s Back).25
The evidence of Cavell’s questionable moral reading—by  a  man who has labe-
led his own work as instructions in the moral life, and who claims that Nietzsche and 
Heidegger  and others deserve our attention as readers and students, and should ad-
just  our moral lives—rests,  if nowhere else, in  a  few minutes of the podcast with  his 
former student Charles Bernstein. I have transcribed the relevant section. 
BERNSTEIN: Do you think that a philosopher’s or  a  poet’s work should be jud-
ged by  their moral conduct in the world or  by  the work itself? Does the 
bad things that people do—I mean, there are many  famous examples 
that will immediately  come to your  mind as I say  that [laughter from 
CB]—does it negate the work?
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CAVELL: Well, I mean, it would have to be a pretty  bad life to negate the work. I 
mean, if you’re a child molester, I’m not going to read your writing.
BERNSTEIN: Well, That would be a  good example. Those aren’t the paradigma-
tic examples,  but why  not? Why  couldn’t  someone be a  child molester? 
And would it make a difference whether  it was a poet or philosopher? 
Or an artist or a philosopher?
CAVELL: That’s a really very good question.
BERNSTEIN: Yeah,  that’s my  question for  you. It’s a  real question I have wanted 
to ask you, because I figure you thought about it in some way.
CAVELL: Well,  not enough. Not enough. I am willing to go very far with  the 
voice that’s actually  in the words,  in  the text. But what it brings to mind 
is how utterly  it  depends on both sides of that—what the criminal aspect 
of the writer has been.
BERNSTEIN: So it’s the particular nature of the crime?
CAVELL: It’s the nature of the crime, and it’s the nature of the prose, both. If he 
gets the crime into the prose, and has something important to say  about 
it,  and isn’t trying to polish  it over, or [can’t make out] an excuse about 
it, or something, then I might feel moved by it.
BERNSTEIN: And would it make a difference if it was philosophy? That we 
would want a philosopher  or  could somehow not take seriously  the 
work of a philosopher who…
CAVELL: I think the aroma of a bad life, if it’s bad enough, is going to be there, 
and if you know about it, you’re going to have to deal with it.
BERNSTEIN: It’s hard to see with a poet, although people would say  that. If you 
write some poem that’s a wonderful poem that exists, it  can’t really  be 
compromised, but many  people wouldn’t say  that. So, I mean, the poe-
try example most famous is [Ezra] Pound.
CAVELL: Well, yes, that’s a good instance. And it’s a  problem. And sometimes 
you get caught up in the problem, and sometimes you leave the crap 
behind, and you are in  the mood, you’re in the poem. But I don’t think 
there’s a formula for this.
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BERNSTEIN: And the other one that  I’m obviously  leading to, because it’s a per-
son you write about, is Heidegger.
CAVELL: Yeah. That’s a very good instance.
BERNSTEIN: Yeah, of course.  Your relation to Heidegger  is interesting. He 
seems fundamental to you. At  some point in your  work,  but  at the same 
time, not—can I put that—you sort of don’t want to turn away  from 
Heidegger  it  seems to me in the writing. But I don’t actually  know what 
at this point in your life—you certainly  haven’t  been writing about  it  re-
cently, you think about that. Because I think even the thinking about 
what the relationship to Heidegger’s work as the rector was has for 
many  people contaminated the ability  to read the later Heidegger (Poe-
try, Language, and Truth) or certainly  Being and Time—There’s so-
mething about that Nazi, Aryan supremacy—just because you put the 
two things together, you all of a sudden start to see it there. If you want 
to.  Once you  put that on there, then all of a sudden you project that in. I 
mean,  is that unfair? Is that  accurate to the work? Is it fair  to philo-
sophy, or the philosophy  that is important to you, because there are 
things that are said there that are needed?
CAVELL: I am  just  going to say  it depends. If he had been a murderer, I mean, 
actually laid hands on…
Cavell says he has thought about these ethico-political matters, but “not  enough.” 
Bernstein expected otherwise. Cavell’s response to Bernstein is in a special cadence in 
the podcast. There is a deliberateness in delivery  leading up to the “it  depends.” Ca-
vell introduces contingencies and conditional clauses. “If he gets the crime into the 
prose” and “if he actually  laid hands on.” Some boundary  exists, and once the boun-
dary  is crossed (when the crime enters the prose,  and when the hands are laid),  then 
it’s possible to make judgments and larger ethical decisions,  perhaps as dramatic as 
Cavell’s statement about the writings of a  child molester. On this line of thinking, a 
threshold must be achieved,  establishing the groundwork for  an ethical position, a 
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commission of an act that leaves unspoken whether ethical thought also needs to 
address acts of omission. Time for a closer look at “it depends.” 
Cavell’s “it  depends” functions as a  refuge for  those who do not want to deal 
with the dark side of Heidegger, or  Nietzsche, or Gadamer, or  Blanchot, or de Man.26 
It  can  reach absurd levels, such as Sheehan’s reliance on exact  numbers that get  us 
specifically  nowhere. In Sheehan’s criticism  of Faye, and doubtless it’s as much  a per-
sonal criticism as a defense of Heidegger, Sheehan writes: “Being and Time is a thickly 
argued book comprised of 497  pages and 143,000 words in the German. But despite 
the magnitude of his claim, Faye devotes only  1550 words to his analysis of Hei-
degger’s magnum  opus – while in  the process passing a damning judgment on the en-
tire book” (EF, 379).27 Would 1,551  words of analysis have been better, more to the 
point, justified the “damning judgment”? The number of words to reach the important 
threshold (for Sheehan to accept Faye’s judgment) is never  mentioned. On the other 
side, someone like Jean Grondin, official biographer  for Gadamer, wants to claim that 
because Gadamer had some Jewish friends during the National Socialist period, that 
fact serves as exculpatory  evidence that he could not be an anti-Semite, or someone 
who accommodated National Socialism. For  Cavell, Heidegger  must have actually  laid 
hands on… on whom? The presupposition must be that we lack an episode reporting 
Heidegger strangling one of his Jewish colleagues or pushing a  concentration camp 
prisoner into an oven or  punching an Allied soldier  in the face during a battle. There’s 
that kind of “laying hands on.” Would that be the necessary  scenario for  Cavell, the 
man ready  to stop reading the writing of child molesters,  to acknowledge the stain that 
runs across Heidegger’s works? On the other  hand, we also lack episodes in which 
Heidegger actually  laid hands on any  National Socialist or  Nazi sympathizer who 
might have been involved in harming others—if “laying hands on” is the decisive crite-
rion. But it is not, any  more than one would make ethical judgments about a sniper 
using the “actually  laid hands on”  line of defense, since “laying  hands on” could not  be 
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taken literally  by  Bernstein or  other listeners to the podcast with Cavell. In the Ger-
man Criminal Code prior to 1968, anyone who was convicted as an accomplice to a 
crime was subject to the same penalty  as the perpetrator. 28  Cavell must  have been 
thinking about Heidegger in a different legal frame in response to Bernstein’s questi-
on, a question that  apparently  has not been troubling Cavell or his followers, especially 
the ones who want to foist a Cavellian ethics upon us.
In the “actually  laid hands on” defense of Heidegger,  Cavell offers a version of 
the Doubting Thomas narrative. The wound/crime is real, only  if one can touch it, put 
hands on it, through it. Elsewhere, such as in his interpretation of E.T.A. Hoffmann’s 
“The Sandman,”  Cavell seems to warn his readers against such literal-minded skepti-
cism, while suggesting that a skeptical crisis can spread throughout a  community, and 
looks like a massive reconsideration of reality  itself (a situation that seems necessary 
for Cavell and his acolytes). Might some listeners to the podcast  say  that Cavell is gi-
ving the proverbial “benefit  of the doubt”  in the absence of overwhelming empirical 
evidence of hands being laid on someone? Must we have overwhelming empirical evi-
dence of bloody  acts by  Heidegger before we wonder  about Heidegger’s ethics, as 
Charles Bernstein and Günter  Figal have? We can start questioning the motives of 
those committed to esotericism,29 and to someone apparently  enthralled by  Nietzsche, 
a writer who planned on having posthumous effects, which gives his writings more re-
levance for readers now. In  Lacanian terms, Nietzsche fashioned himself into a struc-
turing absence (“to be ignited in 300 years”). In his own writings, Cavell follows the 
lead of other philosophers, like Kant,  who suggest  a continual probing  of one’s own 
motives.30  It seems time for students and followers of Cavell to follow  Bernstein’s 
example in questioning Cavell, who admits he has not thought enough about these 
matters related to Heidegger and Nietzsche. If Cavell  has not  thought enough about it, 
they certainly have not.
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A Brief Encounter with Cavell in Amsterdam 
DARKO ŠTRAJN
Stanley  Cavell was hardly  known to me before I met him  in person. And then I was 
genuinely  astounded about how, until then in my  own pursuits in philosophy  to come 
to terms with  the (in)famous discrepancies and differences between the Continental 
and Anglo-American philosophy, I had somehow  managed to miss his contributions. 
Besides, I found that even before my  brief encounter  with Cavell I had shared another 
interest with him  not only  in cinema, but also in the specific cinematic genre of melo-
drama. Unfortunately, I could not  refer to Cavell’s “Melodrama of the Unknown 
Woman” in my  own book on melodrama, written in the little-known Slovenian lan-
guage in 1988.1 Cavell actually  published the chapter on psychoanalysis and drama 
already  in 1989, but the book Contesting Tears, of which  this chapter  was made part 
of, wasn’t published before 1996. 
Anyway, I met Cavell when he visited the University  of Amsterdam in  1998, 
when I happened to be an “academic visitor”  for a few months there on a grant for 
scholars from the countries aspiring to enter the European Union. It must have been 
in  April of that year, when Professor Mieke Bal at Amsterdam  School for Cultural 
Analysis (graduate school attached to the University  of Amsterdam) announced the 
visit of professor Stanley  Cavell—“known as a  representative of skepticism”—In the 
frame of a program  of “Spinoza lectures.” Subsequently, Cavell took part in  three days 
of seminar for the faculty  at the Department of Philosophy, dedicated to his seminal 
book The Claim of Reason. Of course, I remember it  being a great intellectual pleas-
ure to have had the privilege to share with some twenty  or so other participants of the 
conference. However, since I have read the book more thoroughly  only  after the con-
ference, I cannot really  recall in any  detail what Cavell and the members of his lively 
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and active audience imparted. The text of “The Claim,”  which I read with  great inter-
est after  I returned home from  Amsterdam—apart from  two or  three chapters that  I 
read immediately  before the seminar—later “over-scribed”  and, hence,  besieged the 
spoken words from that conference in my memory. 
Afterwards Cavell also gave a lecture for  a  much larger audience of at least three 
hundred listeners at the University’s special place auditorium of the “Lutherse Kerk.”2 I 
shall never  forget Cavell’s simultaneously  scholarly  and seriously  frivolous twist  from 
this lecture, which was accompanied by  the clip of a sequence from Minelli’s film The 
Band Wagon (1953). Of course, I cannot quote word for  word what Cavell said in that 
lecture,  but I definitely  remember the line of his thinking and the rhetoric, which as 
they  were, aimed to cause an  effect of illuminating astonishment  among the sophisti-
cated listeners.  When he addressed the above-mentioned relationship between the 
Anglo-American and Continental philosophy,  he pointedly  raised a  question of the con-
tent of thought based on these two distinctive paradigms. Acknowledging a large scope 
of thought by  such philosophers as Descartes, Hegel, Nietzsche,  Heidegger and so on, 
Cavell asked (himself) whether  it was possible at all that  such dimensions of thought as 
in their philosophies were not reflected in the Anglo-American culture. The answer to 
his question elicited at first some giggling and appreciative laughter an instant later, 
when the lecturer’s point got fully  assimilated in our  comprehension. Needless to say, 
what  continental philosophers had devised in  their  work was not absent  from  Anglo-
American  culture; the ideas that the empiricist,  positivist and analytical philosophi-
es—and, moreover, not all of them  strictly  “geographically” American or  British—did 
not really  considered, were “given voice” in literature, in Shakespeare’s tragedies, in 
writings of transcendentalists Emerson and Thoreau,  later  in  the novels of Henry 
James, and in Hollywood films. To illustrate his point,  Cavell explicitly  compared Hegel 
to Fred Astaire, at once condensing in his words the “master—slave”  dialectics,  the rela-
tionship of concepts of the particular  vs. the idea of totality  or the whole,  American his-
tory, questions of aesthetics,  economy  and metaphysics. So, as it was expressed in Cav-
ell’s slightly  “provocative” tone,  dancing and singing on film  are acts of thinking and 
performing philosophy. Undoubtedly, a  number of themes, which were touched upon 
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in the lecture in a rather condensed and rhetorically  accentuated manner, could be 
found throughout Cavell’s works,  but rarely  in such a straight, clear-cut and revealing 
form. To illustrate the point, let me just take an example from  his treatise on Thoreau’s 
Walden.3 He claims that Walden was “written in a  pre-philosophical moment of its cul-
ture,” when also a range of different disciplines from  philosophy  to politics had not 
been separated; and then Cavell proceeds: “This pre-philosophical moment, measured 
in American time, occurred before the German and the English traditions of philosophy 
began to shun one another, and I hoped that if I could show Walden to cross my  own 
philosophical site, I might thereby  re-enact  an old exchange between these traditions.” 
I cannot go further than this in this short piece. Allow  me just to mention that  after 
making this point, he embarks on a dialogue with Derrida and Levi-Strauss regarding 
the “idea of literature as ecriture.”4 I dare to say  that Cavell’s enormous contribution, 
which through the concept of (Descartes-based) skepticism  brought up a new vision of 
intellectual dialogue, still needs to resonate in  maybe some yet  unconceivable space or 
framework of thinking. Cavell’s writing  touches upon not only  relationships between 
different “systems” (or in  some articulations “paradigms”) of philosophy, but  also be-
tween different  levels, forms of expression and genres, of which his expanding of Aus-
tin’s concept of the ordinary  language philosophy  into the broader “philosophy  of the 
ordinary”  is just one explicit case. His works—no matter how much they  are maybe 
seen as such in some “unfriendly” American philosophies—cannot  be read at all as an 
advocacy  of the “European”  philosophy  against the “American” one, but strictly  as an 
affirmation of mutual recognition, exchange and suggestion of an eye-opening intellec-
tual (however not necessarily  only  sophisticated) experience. When he discusses posi-
tivism  and deconstruction, he points out  that “the appeal to mathematical logic for its 
algorithmic value is an appeal to its sublime inscriptional powers (of alignment, rewrit-
ing, iteration,  substitution,  and so on).”5 Much such discernment clearly  bears witness 
to his deep philosophical impartiality  regarding the gap between two cultures and two 
“logics” of thought. On the other hand, his great  book on Wittgenstein is in many  re-
spects a case for positivist philosophy in the areas of its strength.
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Cavell undoubtedly  anticipated some currents and new areas of thinking, 
which could be now clearly  illustrated in a number of “post-post-structuralist” phi-
losophies and, even more,  in a variety  of new  combinations of the interdisciplinary 
humanities. After  all, the publication of his first book on film  (The World Viewed, 
1971) for  almost a decade preceded the renowned Deleuze’s Image-mouvement 
(1981), let alone more recent contributions of “filmosophy.”
As for the detail of associating Astaire to philosophy, I found out that before 
1998 Cavell mentioned Astaire and his dancing just more or less sporadically. There-
fore,  his point in the lecture at  the “Lutherse Kerk”  could not have resulted from his 
previous work.  What did sound as a bit frivolous cerebral “arrogation,” became only  a 
few years later a well-founded philosophical analysis, within which  Astaire is brought 
into a dialogue with, among others, Immanuel Kant. Pointing out the emphases on the 
reading  of individual works of art, Cavell says: “I think of this emphasis as letting a 
work of art have a  voice in what philosophy  says about  it, and I regard that  attention as 
a way  of testing whether the time is past in which  taking seriously  the philosophical 
bearing of a particular work of art can be a measure of the seriousness of philosophy.”6
But let me come back to where I began. My  personal encounter  with Cavell ex-
ceeded only  my  presence among the audience. One day  after  the seminar on “The 
Claim” a small group of five or  six went for a coffee outside a  bar near new Amster-
dam  city  hall. There I had a chance to talk to Cavell directly  and I caught his interest 
by  telling him that  I wrote my  dissertation on Johann G. Fichte, and that  I found out 
that some American colleagues had never  heard of him. He then explained that even 
he himself in  his formal philosophy  curriculum  had hardly  heard of even Descartes, 
let alone all notorious German philosophers. We exchanged some views on the then 
already  gone attempts of a dialogue between post-structuralism  and some Anglo-
American philosophies, which seemed to share somewhat similar  conceptual attitude 
towards language, and in the end we were grateful of the coincidence, which  brought 
about Ludwig Wittgenstein.
CONVERSATIONS                                                                                                                                                                        4 76
6. Cavell, Philosophy the Day after Tomorrow  (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Har-
vard University Press, 2006), 10.
Cynical Self-Doubt and the Grounds of 
Sympathy: A Response to Stanley Cavell’s 
“Knowing and Acknowledging”
SAM CARDOEN
The Goals of “Knowing and Acknowledging”
The foundational essay  of Stanley  Cavell’s oeuvre, “Knowing and Acknowledging,” 
prepares the author’s continued interest in sceptical doubt about the existence of 
other minds as well as his specific approach to this particular philosophical problem. 
One useful way  of approaching “Knowing and Acknowledging” is to suggest that it 
addresses the other minds sceptic so as to excavate alongside him  the underlying 
ground from which  his doubt about the existence of other minds emerges. Cavell,  in 
other words, appears to compose his argument  in such a  way  as to lead the sceptic 
along a series of steps that  demonstrate that his sceptical doubt does not simply  exist 
as a self-contained or self-standing problem. In doing so, Cavell traces the emergence 
of sceptical doubt  about other  minds to a specific anxiety  about our reliance on ex-
pressions of sympathy  as a way  of responding to the suffering of others. Cavell argues 
that the sceptic subsequently  intellectualizes this anxiety  into sceptical doubt.  Cavell 
explicitly  does not  seek to refute the sceptic; he even accepts that the sceptic’s intel-
lectual doubt is, in its way, valid. For Cavell,  to try  to straightforwardly  refute scepti-
cal doubt is simply  to accept the terms on which it presents itself,  and thereby  to ex-
tend the sceptic’s view. Instead,  Cavell tries to get the sceptic to a  point where he will 
regard the nature, and the origins, of his doubt differently than he did before. 
Cavell does not disparage the sceptic’s position of doubt,1 nor does he want to 
refute it.  His angle of approach is to sympathetically  inhabit the sceptical position, 
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even as he questions the role which it plays for  the sceptic, which  he does by  suggest-
ing that the sceptic’s doubt is in fact an intellectualization. By  taking this double posi-
tion, in which he both sympathetically  inhabits and inspects the sceptic’s position, 
Cavell seeks to gain the sceptic’s trust to alter his self-understanding. Still, Cavell’s 
claim to insight into the origin of the sceptic’s doubt is not meant as a presumptuous 
claim to intellectual superiority. Rather, Cavell recognizes a  sense of limitation which 
the sceptic intellectualizes. It is the sceptic who claims a superior  position by  reinter-
preting an unsettling awareness of his finitude—of his ineluctable separateness from 
others, which he regards as a  form  of powerlessness—into a doubt  about the validity 
of our belief in the existence of other  minds. He does so by  reinterpreting ordinary 
language-games in such a way as to arrive at sceptical doubt.
For  Cavell,  it is an initial dissatisfaction with  our  reliance on expressions of 
sympathy  as a way  of responding to the suffering of others which specifically  is to be 
understood as the underlying ground from  which sceptical doubt will emerge. The 
central purpose of “Knowing and Acknowledging” is to restore the sceptic to the di-
mension of ordinary  interaction which his sceptical doubt, and its underlying cause, 
have left unsettled. This goal also explains Cavell’s sympathetic approach to the scep-
tic’s position: by  relying  on the power of penetration of the sympathetic imagination, 
Cavell intends to demonstrate that it  allows him  to better  understand the sceptic than 
the sceptic understands himself. This is meant  to indicate to the sceptic that his spe-
cific anxiety  about sympathy, which  Cavell interprets as the underlying cause from 
which his doubt arose, is unfounded. He so enables the sceptic to return to the ex-
pression of sympathy as a way of responding to others who suffer.
This Paper: Its Goals
This paper constitutes a  critical reply  to the line of argument Cavell  develops in 
“Knowing and Acknowledging.” The above introduction, while rudimentary  and all 
too brief, should nevertheless suffice for the purpose of listing the goals of this paper:
(1) The first goal of this paper is to argue that  it  is possible to articulate an al-
ternate way  of portraying the specific anxiety  about sympathy  which underlies the 
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emergence of sceptical doubt about other  minds. I will repurpose an early  essay  of 
Cavell’s on Samuel Beckett’s play  Endgame to help render  this alternate account. 
Cavell’s strategy  is to prove to the sceptic,  as he conceives him, the power, or  the 
depth of penetration, of the sympathetic imagination. The sceptic, as I conceive of 
him, requires something altogether different. He requires a demonstration of the le-
gitimacy of our reliance on expressions of sympathy. He is haunted by  a sense that, 
in  relying on expressions of sympathy, we only  truly  serve ourselves, not  others.  This 
anxiety  is the reason he believes our reliance on sympathy  to be illegitimate, to be 
without grounds. The problem, as my  sceptic sees it, is not  that we cannot rely  on 
sympathy  to provide us with adequate insight into the other’s experiences; it is in-
stead that expressions of sympathy  are unwittingly  deceptive, self-serving ploys that 
do little to relieve the other’s suffering: sympathy  allows us to ignore the other’s suf-
fering. In my reading, this anxiety is what gives rise to the problem of other minds. 
 (2) As such, I uncover an internal connection between the problem  of other 
minds and the problem of cynical self-doubt. I should briefly  explain, then, what I 
mean here by  the notion of cynical self-doubt, the description of which I have bor-
rowed from  South African novelist J.M. Coetzee’s critical writings.2 For  Coetzee, a 
person who is struck by  cynical self-doubt is convinced that  he is always inevitably 
self-interested, even when he seeks not to be self-interested. Nevertheless, he can 
only  know in an abstract sense that  he, and all of the common or established prac-
tices he is likely  to follow, are ruled by  self-interest.  He cannot pinpoint the exact or 
final nature of his self-interest or the particular shape which it  takes in particular  in-
stances. That  is to say, any  sincere attempt to give a truthful account of himself, his 
motives,  of his actions or of his practices is itself inevitably  biased; and any  attempt to 
uncover  the underlying bias so as to eliminate it must in  turn be biased, so that he is 
compelled to submit his sense of self to an endless process of self-revision. While an 
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2. We can find Coetzee’s  description in his comments on the problem of truth  in  autobiogra-
phy. In Doubling the  Point, a  collection  of essays with  accompanying  interviews which was published 
in  1991, Coetzee discusses (391-392) his 1985  essay “Confession  and Double Thoughts: Tolstoy, Rous-
seau, Dostoevsky.” This essay was itself more or less  coincided with a  lecture which  Coetzee gave at the 
University  of Cape Town  in  1984, with  the title Truth in Autobiography, which  helpfully  summarizes 
Coetzee’s sense of the problem. In  short, In Doubling the  Point, Coetzee describes  himself as one who 
is stuck, or who moves, between a  position  of  cynicism and a position  of  grace; the cynic believes auto-
biography  can only lead to a self-interested account of  oneself, whereas the person who aspires to 
grace wishes  to believe that we can, finally, see ourselves clearly. In  his critical remarks from  1984 and 
1985, Coetzee links this issue to a tradition of writers which most notably includes Fyodor Dostoevsky.
orthodox reading of “Knowing and Acknowledging” does not help clarify  our sense of 
an internal link between the problem of other minds and the problem of cynical self-
doubt, Cavell’s essay  on Beckett’s Endgame does lend itself to this approach. By  por-
traying the anxiety  underlying sceptical doubt about the existence of other  minds in 
an alternate fashion, I uncover the link between the problem  of other minds and the 
problem of cynical self-doubt, and I use Cavell’s views of Beckett to take this step. 
(3) I also devise a tailored way  of defusing the specific form of anxiety  about 
sympathy  which, in my  alternate account, underlies both the problem  of other  minds 
and the problem  of cynical self-doubt. In doing so, I try  to follow in the footsteps of 
Cavell’s attempt to sympathetically  imagine himself into the position of the other 
minds sceptic so as to alter his self-understanding.  The most  important goal of this 
paper  is,  much like Cavell’s goal, a  return to sympathy  as a proper response to the 
suffering of others.  But I propose an alternate way  in which we can secure this return 
to sympathy, since I conceive the anxiety that underlies its loss altogether differently. 
(4) Finally, in relation to the critical study  of Cavell’s works, I would briefly 
suggest that this paper,  if only  implicitly, presents a  counterweight to the tendency  to 
accept  (Cavell’s essays on) Shakespeare as the main literary  prism through which to 
approach his philosophical thought on the subject of sceptical doubt. Typically, this 
critical approach is one that, to my  mind,  all  too comfortably  accepts Cavell’s use of a 
conceptual dichotomy  between avoidance and acknowledgment  as a tool to interpret 
scepticism.3 Avoidance is the underlying condition from which scepticism as a failure 
to acknowledge arises. Cavell gleans this dichotomy  from his reading of Shakespeare. 
I will present the cynical sceptic as one whose doubt begins in a desire to possess the 
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3. See, for  instance, Stephen Mulhall, Stanley Cavell: Philosophy’s  Recounting of the Ordi-
nary (New York: Oxford University  Press, 1994). For  Mulhall, the discovery of  the actual role of  crite-
ria in  our lives  goes alongside “the discovery of our own  responsibility—our responsiveness—in  the 
existence of others”  (114). We must realise that “[t]he knowledge which such  criteria  [of pain] confer 
imposes a call on [us]—for  comfort, succor, healing; [a call by  the other] for a  response which  helps to 
assuage the pain  or to acknowledge that the pain is unassuagable” (110). The sceptic is  “right to sus-
pect that there is more to knowing that someone is in pain  than  the mere satisfaction  of criteria.”  “But 
by  concluding from this  that we cannot reach the inner life of others, by  thinking that a  human’s  be-
haviour leaves us uncertain of  the nature and even the existence of her inner life, the sceptic himself 
refuses the responsibility  for those criteria,” since he fails  to depend on criteria  of pain to inform  and 
guide his  discriminate responses to the other’s expressions of  need and pain. Mullhall’s reading, which 
is faithful  to Cavell  and faithfully  adopts  his understanding of the sceptic’s  failure to acknowledge or 
avoidance, clashes with  the alternative line of  thinking  I propose in this paper, in which the sceptic, 
from  the very  start, wants to be absolutely responsive to the other so as to bring an absolute form of 
relief  to the other. This  reading implies that the sceptic, as  I see him, is  one who cannot accept the fact 
that another’s pain may be “unassuagable.”
other’s suffering.  The cynical sceptic,  then, is not readily  convinced by  the idea that 
his sceptical position is initially  one of avoidance; instead his desire to be absolutely 
responsive is what eventually  leads him  to a  form of paralysis,  and so into avoidance. 
In this approach to other minds scepticism, I conceive of avoidance as the end result 
of a wish to be absolutely responsive, but never simply as the starting point of doubt. 
“Knowing and Acknowledging” on the Problem of Other Minds
 
In “Knowing and Acknowledging,”  Cavell, following in the footsteps of Wittgenstein, 
relates the problem of other  minds to the problem of suffering.  The other minds scep-
tic suggests that we cannot know with certainty  that there are in fact other  minds, be-
cause we are confined to the other’s expressions, in this case of suffering, in establish-
ing that he is a sentient being.  Since we cannot guarantee that his expressions of suf-
fering are not  in reality  produced by  a sophisticated robot or by  an automaton, we 
cannot be sure that an actual other mind exhibits them, and, thus, that other minds 
do in fact exist. For  us to know with certainty  that there are in fact other minds, we 
would have to be able to experience the exact instance of suffering which  the other 
experiences as he experiences it.  That is, to show beyond any  doubt  that the other  ex-
ists, we would need to have a direct and unmediated access to his perspective. This 
position itself can be restated as saying that we would need to be able to be the other 
to rebut sceptical doubt. The sceptic argues that, since we cannot  be the other and 
experience those specific instances of experience he lives as a separate being, we can-
not possibly establish beyond all doubt that the other exists. 
Following Wittgenstein, Cavell tackles the sceptic’s position by  suggesting  that 
the sceptic’s problem  crosses two distinct language-games. In a first  language-game, 
we express sympathy  as a  form of acknowledgment of the other. If I say  “I know how 
you feel”  or “I know you are in pain,” I ordinarily  mean to express sympathy, and in 
doing so, I show that your suffering affects me. In a  second language-game, I rely  on 
the phrase “I know”  to claim  certainty,  or a  privileged position that allows me to 
make a claim to knowledge. If we are in a museum  and I claim  that we are looking at 
an early  Picasso, you may  try  to dispute my  claim. You may  try  to argue that I am 
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wrong and that we are in  fact looking at a late Picasso. If I go on to dispute your 
claim, you  can try  to end our argument by  saying that you “know” that this is a late 
work of Picasso, since you wrote a dissertation on the evolution of style in Picasso’s 
oeuvre. Given your  background in art history,  you are in  a  privileged position to stake 
your claim and correct my  error. I am  likely  to accept your  claim, unless I happen to 
know that you are making up things and in reality  know little about Picasso’s oeuvre. 
I also would have to supply  an account of some the actual features of Picasso’s later 
works. 
Cavell argues that the sceptic’s problem arises because he crosses these two dif-
ferent uses of “I know.”4 The sceptic is one who reinterprets our acknowledgment of 
the other’s pain,  “I know you  are in pain,”  as a knowledge claim  about the other’s inner 
state. In crossing the first  and the second language-game, in which “I know”  play  dif-
ferent roles, he argues that  the other  is always in a privileged position with respect to 
himself, so that we can never be in a privileged position with respect to another. 
Cavell’s sympathetic account of the sceptic’s position is one in which he does 
not  aim to discard the sceptic’s crossing of language-games as a foolish error.  Cavell’s 
approach to sceptical doubt is to be understood as an attempt to bring to light the 
form of disquietude that underlies the emergence of the problem of other minds.  The 
sceptic, insofar that he is confronted with the other’s pain, finds that his confronta-
tion with the other’s pain,  and his recognition of the possibility  that the other  is able 
to suppress it, has made him  singularly  aware of the other’s status as a  separate be-
ing. But he goes on to interpret this awareness as an intellectual problem. 
 There are, in Cavell’s account of this process, specific conditions in place that 
allow the sceptic to develop his doubt  by  crossing language games. There is, in other 
words, a ‘when’ that accompanies “what we say” if we are led to speak sceptically. 
Cavell investigates the sceptic’s interest in the occasion on which another  person is 
led to remark: “I know  I am  in pain.” This remark Cavell reads as an expression of 
exasperation.5 It is used when the other does not want to reveal his suffering to us, for 
instance out of shame, even though we in fact have sought  to acknowledge it: “I can 
tell something is wrong with you; you must be in a lot of distress.” The sceptic,  how-
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5. See ibid., 256.
ever, interprets the significance of the remark “I know I am in pain” differently  in 
light of a superficial similarity  between the language-games of claiming knowledge 
and acknowledgment. That is to say, the simple fact that we can withhold the proper 
recognition or expression of our suffering, for Cavell, can lead the sceptic into doubt:
[T]he fact that another person may  now  be in pain yet not acknowledge that 
he is in pain, is the same as, or seems to entail, the fact that he now  knows 
that he is in pain; and this turns into the (imagined?) fact—or is read as the 
(imagined) fact)—that he is now certain that he is in pain. And from this 
point, the rest  of the argument is forced upon us,  seems undeniable: How 
does he know (what is his certainty  based on)? Because he feels (has) it (the 
fact that he feels (has) it). But obviously  I can’t feel it,  I can’t have the same 
feeling  he has, his feeling; so I can never be certain another person is in 
pain. Moreover, even if he tells me, he might only be feigning, etc., etc. 6 
 
In Cavell’s view, the idea that the other may  suffer, but is able to suppress expressing 
it,  causes the sceptic’s anguish, since it leads to a  picture of the other as one who, 
through  access to his inner states, now knows what we cannot  know because it  has 
not  been outwardly  expressed. The sceptic intellectualizes this anguish into sceptical 
doubt by  crossing the language-game of acknowledging (one’s own or another’s) suf-
fering and the language-game by  which we make knowledge claims. Thus, the scep-
tic’s feeling of powerlessness, which he experiences when confronted with the sepa-
rate other as one who suffers but fails to give proper expression  to it, “presents itself 
as ignorance—a metaphysical finitude [presents itself] as an intellectual lack.”7 The 
crossing allows the sceptic to present the other as one who has what he cannot pos-
sess, or have access to, i.e., the other’s specific instance of the experience of pain.  
In response,  Cavell emphasizes that the other is one who “is impaled upon 
his knowledge” 8 of his suffering. The sceptic’s doubt, by  contrast, allows him  to at-
tribute to the other a sense of mastery  in which  he possesses access to his pain. The 
other, in the sceptic’s account, has access to his own experiences in a way  that the 




sceptic does not. And by  conceiving of the other’s relation to his suffering in this 
way, the sceptic suppresses the powerlessness that he experiences in  the face of the 
other’s suffering. It is, for Cavell, rather  unhelpful to think of the other as one who 
has access to a secret garden from which we are debarred by  our ordinary  finitude;9 
or  it is, at  the very  least, unhelpful to do so insofar that one does not wish to turn to 
the other into an intellectual problem, but rather  relate to him  as a person subject 
to suffering. 
Similarly, the problem  of solipsism can take hold if I, with respect to myself, 
reinterpret the “I know”  in  “I know  I am in pain.”  When I reinterpret the expres-
sion, I find I can conceive of my  relation to my  suffering in such a way  as to allow 
myself a  sense of mastery, or  of privileged access. This sense is disallowed by  our 
ordinary  subjection to suffering, which itself now goes unacknowledged as it be-
comes intellectualized. I appease the underlying feeling of shame or  exposure that 
drives me to reply  to an acknowledgment of my  suffering with  the answer, “I know  I 
am in pain.” 
Still,  Cavell not only  indicates that the sceptical position allows us a  sense of 
mastery  that is disallowed by  the ordinary  experience of being subject to suffering. 
He also shows that we can understand and notice when another person suppresses 
his suffering and fails to give proper expression to it, just as we are able to recognize 
that someone’s statement “I know I am  in pain” constitutes an attempt to repress his 
suffering. And he applies this very  fact to the sceptic’s case itself. That  is to say, Cav-
ell appears to approach the sceptic’s intellectualization of his anguish  as a failure to 
give to it its proper expression. The sceptic is presented as one who suffers at  the 
hands of other’s possible suffering, but who fails to acknowledge as much, opting in-
stead to intellectualize his anxiety  into sceptical doubt. By  taking this approach, 
Cavell has conceived of the sceptic’s doubt itself as a target for  sympathetic under-
standing,  so as to undermine the anxiety  that allows the doubt to emerge. He tries to 
prove, in other words, that  it is misguided to think that we are never in a better posi-
tion in respect to the other  than the other is in respect  to himself. And that  we can in 
fact  help the other, who suppresses his pain, by  providing the right words to express 
it.  For this is the actual goal of Cavell’s approach, as opposed to an attempt to show 
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that he has outsmarted the sceptic. Cavell does not want to better  understand the 
sceptic than the sceptic understands himself to outwit him, but to help him with his 
struggle.
Cavell intends to show the sceptic that  the impossible desire to be the other, to 
undo one’s separateness so as to gain complete intimacy  with  the other, is an unnec-
essary  desire, since the power of the sympathetic imagination is such that we can rely 
on it to penetrate the other’s thoughts in  ways that the other may  himself not even 
have expected or  foreseen. This, Cavell indicates, is one of the sources of our grati-
tude to literature. Literature is capable of revealing aspects of our  own experience of 
which we lost  sight  because we did not express properly, by  which we failed to take 
possession of them. Cavell tries to write a  philosophical essay  that  can play  the same 
role for  philosophical scepticism about the existence of other minds. Crucially, the 
depths Cavell’s sympathetic imagination plumbs are not simply  depths of intellectual 
discernment. Cavell wants the sceptic to recognize that he himself has struggled with 
a doubt which the sceptic still entertains in its original form. And he wants him to see 
that, in reading Cavell’s essay, he too can work through that doubt. 
This search for trust  explains Cavell’s indirect  approach. His essay  is written 
in  such a way  as both to require and allow its target to think along with the author 
as he leads him through a series of steps that culminate in a  compelling affirmation 
of the power of expression and sympathetic understanding: “To know you  are in 
pain is to acknowledge it, or to withhold the acknowledgment.—I know your pain 
the way  you do.”  10  Cavell’s strategy, then, involves gradually  building a bond of 
trust with the sceptic, since, for the sceptic, there is the “problem  of making […] ex-
periences known […] because one hasn’t the forms of words at one’s command to 
release those feelings, and one hasn’t anyone else whose interest  in helping to find 
the words one trusts.” 11 Cavell takes the role of looking for the words with which the 
sceptic can safely  release the anxiety  and shame underlying his doubt.  And he is able 
to assume that particular role because his strategy  of composition portrays him as 
working, or  having worked at  the very  least, along the same path which the sceptic 
now follows. In sum, Cavell’s strategy  of gradual identification  with the sceptic is 
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meant to defuse the feelings of shame and exposure which, in his account, will lead 
to the emergence of the problem  of other minds, the problem  of privacy  and the 
problem of solipsism.
  
The Problem of Suffering Intellectualized
There seems to be a fundamental problem with  Cavell’s approach: it itself reads as 
the result of a  process of intellectualization; to put it  differently,  Cavell’s approach is 
at the very least marked by the process of intellectualization he tries to uncover.  
Cavell’s soothing of the sceptic’s anxiety, in which he stresses that the other 
is one who is impaled upon his knowledge of his suffering rather than one who has 
supreme cognitive access to it, and to which  idea he then responds by  validating the 
penetrative power  of sympathy, cuts off the path to an alternative understanding I 
would pursue instead. The same counts for  Cavell’s appreciation of the sceptic’s ini-
tial noble intentions: “He begins with a full appreciation  of the decisively  significant 
fact” that “others may  be suffering and I not know,”  which leads him  to become 
“enmeshed […] in questions of whether we can have the same suffering, one an-
other’s suffering.”12 The problem  of the suffering is,  in most  cases, hardly  captured 
by  the insistence that it may  be that others suffer while we are somehow unaware of 
it. The problem with the suffering of others is usually  not  that  we are unaware of its 
occurrence, but rather  that we are deeply  aware of it, and that we are at  the same 
time powerfully  aware of our powerlessness to alleviate it.  Similarly, in suffering we 
are not primarily  impaled upon our  knowledge of our suffering,  but rather  upon our 
suffering itself, even if we can grant that  the emotion of shame can exacerbate our 
experiences of suffering. I would suggest,  then, that  his attempt to inhabit and work 
through the sceptic’s intellectualized position has lead Cavell to retain certain as-
pects of the sceptic’s general sense of the type of problem our separateness must 
lead to.
 
“I Feel Your Pain”: Survivor’s Guilt
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By  beginning from  the point of view  that the problem  of suffering is that  we often are 
aware of it  yet  feel powerless to do much about it, we can begin to think differently 
about the emergence of sceptical doubt as a response to the suffering of others. The 
problem now becomes not whether the sympathetic imagination is able to penetrate 
deeply  enough so as to provide an understanding of the other’s motives. Instead,  the 
issue shifts to the question as to whether our  reliance on expressions of sympathy  is 
legitimate. Cavell’s “Ending the Waiting Game: A Reading  of Beckett’s Endgame”  can 
help us clarify  why  this is so, just as it  can help us reconceptualise the emergence of 
the problem of other minds insofar as it is linked to the problem of cynical self-doubt.
Cavell’s essay  on Beckett  portrays Hamm, Endgame’s protagonist, as one who 
suffers from survivor’s guilt that drives him into self-denial, madness, and so tyranny. 
The goal of Hamm’s tyranny  is to see all life,  including his own, extinguished.  But, 
because he is both  blind and wheelchair-bound, Hamm  needs the help of Clov. As 
Hamm’s servant, Clov  has to check for  signs of life on the horizon, peering out of the 
windows of the bunker in which they  both live. That is to say, Clov  has to verify  for 
Hamm that all life has been extinguished. As such, it is obvious to the reader that 
Hamm can never be certain  that what remains of life inside the bunker is all that re-
mains of life in its entirety. And it  is equally  obvious that,  as long as Hamm and Clov 
survive, their survival constitutes a  negation of Hamm’s primary  goal. This basic set-
up identifies Endgame as a  literary  attempt to reflect  on  the sources of an attitude of 
paralyzed melancholy, which the play then identifies as a symptom of survivor’s guilt.
Endgame is a reply  to the biblical story  of Noah,  in which God exterminates all 
human life on earth  with  the exception of Noah’s family.  In the biblical story, Ham  is 
one of the sons of Noah  and so survives the flood.  He falls out of favour with  his fa-
ther, because he finds Noah naked in a drunken stupor. Noah is naked not only  in a 
literal but also in a figurative sense.  He is naked in a  figurative sense because the rea-
son God singled him out for survival was that he was supposedly  a  righteous and wor-
thy  man. Now, however, he has shown himself to be flawed not only  because of his 
inebriation, but also because his shame at Ham’s knowledge of his flaw drives him  to 
the act of cursing his son  and his progeny. Ham’s encounter  with Noah, then, is a 
subplot  that speaks to the impossibility  of human fruitfulness without the risk of 
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transgression and failure. Noah’s cultivation of wine, in this story, symbolizes his ful-
filment of the task of fruitfulness which God imposes under his renewed covenant 
with  mankind. At the same time, Noah’s abuse of drink is meant to draw  our  atten-
tion to the fact that  he is still liable to weakness of will and a capacity  for error. The 
basic tension which  Beckett detects and expertly  explores lies in  the fact  that Noah 
repeats the exact same tendencies that led to God’s choice to destroy mankind.
In Endgame,  two further survivors who also live inside the bunker are 
Hamm’s parents, Nagg and Nell, whom  Hamm keeps confined to trashcans with 
Clov’s help.  Nagg is Beckett’s version of the biblical Noah. In Beckett’s play, it  is he 
who is subjected to punishment by  Hamm, in what constitutes a  reversal of the pun-
ishment Ham is subjected to in the original story.  In  response, Cavell reads Hamm as 
one who, having seen his father  for what he truly  is, believes God was wrong to spare 
him  and his family.13  God ought not  to have made an exception for  Noah,  since 
Hamm knows Noah simply  to be an ordinary  flawed man, just as those who were 
killed in the flood by  God. Given his father’s ordinary  flaws, Nagg cannot justify  the 
fact that he and his family  were saved whereas others were left  to die, since Noah was 
supposedly  saved by  God because he was a  righteous man. By  seeking to extinguish 
his own life and that of his family, Hamm reminds God he is no different from  those 
who were killed. As such, his desire for self-denial is to be taken as a distorted expres-
sion of solidarity. 
Hamm also wants to extinguish all  other remaining life, because he has come 
to think of life as such as illegitimate. This spite against life can be explained in light 
of a traumatized awareness of the suffering of others. Hamm thinks we are largely 
unconcerned with the fact that there is no reason that we are spared, whereas others 
have to suffer.  If life is blind self-perpetuation, nothing about life, including our own, 
can be redeemed. In Cavell’s reading, Nagg’s apparent lack of concern for  the fact that 
he was saved for  no particular reason is what leads Hamm to see us as inevitably  and 
irredeemably  self-interested. This lack explains why  Hamm  curses his father  and 
considers his renewed task of fruitfulness or  replenishment an entirely  illegitimate 
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one. For Hamm, the fulfilment of God’s new covenant with man can only  reproduce 
the same kind of flawed man God had wanted to eliminate to begin with. 
Hamm believes the only  justified way  of responding  to the suffering of others is 
to share in it. This desire to share in  the suffering of others itself, however, reflects an 
impossible desire to take away  the others’ suffering by  assuming it as one’s own. He 
wants to assume their  suffering to extinguish it for them. This, of course, cannot be 
done. And because it is impossible, he is only  able to respond by  deeming all of life, all 
our practices,  all our pursuits of interests,  and all forms of human expression illegiti-
mate. In the face of the fact of suffering, then, we can be lead to ask ourselves whether 
we are permitted to live our  lives, whether life and its pursuits are not at  heart illegiti-
mate. If we are inclined to answer  this question positively, we are led to hold a  view of 
life in which the only  proper  way  to live is to fix ourselves to despair and to melan-
choly. We find ourselves perpetually  at odds with life. The melancholy  person despairs 
of his own irrepressible participation in life,  but,  despite his intense wish for  self-
denial, finds himself unable to end life. Hamm, after all, continues to live. In melan-
choly, we are at best able to colour  our inevitable attachment to life and the pursuit  of 
our interests with a sense of reticence. In  fact, Hamm cannot properly  express his de-
sire for  self-denial. In doing so, Hamm would express a  desire, which itself is an act 
that his worldview cannot condone. This is an  alternate articulation of the frustrated 
logic of Endgame, since it explains why Hamm is alive but immobilized. 
Cavell himself describes Hamm’s self-mortification by  stating that “[s]olitude, 
emptiness, nothingness, meaninglessness, silence”  are, contrary  to what is by  now a 
hackneyed interpretation of Beckett, “not the givens of Beckett’s characters but their 
goal, their  new heroic undertaking.”14  In  Endgame,  Hamm specifically  asks Clov: 
“We’re not beginning to mean something?”  Clov  laughs: “Mean something! You and 
I,  mean something!”  Despite Clov’s swift dismissal of Hamm’s worry, the interchange 
is such that the spectator is led to infer that these characters mean to mean nothing. 
Hamm’s worldview is, of course, irreparably  flawed. The unforgiving view that 
all of our pursuits or interests are inherently  illegitimate allows us to avoid the diffi-
culties we face in finding suitable and sufficiently  subtle answers to the question as to 
how we ought to live our lives as moral beings. The rejection of any  pursuit qua pur-
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suit also reflects the disappointment which we are bound the experience with the 
limitations of any  attempt to provide a satisfactory  or comprehensive answer to that 
question. The melancholy  of Hamm allows us to suppress the role of judgment in the 
process of separating expressions of interest that constitute a  form of transgression 
from those we can legitimately  retain. All in all, his worldview allows us to avoid the 
inevitable complexities of engaging in a serious and sustained attempt at living and 
contemplating an ethical life, even as it appears to allow us to lay claim to that ideal.
In response to the line of analysis Beckett’s Endgame produces, I will now try 
to develop a philosophical articulation of, and response to, Hamm’s survivor’s guilt. 
Although Beckett achieves a  powerful understanding of this convoluted and highly 
specific experience in Endgame, he does so by  harnessing the tendency  to hyperbole 
that defines it, since hyperbole is part of the skewed self-understanding  survivor’s 
guilt enforces. A  philosophical account is one which, in order to defuse the specific 
anxiety  Beckett’s play  embodies,  must try  to find a  more even-tempered way  of por-
traying survivor’s guilt. To render such a plain account, I discuss the case in which I 
am faced with the other’s suffering and express my  sympathy  by  saying “I feel your 
pain.”  This account should clarify  the way  in which Cavell’s essay  on Beckett allows us 
to think of the emergence of other minds scepticism  differently,  and to clarify  the link 
between the problem of other minds and the problem of cynical self-doubt. 
Ordinarily, our expressions of sympathy  function as a  recognition of the fact 
that we suffer  at the hands of our  ability  to recognize that the other currently  suffers 
the same specific type of suffering we are capable of experiencing.  Still, we not only 
recognize the other’s suffering, but  are also affected by  it.  By  expressing sympathy, we 
release ourselves from the grip the other’s suffering has on us, and help him  to be re-
leased from the way  suffering singles him  out. By  expressing sympathy, however, we 
do not mean to say we feel the same instance of suffering as the one suffering.
Yet, as I understand him, the sceptic is one who believes that, in saying “I feel 
your pain,” he catches himself in a lie. The helplessness he experiences in  light of the 
other’s suffering makes him  reinterpret his words in such a way  that they  no longer 
mean what we ordinarily  mean by  them. His words now appear  to indicate to the 
other that  he is able to experience the instance of suffering which the other suffers, 
even if it is the case that  he cannot,  since he cannot be the other. At  the same time, 
CONVERSATIONS                                                                                                                                                                        4 90
however, he comes to believe that his words commit him  to a  different response to 
the other’s suffering: they  seem to have promised to the other that he can respond to 
the other’s suffering by  experiencing his suffering for him. This is how we arrive in 
the position of Hamm, who experiences a  form of survivor’s guilt, in which we feel we 
ought to be able to suffer in the other’s stead. The sceptic’s words make it seem  to 
him  as if absorbing the other’s suffering is the only  meaningful way  of responding to 
it.  Once the sceptic begins to think as much, he will develop a  superhuman ideal of 
responsiveness which he, in turn, takes to be his responsibility  towards the other.  If 
he cannot absorb the other’s suffering, he believes,  he fails the other; we pass over the 
other’s suffering if we respond to it in any other way than taking possession of it. 
Having caught himself, or so he thinks, in an unforeseen lie, the sceptic will 
take issue with  expressions of sympathy. First of all, he focuses on the fact that our 
expressions of sympathy, as expressions of anguish, have the effect  of releasing us 
from the way  in  which we are gripped by  the other’s suffering. More precisely, he 
starts to think we only  express our  sympathy  to rid ourselves of our concern for the 
other. Secondly, he starts to think that expressions of sympathy  unnecessarily  shift 
attention away  from the other’s suffering to our  own suffering at  the hands of the 
other’s pain. The sceptic is inclined to say  here: what does it matter that we suffer  at 
the hands of the other’s suffering; the other’s suffering itself is what matters! The 
sceptic, in other words, is pained by  a  sense that we cannot get  away  from ourselves 
so as to stay  more radically  faithful to the other. Both  of these elements contribute to, 
and give expression to, the sceptic’s suspicion that he has been fundamentally  self-
interested in expressing his sympathy  with others as they  suffer. This self-interest he 
identifies as having a  specific quality: he did not consciously  pursue it. He believes he 
catches himself in  a  lie, even though he did not intend to lie. He believes he catches 
himself looking out only for himself, even though he never intended to do so.
Once we are struck by  cynical self-doubt, then, we begin to think of ourselves 
as inescapably  self-interested.  We think that even when we try  to go beyond being 
self-interested, we cannot escape self-interest.  The specific nature of our self-interest 
is our blind spot. While we can try  to excavate and analyse our obscured self-interest, 
every  renewed attempt to analyse it is inevitably  marked by  a  new obscured form of 
self-interest. This process of revision can potentially  go on endlessly; the process, at 
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least,  can never reach a truly  satisfactory  end. This,  then,  is another way  of referring 
to the affliction that strikes Hamm, but only  insofar that it constitutes an  intellectual 
version of his tendency  towards self-mortification. In this interpretation, cynical self-
doubt is a problem, or attitude, that arises as an intellectualization of survivor’s guilt. 
Taking  a wider perspective, we can argue that the origin of cynical self-doubt, 
which can  specifically  emerge as an intellectualization of survivor’s guilt, lies in the 
(perceived) occurrence of moral weakness of will (akratic failure).  Cynical self-doubt 
intellectualizes weakness of will: it  appears that we would rather believe that we are 
inescapably  self-interested than accept responsibility  for the fact that we have failed 
to act in  the way  we believe we ought to have acted.15 In the specific case of the scep-
tic’s survivor’s guilt, the way  he feels he ought to act requires him  to outstrip the lim-
its of what is humanly  possible. His reinterpretation of the phrase “I feel your pain” 
leads him  to want to act in accordance with a moral motive that imposes a demand 
that cannot be met. Crucially, it  is the sceptic himself who perceives his failure to 
meet it as an akratic failure; the final part of this paper will question this perception.
At this point, the reader may  wonder: how does this reading of the way  in 
which our  expression of sympathy  “I feel your pain” can lead us to cynical self-doubt 
relate to the problem of other minds? The reasoning I observe here is as follows. The 
sceptic is one who will interpret our  expression of sympathy  “I feel your pain”  by  stat-
ing that it is impossible: “I cannot feel your pain; I cannot have or  take it for  you.” 
This leads him  into cynical self-doubt, because his words lead him  to think we have 
caught ourselves in a lie.  Still, there is a second path he can follow. The idea  that  he 
cannot have the other’s pain, or absorb it  for him by  taking his place,  can be intellec-
tualized into a doubt  about the existence of other minds: “If I cannot take the other’s 
place,  I cannot have his experiences,  so that I cannot know if he even exists in the 
first  place.” This alternate reading of scepticism  about other minds argues that the 
sceptic arrives at his doubt because of a proximity  between the two expressions of 
sympathy  “I feel your pain” and “I know your  pain.”  This proximity  allows us to rein-
terpret our original inability  to feel in  terms of an inability  to know with  certainty. 
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This approach  inverts the way  other minds scepticism was originally  conceived of, 
since the sceptic originally conceived of his inability to know as an inability to feel.  
In sum, the sceptic’s doubt  about other  minds takes hold because a specific set 
of circumstances lead him to believe that the proper way  in which we ought to relate 
to the other’s suffering is one in which we ought  to be able to take the other’s pain 
from him, to have or absorb it for him  so as to extinguish  it for  him. The sceptic intel-
lectualizes his inability  to absorb the other’s pain, to experience it for  him  by  taking 
his place, into a philosophical problem in which his inability  to access the other’s ex-
perience makes him  doubt  the ground of his belief in the other’s existence. The same 
set of conditions can also lead us to assume a position of cynical self-doubt.
It  will seem, then, that the sceptic is faced with an unsettling scenario in which 
he falls prey  at the same time to cynical self-doubt and to other minds scepticism, 
both of which nevertheless still serve to deflect the underlying problem that one has 
been weak-willed. The confluence of these two forms of scepticism, which, in brief, 
are related insofar  that they  are problems of knowledge or truth, can also lead us to 
propagate a specific ethic. This ethic of alterity  advocates passiveness and abjection 
before an Other on whose otherness we can have no grip, and whose very  otherness 
would at  the same time be threatened by  any  attempt we might make to grasp it. This 
version of the ethics of alterity  is a dead end.16 It can provide us with  no guiding sense 
of how to take targeted action for others, nor  can it provide us with a sense of the 
necessary  limits of such action. Finding limits is of the utmost importance to the 
sceptic as I conceive of him, as an  absence of proper  limits leads him to paralysis.  In 
suggesting that the confluence of cynical doubt  and scepticism  about the existence of 
other minds leads to this ethic, I assume that the sceptic’s doubt about the existence 
of other minds entails the problem  of privacy. For the sceptic, the fact that  we may 
recognize the other’s outward expressions as expressions of an inner state cannot 
guarantee that the content  of those inner  states matches ours, which itself has as its 
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corollary  that  we cannot know that those outward expressions express any  type of 
inner state. When the cynic combines his sense that  we cannot trust the other’s ex-
pressions as reliable indexes of inner states with  his sense that we are inevitably  self-
interested, he will think his interpretation of the other’s behaviour is inevitably  bi-
ased and adopt a deferential stance in  which any  judgment of the other is withheld. 
This deferential stance helps to suppress the underlying problem  of weakness of will, 
as no legitimate judgments remain on which the cynic could hope to base his actions. 
Still, it  can also be the case that only  one form  of doubt will take hold: in  this 
case, other  minds scepticism  functions as an alternate intellectualization of our  in-
ability  to absorb the other’s pain, and so provide refuge from cynical self-doubt. 
Other minds scepticism is able to function as a refuge because it  is, all in all, a  more 
static, dispassionate, controlled, and controlling form  of doubt. It provides a stronger 
form of negative mastery  than cynical self-doubt  does. Cavell presents other  minds 
scepticism as a position that allows us to relieve the strain which  our ordinary  reli-
ance upon the notion of another  imposes,  insofar that it abstracts from the responsi-
bility, or  responsiveness, which the other’s expressions entail; it implies a loss of ac-
knowledgment. In our  everyday  interactions with  the other, we are not  meant to take 
the other’s expressions as elements that fail to establish the truth  of his existence; 
they  are not meant, in  their  ordinary  role,  to tell us “how  it is”  with  the other, but 
rather “how it is”  with him.17 Other  minds scepticism  is a form  of doubt that  enables 
us to lose sight of the actual role our notion of another is meant to play. 
To Cavell’s conception of the enabling aspects of scepticism I add another. Un-
like other  minds scepticism, cynical self-doubt is able to affect  our inner life in pro-
foundly  disturbing ways. It can undermine our  everyday  ability  to act as moral 
agents, and it also serves to deflect  the need to take responsibility  for weakness of 
will. It robs the reasons upon which we act of the legitimacy, and so of much of the 
force,  which  they  are supposed to have for us. The problem of other  minds, by  con-
trast, allows us to avoid the endless self-questioning to which cynical self-doubt  leads. 
The seductive picture of the self as an inner realm to which we have privileged and 
unimpeded access, but which at  the same time leaves us locked out from  others, 
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leaves no space for the kind of frenzied self-questioning cynical self-doubt entails, es-
pecially so because the reality of the other as a source of shame loses its grip on us. 
Nevertheless, the above remarks are not meant to imply  that cynical self-doubt 
necessarily  loses out to other  minds scepticism. If we are inclined to cynical self-
doubt, we are likely  to suspect that  sceptical doubt about the existence of other 
minds, as well as the problem of solipsism, serve an ulterior  purpose that we should 
uncover.  This I have done, or perhaps only  in part. Yet the cynical view itself may  be 
doubted. We can also try  to establish what is at stake in cynical self-doubt so as to re-
lease ourselves from  its grip. I have done so, at least in part, by  arguing that cynical 
self-doubt intellectualizes weakness of will: rather  than taking responsibility  for our 
weakness of will, we prefer to believe that we are inevitably  self-interested, and 
thereby  can set  into motion a potentially  endless process of revision of our  particular 
motives.  Still,  there is little chance we will in fact have successfully  undone cynical 
self-doubt in the specific case I have discussed, unless we can show that the moral 
motive in which the sceptic believes is faulty.  A more solid solution requires, then, 
that we demonstrate that the desire to absorb the other’s suffering in order to extin-
guish its impact on him does not have the status of a judicious moral motive, so that a 
failure to live by it cannot be understood as an occurrence of weakness of will. 
Steps to a Solution
As I have said,  the sceptic is led astray  in his assessment of the role of expressions of 
sympathy  in our lives. If we demonstrate this to him, we take a step towards allowing 
him to recover the expression of sympathy as a way of responding to suffering. 
We can reiterate that by  using the expression “I feel your pain” we do not mean 
to express that we are capable of experiencing the other’s pain for him. The words 
never meant this,  so that  the sceptic is wrong to think he catches himself in a lie.  If we 
use expressions of sympathy, we mean to say  that we are affected by  the other’s suffer-
ing exactly because we are able to recognize it as a certain type of suffering.
To this first  point the sceptic will want  to reply: even if that is not what the ex-
pression ordinarily  means, this fact in itself does not  imply  that we ought not to be 
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able to respond to the pain of others by  assuming it for them. In other  words, if we 
stress the sheer  impossibility  of taking the other’s pain, this point may  not suffice to 
change the sceptic’s perspective on the matter. In response, it helps to recall that the 
sceptic’s inability  to allow expressions of sympathy  their rightful role in his response 
to the suffering of others paralyzes him. He holds himself to an absolute standard he 
can never  achieve.  He so condemns himself to radical impotence in the face of the 
other’s suffering. As such, he ends up in the position of the one who lets the suffering 
of others pass him  by. And this is what he accused us of in relying on expressions of 
sympathy; given his view that we ought to be able to respond to the other’s pain  by 
possessing it  emerges in  part due to the fact that he believes others’ to be indifferent 
to the pain of the other, the sceptic is certain to be struck by this line of response. 
The sceptic,  however, is bound to take this second point as a painful blow; it 
will return him  to the type of restless mood in which he began to suspect that expres-
sions of sympathy  are a form  of self-deceit and expressions of a  covert self-interest. 
Instead, he now suspects his suspicion of sympathy  was itself an expression of a cov-
ert  self-interest. Was his obsession with an absolute form  of responsiveness to the 
other’s suffering  simply  a ruse which he played on himself so as to allow him  to ig-
nore the other’s pain,  even if he did not realise this was the case? To disabuse the 
sceptic of this unhelpful cynical line of thought, we can remind him  that he began to 
believe that he was duty-bound to absorb the other’s suffering  in response to an expe-
rience of powerlessness. In light of this reminder, it  should become clear that  his self-
suspicion itself is unfounded: his cynical self-doubt intellectualizes an unsettling ex-
perience of powerlessness, which  it deflects. The idea  that we are inevitably  but ob-
scurely  self-interested, even when we seek not to be, is an  intellectualization of the 
everyday  experience in which we fail to go beyond our self-concern, because we be-
lieve we are simply powerless to do so, or because we are too cowardly to do so. 
Only  now are we in a position, in relation to the sceptic’s cynical self-doubt, to 
stress that expressions of sympathy  are beneficial not only  to those who provide 
them, but  even more so to those who receive them. Those who receive them are com-
forted by  the acknowledgment of their suffering. This point will tackle the sceptic’s 
sense that  expressing his feelings of sympathy  is much like doing nothing at  all. Still, 
expressions of sympathy  are not just symbolical attempts to restore a sense of equal-
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ity  between the one who suffers and the one who sympathizes,  which so pre-empt the 
sense of shame to which  our suffering  exposes us.  If we give expression to our suffer-
ing at the hands of the other’s suffering,  we do not  mean to draw attention away  from 
the other, nor do we simply  seek to release ourselves from  our concern for  him; we 
are truly  affected by  the other’s suffering and wish to show our concern. Moreover, it 
is only  once we are able to release ourselves from the paralysing grip the other’s suf-
fering has on us that we can go beyond the fact of simply  recognizing it. That is to say, 
while the sceptic thinks of expressing sympathy  as at best  an empty  act, and at worst 
as a  cynical and self-interested one, we must see that expressing our  sympathy  can 
function as a  part  of a larger process of responsiveness  by  which we help the other. It 
releases us from the grip of the other’s suffering so that we may  actively intervene to 
alter the circumstances that contribute to it. It  is only  after  we compose ourselves 
that we can start this more comprehensive process of alleviation.
Now, it  is true that often we do not perceive how we can help someone who is 
suffering beyond the act of expressing our sympathy  with him. There appears to be 
nothing or  too little we can actively  do to meaningfully  alter his circumstances. This 
overwhelming feeling of powerlessness is frustrating. Yet  it is also true that we tend 
either to overestimate how much is asked of us or  to underestimate how  much we are 
able to contribute. These are matters in which ethics’ role is to help us gain a sense of 
measure and clarity.  Moreover, it is in  contexts in  which we feel as if we are wholly 
powerless that we must  remind ourselves that expressions of sympathy, which to the 
sceptic seem simply  banal or empty, often have a greater capacity  to comfort than any 
type of direct action that we might take to try  to help others. To express sympathy  is 
to undertake a form of action, however negligible we consider it.
This reminder does not mean the sceptic’s suspicion of sympathy  is entirely 
absurd. In fact, I cannot conclude without making a  few reasonable concessions to 
the sceptic’s point  of view.  To fail to do so may  exacerbate an unwillingness to grant 
the role of sympathy  in our life. Expressions of sympathy  are often abused in  the par-
ticular ways in which the sceptic exclusively, and thereby  wrongly,  presents them. We 
do sometimes express our sympathy  only  to draw attention to ourselves as magnani-
mous facilitators of care, or  because we consider ourselves to be upstanding persons. 
We do sometimes abuse expressions of sympathy  so as to relieve ourselves from a 
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painful awareness of the other’s suffering. Or  we employ  it to force the other  to stifle 
his expressions of suffering, so that  we no longer  have to be confronted with his dis-
tress. By  contrast, we will sometimes rely  on our  ability  to be affected by  the other’s 
suffering as an ability  that  allows us to wallow in it,  to use it as our own personal sen-
timental masochistic indulgence. This attitude is what we might have accused Hamm 
of, if we had regarded him  only  from a sceptical perspective which considers him to 
be a narcissist who in fact does not experience a true bereavement.
The above tendencies can, to a lesser  or to a greater  extent, become parts of 
our character,  should we fail to resist them  and the escape they  provide. Crucially, 
however, they  abuse and distort our  capacity  for sympathy. The fact that our reliance 
on expressions of sympathy  is open to abuse does not  mean we must deny  the role 
they  have in our relations with others.  If we accept that we experience suffering and 
sympathy,  both of which we should properly  express, we can avoid a  cynical attitude 
in which we forego the effort which is required to contemplate, and live, a good life.
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